Religious Freedom Meets Antidiscrimination in Crosspoint v. Makin

 In the ongoing case of Crosspoint v. Makin, the state of Maine finds itself at the center of a constitutional dispute that highlights the tension between religious liberty and anti discrimination principles. The case raises the question of when the government can place conditions on public funding for religious institutions, and whether religious schools can receive taxpayer money while maintaining discriminatory policies.

Maine’s education law guarantees free public education to all students in the state. To ensure equal access to all, the state operates a tuition program that pays for students to attend approved private schools in districts where there may not be any public schools. To qualify for this public funding, participating schools must comply with the Maine Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination based on various protected characteristics, including religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity. 

Crosspoint, a religious private school in Maine, seeks to participate in this tuition program but wants an exemption from the antidiscrimination requirements. The school wants to continue to discriminate against student applicants based on their religion, sexual orientation, and/or identity. The state of Maine denied this exemption. In turn, Crosspoint filed a lawsuit arguing that requiring them to adhere to the state’s antidiscrimination policies is a violation of their free exercise of religion and free speech rights under the First Amendment. The U.S. District Court denied Crosspoint’s request for a preliminary injunction, stating that Maine’s antidiscrimination law is neutral and generally applicable. The Court also found that the law merely regulates conduct, not speech. Crosspoint has appealed to the First Circuit, where the ACLU, ACLU of Maine, and Americans United for Separation of Church and State have filed amicus briefs supporting Maine’s law. 

The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause is the central constitutional issue presented in this case. Crosspoint argues that being forced to comply with antidiscrimination provisions substantially burdens their religious exercise. They believe that the First Amendment protects their right to operate according to their religious beliefs, even when receiving public funds. However, Maine has a compelling state interest in ensuring that publicly funded programs do not engage in discriminatory practices, and that schools voluntarily participating in state programs must follow the same rules as other recipients. 

There are a few Supreme Court precedents relating to Free Exercise that are relevant to this case. In Sherbert v. Verner (1963), the Court establishes that laws substantially burdening religious practice must be justified by a compelling state interest. In Sherbert, the Court ruled that a Seventh-day Adventist could not be denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. In Crosspoint, the school could argue that, like Ms. Sherbert, it faces a choice between following religious convictions and receiving government benefits. However, Maine could counter this argument by stating that unlike in Sherbert, where the state had no compelling interest in forcing someone to work on their Sabbath, the state does have a compelling interest in preventing discrimination in publicly funded education. 

Perhaps the most directly relevant precedent to the Crosspoint case is Bob Jones University v. United States (1983). In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the IRS could revoke the tax-exempt status of a religious university that enforces racially discriminatory policies based on religious beliefs. The Court held that the government had a “fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education,” which outweighed the burden on the university’s right to Free Exercise. For Crosspoint v. Makin, this precedent strongly supports Maine’s position that its interest in preventing discrimination can justify refusing funding, even if these conditions affect Crosspoint’s religious practices. 

I believe that this case should be ruled in favor of Makin. Bob Jones University provides the strongest precedent to support this outcome. The Supreme Court has already accepted that the government can refuse to subsidize discrimination, even when that discrimination is motivated by sincere religious beliefs. Although Crosspoint’s strongest argument can come from Sherbert, there is a strong difference in reasoning that would weaken that argument. Unlike in Sherbert, where the state had no compelling interest to deny benefits, Maine does have a compelling interest to prevent discrimination in education. 

Maine isn’t forcing Crosspoint to change its religious beliefs or practices, it’s simply stating that if the school wants public funding, it must comply with public nondiscrimination requirements. This is a neutral rule, and a conditional benefit, not a punishment for religious exercise. The school is free to maintain its discriminatory policies if it wishes to, it just cannot expect taxpayers to subsidize those policies. It is possible for Maine to keep the balance between religious free exercise and state interests by allowing religious schools to participate in the tuition program as long as they are willing to follow the same laws that other schools must follow, so that the state can ensure that no public funds are going towards discriminatory practices. 

https://www.aclu.org/cases/crosspoint-v-makin

https://www.au.org/how-we-protect-religious-freedom/legal-cases/cases/crosspoint-church-v-makin/

Prayer in School: Where's the Line?

