During the trial of former U.S. Congresswoman Corrine Brown on charges of fraud, a male juror, called Juror 13, told his fellow jurors that he believed the “Holy Spirit” informed him that Brown was not guilty. The district judge chose to replace Juror 13 because of his statements, and Brown was then convicted and sentenced to prison. The judge dismissed Juror 13 for “injecting religious beliefs that are inconsistent with the instructions of the court, that this case be decided solely on the law… and the evidence in the case.” He referred to the juror’s invocation of God as allowing an “outside force” to influence his decision in the case. When questioned by the district judge, however, Juror 13 implied his prayers were for "the Holy Spirit to aid him in weighing the evidence of the case," and he did not say that he received a divine order to acquit Brown.
Brown’s conviction was reviewed and upheld by a three-judge panel of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2-1 decision in January 2020. Judge Rosenbaum wrote for the majority, saying that the right to a trial by jury hinges upon the right to a verdict that is based off of evidence, and that cannot be substituted for “some form of divine guidance.” Judge Pryor, however, dissented, arguing that the district court “erroneously” conflated the “divine guidance” the juror believes he received with reliance on “an outside force” and religious beliefs that “render the person unable to perform the duties of a juror.” Pryor argued that if religious jurors have the constitutional right to practice their religion by privately praying for guidance from God, then the court cannot fault them for believing they received a response.
Brown’s legal team believes the current decision denies the “noble and civic duty to serve as a juror to hundreds of millions of Americans” who seek religious guidance through prayer and could lead to jurors being denied “simply because they believe that God answers prayer.” The issue was reignited on September 24 when the full 11th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the January ruling and agreed to rehear Brown’s case.
Although Brown’s case does not directly involve an issue of religion, her conviction relates to the First Amendment issue of free exercise: does a juror have the freedom to seek divine guidance when reviewing a case? Does a juror’s invocation of religious counsel disqualify them from being impartial? I do not believe so. In my opinion, Juror 13 should not have been dismissed.
There is little direct precedent to be examined here, but we can look at other ways in which the courts have ruled on religious practices within governmental situations. In the 2014 case Town of Greece, New York v. Galloway, the Supreme Court ruled that opening a local government meeting with a prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause as long as there is no coercion and no religion is advanced or discouraged. Unlike Brown’s case, Galloway was about an establishment of religion, but the court stated that regulating whether prayer occurs or how it is carried out would put the government in the position to “act as supervisors and censors of religious speech,” thus involving the government to a greater degree than the practice of prayer itself. In dismissing Juror 13, the district court acted as a “supervisor” of a juror’s religious behavior and speech.
I find myself concerned with the broader implications of the dismissal of Juror 13. The juror’s prayers were only seen as an issue because he discussed them and he believed they were answered-- would his prayer have been acceptable if he had not told others about it? Or would it be acceptable if he did not believe that God answered his prayers? Prayer is a personal and intimate practice that is central to many religions, and in punishing a juror for privately praying about a case, the government unconstitutionally limited the individual’s free exercise and created an unenforceable standard. The court cannot reasonably regulate prayer or belief in prayer. In dismissing Juror 13, the court essentially said that jurors may not pray about the case, which places the government in a position of supervising private citizens' religious practices.
The issue is further complicated by the existing interconnection between our judicial branch and religion. Federal jurors traditionally take an oath stating something to the effect of, “Do each of you solemnly swear that you will well and truly try the case now before this court and render a true verdict, according to the law, evidence, and instructions of this court, so help you God?” This oath, similar to the oath witnesses must take, is seen as an appeal to a “higher truth.” It is inconsistent then, for Juror 13 to be removed from court for doing just as the oath states-- asking their God for help. Regardless of your own religious convictions or your opinions on the case of Corrine Brown, the dismissal of Juror 13 sets a dangerous precedent for what disqualifies a juror and creates unrealistic and unconstitutional standards for the government to evaluate jurors’ private religious convictions.
10 comments:
I agree with your analysis and decision that dismissing the juror was unconstitutional. There is definitely no issue of coercion since the prayer was initiated by a single person and was said only to that person and so, them being disqualified clearly violates their free exercise of religion and constitutes discrimination against religion. The argument that the person’s religious beliefs could interfere with their ability to remain impartial is really not compelling to me because then no one could ever be a judge or juror because everyone is biased one way or another. Think about the new Supreme Court nominee made by Trump, since she is known to be extremely religious, should she be disqualified as well? Whether you agree with that or not, I think if she was rejected solely because of her religious convictions, that could be seen as discrimination against religion. There are also so many political figures in positions of power whose decisions are absolutely motivated by the companies and lobbyist groups that endorse and support them monetarily, and so it is hard to find a case where someone is not going to be totally unbiased in their decision.
While I don't necessarily agree that the juror's prayer was coercive towards his decision regarding the Brown's case, I don't think that it can be deemed unconstitutional for the juror to be released on the basis of his use of religion during his civil service. Jurors are commonly released from their duty for numerous reasons that could be deemed discriminatory. For example, an unfavorable predisposition towards a defendant's race, lifestyle, or occupation is cause for a juror to be dismissed from serving on a case. The precedent of juror release supports the decision to release a man from the jury who has invoked prayer in his decision process. The overwhelming state interest to provide an impartial jury that will justly assess the case at hand is greater than the state interest in unequivocally protecting the free exercise of an individual juror. That being said, I do see an issue in the various court proceedings that invoke a religious sentiment of "God" like the oath that the jurors are subjected to. It is very contradictory that the state upholds that religion cannot be established, yet they invoke religious rhetoric during court proceedings.
