An article in today’s NY Times describes a conflict that
arose in Las Vegas over a special Caucus held after sundown on Saturday in
order to accommodate a growing population of Orthodox Jews. Caucus goers were
required to sign a legal declaration under penalty of perjury that they could
not attend the regular caucus because of their “religious beliefs.” Those who
refused to sign the declaration were denied access to the caucus.
This incident provides a good example of how the
Establishment clause and the Free Exercise clause of the 1st Amendment
are often at odds with each other. While holding the official caucus during the
day, thus preventing Orthodox Jews from being able to participate could provide
a valid argument for accommodation, it raises the question of what constitutes
a valid excuse for missing regular elections, and how should they be accommodated.
Does religion get a special pass or is it just one of many groups who should be
accommodated? The focus on Orthodox Jews in regards to this special caucus also
opens the door to questions of establishment. By primarily accommodating Orthodox
Jews, did the Clark County Republican Party (CCRP), which ran the caucus in
question, effectively raise Orthodox Judaism above other religions?
In the past the Supreme Court has been hesitant to rule in
areas of religion, especially when the Free Exercise Clause is involved. While free-exercise may be used as a defense,
the declaration requirement, which explicitly limits attendance to those with a "religious excuse," places this issue squarely in establishment
territory. Even though the CCRP argues that the declaration was meant to
include Adventists as well, actions on the ground suggested otherwise. One person,
who was refused admittance, claims that he was asked by a poll worker whether
he was Jewish. More instances like this would be strong indicators of the CCRP’s
true target audience.
1 comment:
David, I believe you have articulated a very significant challenge to the idea that religious belief, and only religiously motivated belief, exempts you from adhering to civil law. Allowing for religious exemption privileges a belief or practice that can be backed up by a religious tradition, while disenfranchising those who hold similar personal convictions unconnected to the theology or ideology of any religious tradition. For instance, the Catholic church is arguing that they should not have to abide by President Obama's health care mandate that included mandatory contraceptive access for employees on the grounds that it violates Catholic doctrine. However, it would sound ridiculous if an employer, of his or her own opinion or accord and not motivated by religious belief, decided that he or she thought access to contraceptives was just wrong and refused to provide them to employees. The challenge then is in protecting the free exercise of religion while not privileging it.
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