On March 18th the Texas senate advanced Senate Bill 11, (SB 11) a bill that would allow school boards to vote on a resolution that would require schools in said district to provide all students and employees with a voluntary time slot, specifically outside of instruction time, for the purpose of prayer and reading religious texts. Additionally, the bill requires districts and schools to collect a permission slip, signed by a parent or guardian, from all employees and students that wish to partake in the religious experience. The permission slip would acknowledge that the student/employee has a right to make a choice about whether to attend, consent to the religious nature of the meetings, and a waiver of the signers’ rights to pursue future legal state or federal action against this policy. Schools must also ensure that these activities cannot be “in the physical presence, within the hearing of, or in another manner which would constitute an injury in fact within the meaning of the United States or Texas Constitution” of anyone who has not signed this permission slip. It specifically outlines that prayer should be held before school, in areas and classrooms where everyone has signed the form, or implemented in any other method recommended by the attorney general or legal counsel for the district or school. Finally, every school board or school governing body would be required to hold a vote on this policy within six months of the act’s enactment.

Senator Mayes Middleton, the coauthor of the bill, claims that the bill is “about providing a space for free expression of our religion in public schools and open-enrollment charter schools” and argues that it is constitutional as it “does not make participation in prayer or reading religious texts compulsory.” However, opposing senators argue that the policy would intertwine religion and state in a way that they believe violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. With that being said, who’s argument is more in line with what the constitution allows? Furthermore, to what extent is prayer permissible in our public schools?

Examining the legislatures motivations is a common strategy of the Supreme Court in addressing issues of establishment to understand the neutrality and intentions behind a given law, one such case is Edwards V. Aguillard. In which the Supreme Court held that a Louisianna statute requiring public schools to give balanced treatment in regards to teaching “creation science” and “evolution science” had the primary purpose of “[endorsing] a particular religious doctrine” and thus “[furthered] religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.” Since they used Senator Bill Keith's Legislative testimonies to come to this conclusion, it makes sense to examine the motivations of Senator Middleton who said; “our schools should never have been God-free zones and our founders never intended separation of God from the government.” When he was questioned further about the constitutionality of the issue, he said “There's no such thing as separation of church and state.” This is even though as early as the 1947 Everson V. Board decision, which has been upheld and reinforced in multiple instances, the Supreme Court has held that; “the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and state.’” Furthermore, the addition of a waiver of rights to pursue litigation against the state in regards to the policy helps to demonstrate that those crafting the law knew that it potentially would violate the Constitution and wanted to avoid being fairly challenged if it does so. Additionally, Senator Donna Campbell said in support of the bill that “There is eternal life and if we don’t expose or introduce our children and others to that, then when they die, they’ll have one birth and two deaths.” A clear reference to the religious idea that nonbelievers will go to “Hell” of some kind, once again reinforcing that the purpose of SB 11 is to advance religion. 

Even though cases such as Kennedy V. Bemerton, in which it was held that Joseph Kennedy’s constitutional right to freely practice religion were violated are referenced to support increasing integration of prayer in school. It is important to remember that Kennedy’s actions took place at an after-school event when there could be no interpretation that his actions were endorsed by the school. SB 11 would allow for prayer during the school day or any other way the attorney general desires, which has ben struck down in a variety of cases, most notably, Stone V. Graham. This is in conjunction with the fact that the school board will make a choice surrounding whether or not to implement the policy, making it the level of integration between church and state impermissible.

In conclusion, while Texas Senate Bill 11 may be seen by some as a constitutional time of prayer during school hours, it is in fact a constitutional violation. I say this as its sole purpose is to further religion, seeks to preeminently prevent any legal action that can be taken because of its constitutional violation, and places far too much power in the hands of elected officials with regards to religious matters. 

https://apnews.com/us-news/joe-kennedy-iii-church-and-state-texas-dan-patrick-donna-campbell-21a2e0674e92ca9ad0dcb8fa32a31fab# 

https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/Text.aspx?LegSess=89R&Bill=SB11

https://www.kvue.com/article/news/politics/texas-legislature/texas-senate-school-prayer-ten-commandments-classroom-bills/269-bd62ead9-9511-4c42-ad88-1e7d6277069c

https://senate.texas.gov/news.php?id=20250318a

https://www.texastribune.org/2023/05/04/texas-legislature-church-state-separation/

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-418/#tab-opinion-4601251

Where is the Line Between Education and Parenting? Vitsaxaki v. Skaneateles Central School District

  Parents and teachers can all agree that children should feel safe at school. They should be welcomed no matter what their background is, and when they are struggling they should have a support system. The boundaries and methods in how this is done are often called into question, as in the case of Mrs. Vitsaxaki and her child.

    In Vitsaxaki v. Skaneateles, the Skaneateles Central School District instituted The Student Gender Identity Policy, in which students who wished to be referred to with names and pronouns other than their legal ones could do so without the school notifying the parents. In this particular case, a 7th grade student identified as Jane Doe, was raised in Greece until she was 9 years old. After moving to New York and starting in a public school, she faced difficulties adjusting to the new environment and new language, which led to the development of anxiety. Her problems persisted even after working with the school counselor to create coping mechanisms. Eventually, with the help of the school’s guidance counselor, Christopher Viggiano, school’s psychologist, Vicky Powers, and the school’s social worker, Michele Rogala, a Gender Support Plan was implemented when Doe decided she would like to change her name and pronouns. The plan explicitly avoided the inclusion of Doe’s parents to avoid “outing” her before she was ready. During this time, Rogala would also host an “LGBTQ lunch” for students that Doe participated in, in which they discussed “concepts of socially and medically transitioning one’s gender” and were given information on “local resources such as counselors, pediatricians, surgeons, and a nearby gender clinic.”

    Doe’s grades began to worsen and when her mother, Mrs. Jennifer Vitsaxaki, asked the school if there was anything she should know that could be impacting her daughter’s grades, she was told “nothing out of the ordinary was happening.” In May of 2021, the school principal, Michael Caraccio, called Mrs. Vitsaxaki to inform her of her daughter’s change in name of pronouns, without informing her that Doe was in the room listening to the phone call. At that point Mrs. Vitsaxaki attempted to console her daughter before requesting a separate phone call. After that, Doe was switched to online schooling, during which she continued with school employees to discuss gender identity, without the knowledge of her parents. When her mother tried to talk to school employees to find out more information about what her daughter was going through, they were hesitant or refused to answer her, and later she moved her daughter to a private school. There her “demeanor, morale, health, and outlook” have been observed by her mother to have improved, and there has been an absence of desire to change her name or pronouns. However, there is a dramatic increase in financial burden, with the private school costing over $12,000 a year.

    Parents maintain the right to raise their children as their religious views see fit under their right to Free Exercise. According to Mrs. Vatsaxaki, her free exercise was violated when the school system referred to her daughter with a different name and pronouns without her consent; her free exercise was also burdened when her ability to raise her child was impacted by the school actively teaching her daughter about gender in a way that went against her religious beliefs. This case shows a conflict in public schools supporting a child’s personal decisions and her family’s religious freedom: is it constitutional for the school to hide a child’s social transition from a family whose religious beliefs do not support gender transitions?

    It is one thing for schools to allow children to go by different names and pronouns in general, it is another to encourage children to pursue those decisions while actively hiding those life-changing decisions from the parents. One article revealed that the principal only called Mrs. Vatsaxaki at the urging of a concerned teacher. While schools should want to help children who are having a hard time, this support system should include the parents, and a child should not be expected to make major life decisions on their own without their parents. A public school’s primary responsibility is the general education of its students, other fields breach the realm of parenting, which is a role parents do not relinquish to teachers when they decide to send their children to public school.

    The Supreme Court has been known to overturn cases that have shown schools overstepping their roles in ways that have impacted religious parenting, such as in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette in which it was decided the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses no longer had to salute the flag since it went against their families’ beliefs. Some may argue that gender identity is not a religious issue, but rather a social or health one, which would go against other precedents set by the Court that determined the government does not have the authority to validate particular beliefs and whether or not they are truly religious, such as in Cantwell v. Connecticut. 

    To encourage the transition for Jane Doe, while hiding it from her parents, shows a support of a particular viewpoint of gender identity, and a condemnation of how her mother would choose to raise her. Parents, who are required by law to have their children in the education system, should not then be forced to wonder what the state is doing with their children. It is both an establishment of religion in that case, as well as a violation of free exercise on the part of the mother.

Paved with Belief

Oliver v. City of Brandon

    Gabriel Oliver, an evangelical Christian, was arrested after sharing his beliefs on a public sidewalk near the city park in Brandon, Mississippi. Gabriel Oliver expresses his faith through many means, including oral dialogue, signs, literature, and expressive clothing. However, these actions are deemed prohibited by local law in Brandon, Mississippi. Oliver was then forced to relocate to a remote area where his message could not reach as many people, which he found disappointing. Determined to reach as many people as possible, Oliver moved to a more populated area, a city park sidewalk, where more people could hear his message. Following this, Oliver was arrested for violating the city’s ordinance on religious speech. Oliver was then fined and released. Oliver found his arrest unconstitutional and filed a lawsuit for the violation of the Free Exercise Clause under the First Amendment with the federal court. However, the district court dismissed his case because Oliver was never imprisoned and only fined. Oliver then petitioned for this to be heard by the United States Supreme Court for the right to challenge his fine and the ordinance that he believes infringes on his constitutional rights. 

    The central legal issue is whether Oliver had the right to evangelize on a public city sidewalk under the religious exercise clause of the First Amendment. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause guarantees individuals the right to practice and express their religious beliefs without interference from the government, with the condition that it doesn’t affect peace and good order. Oliver’s case depends on whether his actions on the public sidewalk coincide with religious freedom or if they violated the local laws in a way that justified his arrest and fine. 

    A key precedent relevant to this case is Cantwell v. Connecticut. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the government cannot suppress religious speech or evangelism unless it poses a clear threat to peace and good order of the public. The Cantwell's were Jehovah’s Witnesses and were arrested for soliciting religious materials without a permit. The Court held that requiring a permit for religious solicitation was unconstitutional because it gave the state too much power to restrict and discriminate against religious speech and expression. Furthermore, the State cannot suppress the communication of religious views if it does not threaten the public good and order of the State. Similarly, Oliver’s religious speech was prevented on a public sidewalk because he violated the City of Brandon's public ordinance laws. Like the Cantwell's, Oliver was not causing harm or disrupting public order; he simply shared his beliefs in a public space. While some may disagree with his message, this does not justify restricting his speech. 

    Another relevant case is Widmar v. Vincent, which establishes that the State cannot discriminate against any viewpoint or restrict religious speech in a public forum, such as city sidewalks. In Widmar, the Supreme Court ruled that a public university could not exclude religious groups from using campus facilities available to other student organizations. The Court emphasized that once the government opens a space for public use, it cannot discriminate against specific viewpoints, like religious ones. Comparably, Oliver on a public sidewalk puts him in a public forum, which means that the State cannot discriminate against the speech that Oliver decides to partake in. The only restriction of his religious speech that can be justified in this case is if he violates peace and good order, which I do not believe he does. Oliver should not be excluded from using this sidewalk to host religious speech just because his content is religious.

    In conclusion, Gabriel Oliver’s case raises important questions about the limits of religious expression in public forums. Based on precedents like Cantwell v. Connecticut and Widmar v. Vincent, I believe it is clear that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects Oliver’s evangelism on a public sidewalk. His speech did not threaten public peace or order, and the city of Brandon’s ordinance unfairly targets religious viewpoints in public forums. I am excited to see if the Supreme Court decides to look at this case and if they will decide in favor of Oliver. 

https://firstliberty.org/cases/gabriel-olivier/#simple1 

Religious Freedom or Just a Paperwork Problem? Breaking Down Malone-Bey v. Mississippi

Malone-Bey v. Mississippi State Board of Health        

Recently, the case of Malone-Bey v. Mississippi State Board of Health (2025) brought to light the potential tensions that can be seen between one's expression of their religious identity and board-approved government documentation. This case raises key constitutional questions about religious free exercise and equal protection under the law, presenting an interesting intersection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and challenging us to consider the limits of religious accommodations in official state records.

        Kent Malone-Bey, a self-identified Moorish American, petitioned the Mississippi State Board of Health to amend his Certificate of Live Birth to reflect his racial identity as “white: Asiatic/Moor.” Malone-Bey, representing himself in court, filed his petition in the Lauderdale County Chancery Court, arguing that the Board’s refusal to modify his birth certificate violated his rights to religious free exercise, due process, and equal protection. He asserted that the inability to have his religiously significant racial identity recognized on his birth certificate impeded his full expression of identity and faith, placing an undue burden on his religious beliefs. However, both the chancery court and the Mississippi Court of Appeals rejected these claims, ruling that the state had no obligation to alter its records to accommodate an individual's religious identity preferences, asserting that birth certificates in the state do not designate race, nationality, or religion of any child, and therefore, no religions discrimination had taken place. 

The court's opinion, delivered by Judge Wilson, emphasized that Mississippi’s birth certificates do not include racial or religious identifiers for anyone. Therefore, the state was not treating Malone-Bey differently from others, nor was it discriminating against him based on religion. The court added that neither state law nor constitutional provisions require the government to adjust its internal records to align with an individual’s religious beliefs - in so far as it is applied equally to all. 

Constitutional Issues

This case primarily engages with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

1. Free Exercise of Religion: Malone-Bey’s argument centered around the idea that because he was unable to fully reflect his religious identity on his birth certificate, his right to free exercise was restricted. The Court, in response, relied on Bowen v. Roy (1986), a Supreme Court case in which the government’s use of a Social Security number for a Native American child was contested for religious reasons. The Court (in Bowen) ruled that the Free Exercise Clause does not require the government to alter its internal processes to align with an individual's religious beliefs. Like in Malone-Bey’s case, the court determined that Mississippi’s decision not to amend his birth certificate did not burden his religious practice - instead, it only upheld a neutral, generally and equally applicable policy.

2. Equal Protection Clause: Malone-Bey claimed that the state’s refusal to amend his birth certificate amounted to religious discrimination. However, the Equal Protection Clause requires proof that the government intentionally treats a group differently without justification. Since Mississippi’s birth certificates exclude racial and religious designations for all citizens, the court found no that there was no discrimination occurring. The state was simply applying a uniform policy, not targeting or burdening a specific religious group like Moorish Americans. 

Analysis and Implications

As seen very early on in Reynold v. United States (1897), religious beliefs are to be protected under the Constitution, but religious conduct can still be regulated by general laws. This is the scenario I believe Malone-Bey finds himself in.

His case parallels previous Supreme Court rulings on neutral and generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise. One case discussed in class was Braunfeld v. Brown (1961), where a group of Orthodox Jewish merchants challenged a Pennsylvania Sunday Closing Law, which required most businesses to close on Sundays. Those who observed the Jewish Sabbath on Saturday, argued that the law placed them at an economic disadvantage by forcing them to close their stores two days a week - once for religious observance and once due to state law. They contended that this violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion by imposing a government-mandated burden on their economic livelihood. The court ruled in a 5-4 decision (very close) that the law was constitutional, and set the precedent that laws can incidentally burden religious practice, insofar as they do not actively target any particular religious group and have a legitimate secular purpose - which in this case was to provide a uniform day of rest for workers. In Braunfeld, the Court found that the law did not force Jewish business owners to violate their faith, only made practicing it more difficult.

Additionally, the case of McGowan v. Maryland (1961) also supported the idea that the government may enact laws that incidentally align with religious practices if their primary intent is secular.

Another case to mention and that I find important to address was the case of Sherbert v. Verner (1963), where a Seventh-day Adventist was denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work on Saturdays. The Supreme Court ruled in her favor and weakened the court's decision in both Braunfeld v. Brown (1961) and  McGowan v. Maryland (1961). This case strengthened religious liberty and led to the establishment of the Sherbert Test, which strengthened protections under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Under the Sherbert test, laws that place a “substantial” burden on religious practice must be backed by a compelling government interest and use the least restrictive means. So what wins out in the case of Malone-Bey?

Religious or Secular: The Mandate of Bible Teachings in Public Schools in Oklahoma

In June of 2024, Oklahoma’s state superintendent, Ryan Walters, mandated public schools to teach the Bible in grades 5 through 12. Each classroom would contain a physical hard copy of the Bible, and teachers were required to read and teach from it; compliance was necessary. To fund the supply of Bibles, Walters planned to use taxpayers' money. Walters, who is a strict conservative, exclaims that the Bible is both a historical and cultural “touchstone” and thus, without basic knowledge of it, the students attending Oklahoma public schools are unable to understand the foundation of the United States fully. In teaching students about verses from the Bible, Walters believes that students would gain a profound understanding of Western Civilization, ethics, and history. These books would be used for historical purposes, which he argues makes them secular, as they are not being used for religious purposes.

On October 15, 2024, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the Oklahoma Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Oklahoma Foundation, and the Freedom From Religion Foundation filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court of the state of Oklahoma on behalf of 32 plaintiffs. The plaintiffs included parents, public school teachers, religious leaders, and Lori Walke, all of whom come from different religious backgrounds (Baptist, Catholic, Atheist, United Church of Christ, and Presbyterian). They sued Ryan Walters and the State Department of Education under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment in the case of  Rev. Lori Walke v. Ryan Walters, arguing that by mandating Bible teachings in public schools and using tax-payers money to purchase Bibles, Walters and the DOE are establishing a religion; intertwining Church and State. Further, the religious freedom provisions of Oklahoma’s Constitution prohibit spending state funds to support religion. By spending millions of dollars on Protestant Bibles, Walters, and the DOE are both directly violating the separation between Church and State and endorsing one religion, which the Constitution prohibits. 
Adam Soltani, a parent, exclaims “We adamantly oppose any requirements that religion be forcefully taught or required as a part of lesson plans in public schools, in Oklahoma, or anywhere else in the country.” Likewise Rachel Laser, president and CEO of Americans United for Separation of Church and State exclaims “Public schools are not Sunday schools… This is textbook Christian Nationalism: Walters is abusing the power of his public office to impose his religious beliefs on everyone else’s children. Not on our watch.”

The constitutional issue in this case deals with the Establishment Clause, which states “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” The Establishment Clause was intended to create a wall of separation between Church and State to prevent the State from establishing a religion. The use of public schools, which are tax-funded by the State, for religious instruction and education, or the use of tax-payer funds to fund religious activities, is a violation of the Establishment Clause, as the State would be entangled with the Church. By mandating the teaching of the Bible for grades 5 through 12 in Oklahoma public schools and using taxpayer funds to purchase Bibles, did Walters violate the Establishment Clause? This is the question that the Court must answer.

When Abbington v. Schempp is applied to the case at hand, there are stark parallels. In Schempp, a Pennsylvania law had been enacted that required 10 Bible verses to be read at the start of each school day in public schools. The Shempp family, who had kids that attended these public schools, sued on behalf of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, exclaiming that the law violated the First Amendment. In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the law violated the Establishment Clause because its purpose was religious, not secular. It violated the constitutional principle of the separation between Church and State. This landmark case, which set boundaries between public schools and religion, can be compared to Lori Walke. Given that the schools in Oklahoma are public and are therefore government institutions, any mandate involving religious content, especially one that promotes a specific religion, violates the Establishment Clause. In Schempp, the government found that even having voluntary Bible readings and prayers could lead to the idea that the government is endorsing religion. In the case at hand, teachers and students have no choice but to comply with the Bible mandate, as all teachers are required to teach the Bible in their classrooms. This appears to be an even more direct violation of the Establishment Clause than in Schempp. In this sense, Lori Walke seems to be a direct violation of Schempp, which ruled that state-mandated religious teachings in public schools are unconstitutional.

I strongly believe that this case should be ruled in favor of Lori Walke. In my opinion, it seems that the goal of the Bible mandate is to spread Christian beliefs. Walter exclaimed that teachers were required to have the Bible in every classroom and “teach from it.” This mandate is not education, but rather, indoctrination. Though Walters argues that the Bible would be used for secular purposes, specifically for teaching students about United States history, the Bible is an inherently religious text. The public schools in Oklahoma would be extremely entangled with religion, as religious doctrine teaching would be required. The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from establishing, favoring, or endorsing religion. Public schools, which are funded by the State are required, under the Constitution, to remain neutral when it comes to religion. They therefore cannot promote or mandate anything religious. In this case, by mandating Bible teachings in public schools in all classrooms, the State is directly using its resources to promote Christianity, and thus endorsing religious teachings. This is a direct violation of the Establishment Clause, as any state-sponsored teaching of the Bible, especially when it is mandatory and strict compliance is expected, can be seen as the government sponsoring religion. Further, in making the Bible teachings mandatory in the curriculum, the government appears to be favoring Christianity over other religions, which is not neutral. In my opinion, there is unquestionably a violation of the Establishment Clause.

I ask you all to consider these questions. Do you think that the purpose of the Bible mandate in public schools is secular, as Walters exclaims? Does the mandate violate the Establishment Clause? Is there a constitutional way to incorporate Bible teachings in public schools? What do you guys think?

Is There a Compelling State Interest in Police Officers Creating Havoc?

On August 14th, 2024 in Manhattan, New York, a peaceful protest was held advocating for the United States government to call for a ceasefire in Gaza. The Anti-war protest occurred directly outside the “New York City Kick off” fundraiser event. The New York City police officers followed the harmonious walk toward West 146th Street. At the concluding point of the protest, the crowd became extremely large and was completely enclosed by the NYPD officers along with a special team of strategic response officers on bicycles. To maintain crowd control law enforcement began kettling the crowd (containing them all in one place without the ability to move). The officers yelled “Move back”, while forcefully pushing protesters closer to one other. Amongst the protesters were two women Zarmeen Azam and Shajnin Howlader, separate but similar experiences during the chaos.

Shajnin Howlader was on the edge of the crowd at this time. She was consistently pushed back by one of the officers, Assistant Chief Stephenson, although there was nowhere to physically go. She spoke out telling the officers she could no longer move, yet they continued to stride further. Sergeant Spalding grabbed the end of Howlader’s hijab, ripping it halfway off her head and leaving it constricting around her neck. The tighter he pulled the more Howlader lost her ability to breathe. She pleaded for help making the officers aware of her choking, while another officer pepper sprayed her. Close by in the crowd, Assistant Chief Stephenson sought out Zarmeen Azam. He pushed through other members walking toward Azam claiming she had placed hands on him. He specifically targeted her as she was the only protester in that vicinity wearing a hijab. He grabbed her by her headscarf, threw her to the ground, and began hitting any bystander who attempted to help with his baton. This cut off her ability to breathe, eventually ripped her hijab completely off her head, and pulled up her shirt. Another officer took a picture of Zarmeen Azam without her hijab on. Both Zarmeen Azam and Shajnin Howlader were taken advantage of and failed by the justice system. 

It is blatantly obvious that Howlader and Azam were religiously targeted based on their appearance and stripped of their undeniable civil rights regarding equal protection. But the constitutional question at hand is whether or not police officers have the compelling state interest to take off an individual's religious headwear or attire while attempting to control a crowd/make arrests? Or is this removal a violation of the First Amendment rights, specifically of the Free Exercise Clause? 

It is important to recognize that hijabs are worn as a religious obligation by Muslim women as a symbol of modesty. Muslim women must have their hair and body covered when they are in the presence of the opposite sex, that is not their close family member or husband. This is meant to reject attention in their direction and appear as humble as possible in the eyes of God. This is a mandatory practice within their religion that not adhering to is considered a sin that could result in serious eternal consequence. In Hearn & United States v. Muskogee Public School District, a Muslim sixth-grade student was suspended for refusing to remove her hijab. The school district claimed that the student’s hijab violated the “no hat” dress code. The United States government intervened in this case stating the school's dress code was a violation of religious expression and could not be applied in this circumstance. This set the precedent that religious clothing or head coverings can not be discriminated against, no matter the dress code. While this case does not touch on compelling state interest, it is extremely important as it recognizes the government's responsibility to protect an individual’s right to free exercise through wearing religious garments. It sets the standard that the United States government holds much respect for religious clothing obligations and will not let citizens' rights be taken advantage of like Zarmeen Azam and Shajnin Howlader experienced. 

Similarly in November of 2020, the New York Police Department vowed to end its discriminatory action of forcing muslims to remove hijabs for mugshot images. The lawsuit reached a settlement causing the police department to change its policy. This change affected not only Muslims but other religious headwear like “skull caps and wigs worn by Orthodox Jews and the turbans worn by Sikhs” (NYT). This demonstrates the NYPD taking steps towards ending discriminatory practices towards religious attire, which should be upheld in every action theytakee. If the police department can’t legally require individuals to remove their religious headwear then how is it acceptable for officers to forcefully rip it off of women protesting?

I’d argue in the case of Council on American-Islamic Relations New York v. City of New York the police officers had no compelling state interest to impede on either of Howlader and Azam’s free exercise rights. The women were peacefully protesting and forced against their will into a violent situation. In Azam’s circumstance, she was subjected to prejudice by being sought out and manipulated for her choice to exercise her religion. I find it especially disgusting that Howlader and Azam’s hijabs were weaponized against them by the authorities. There is no logical explanation here that vouches for any advantageous benefit of weaponizing or removing either of the individuals' hijabs. The officers did not protect any other protestors or stop potential violence through this action. They simply ripped the rights away from two women trying to follow their religious obligations. 

Sources:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tpkGrDRBb4BwY-vW3xWGjt2fdo7QdxHr/view

https://ecbawm.com/news/ecbawm-obtains-settlement-forcing-nypd-to-end-discriminatory-hijab-removal-policy/

https://www.google.com/search?q=hearn+%26+united+states+v.+muskogee+public+school+district+summary

https://casetext.com/analysis/case-summary-hearn-united-states-v-muskogee-public-school-district

https://gothamist.com/news/muslim-women-sue-the-nypd-allege-excessive-force-at-anti-war-protest

https://www.cair.com/press_releases/federal-civil-rights-lawsuit-filed-on-behalf-of-cair-ny-protesters-assaulted-by-nypd-officers/

https://www.nydailynews.com/2025/03/10/lawsuit-muslim-women-hijabs-dislodged-nypd-gaza-protest/

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/nyregion/hijab-muslim-nypd-mugshot-scarves.html#