I do agree with your assessment in this case, and other pseudo-religious practices the state conducts that have a similar appeal to 'Higher Truth' will likely agree with you as well. Chief among these is the practice of our Presidents swearing on a Bible when taking the oath of office. However, taking the position as devil's advocate, I would raise the concern of the possible slippery slope of public officials using religious guidance as an motivation for their actions. However, with no precedence of such a concern, I would still easily support the release of Brown.
I also agree with your argument in this case and that the juror's prayers cannot be deemed unconstitutional. The juror acted independently and was not forcing his religion onto anyone, simply sharing one of the events that led to their decision. Of course, if that were the only reason that the juror believed Brown was innocent, then there is a problem with that as concrete evidence should and always be necessary when making decisions such as these. Religion is just one of thousands of aspects of a person's life that makes them biased in one way or another, and if jurors were to be penalized for their religions, it would set a dangerous precedent for dismissing any jurors for any number of reasons. I also agreed with your argument about the inconsistent but constant clashing of religion and the government in oaths.
Overall, I disagree with you that Juror 13 should not have been released. If the courts were given any type of probable cause, religious or non-religious, that a juror was using methods or personal beliefs to reach a decision in a court case based on anything other than the evidence, that is grounds for removal from the position. There are many reasons that a juror can be released from their duty such as when a juror shows possible discrimination towards a specific group or biased. In this case, Juror 13 indicated that the "Holy Spirit informed him" which shows probable cause for removal as that indicates a methodology in making a decision different than the official jury instruction. I am not saying that anyone with religious views should be dismissed from jury duty. Rather, I am saying than actively using an outside force like God within the confines of the jury role to make the legal decision is violating the responsibility and instructions of jury members. If they allowed Juror 13 to set a precedent by using his "divine force" as the reasoning behind his decision, it creates an extremely slippery slope for future jurors. Future jurors may begin to start using this case as a valid reason for them to use religion as a deciding factor on future juries.
I definitely agree with what you said about religion being an intimate and private way that people's moralities are formed, and that's why specifics matter to me a lot. If Juror 13 was paraphrased in their initial statement, that changes the situation significantly for me. Semantics can be frustrating, but my opinion unfortunately hinges on the details of the wording. Did juror 13 say that the Holy Spirit informed them that Brown was not guilty, or did they say that they wanted the assistance of the holy spirit in weighing the evidence? In the latter case, I absolutely agree with you that the dismissal of Juror 13 was unconstitutional, especially since the Juror's oath already appeals to a higher power. But it's very well possible that what was said initially is accurate and then Juror 13 claimed they had said something different after the fact, in which case I have to say that I don't feel that the dismissal was unconstitutional because as a Juror, you're required to analyze evidence and make arguments for and against the plaintiff and the defendant, not go with the equivalent of a "gut feeling". If someone said "I'm going to flip a coin and if it's heads, God has said that he's guilty", that juror would be dismissed. Religious influence in one's morality is one thing, religious bias is another. Are there any witnesses who can attest to one version or the other happening?
I agree with the majority of the comments in saying that the dismissal of Juror 13 was unconstitutional. Like it or not, almost all people have a code of ethics/morality that in part stems from religious values. Whether they actively prescribe to any specific religious sect, a lot of what we consider "moral" or "ethical" is in line with what being a steward of faith means for different religious groups. With that being said, Jurors 1-12 probably had some of the same beliefs as #13 about what was moral and/or ethical and those beliefs probably stemmed from their own religious code. The only difference between 1-12 and #13 is that Juror 13 chose to vocalize his beliefs. I don't think that simply acknowledging the fact that you have religious beliefs and that those beliefs play a part in your decision making should sound off any establishment clause alarms. Not to mention that we have a right to a jury of our peers and if anyone with a religious affiliation is barred from serving on a jury, some defendants may be able to argue that the jury is not comprised of their peers.
I agree with what has been said above, it was unconstitutional for Juror 13 to be dismissed, and it sets a dangerous precedent moving forward. One aspect of this case that does concern me however is his reasoning. It is no problem if Juror 13's religion influenced his decision along with other reasons, but the fact that he essentially claimed "this is the right decision because God said so" is not valid or professional in my opinion. Religion undoubtedly influences a person's outlook on life, but in the job of a juror, there definitely needs to be secular reasoning as well.
I find myself agreeing with some of your arguments and your opinion regarding Juror 13’s removal, but Sophie raised a good point above. Many American citizens have religious views that will guide their morals and even their daily activities, so it is likely that the other Jurors had particularly religious views that helped guide their decision as well. I think that since the court removed Juror 13 from his position on the jury, it is limiting his First Amendment right of free exercise of their own religion. I liked the question Shana raised that would this be an issue if the court didn’t know that he prayed? I think that this question shows how prayer is a private, personal matter and doesn’t affect other people until they are made aware.
I see both sides in this case. Emma's point that jurors are frequently released on account of different factors is an important argument to consider. While a juror being released is not uncommon, it is the basis of the release that's under review, in this case. A few of my other classmates raised the point that every individual has their own religious/moral beliefs to sway their decision, so the only difference is that #13 vocalized his. However, I'd like to point out that one's morals unconsciously swaying their decision is very different from literally asking God to help him with the verdict. I also want to acknowledge the idea that if #13 would have kept this to himself, he never would have been dismissed; while this might be true, we cannot function off of "what ifs" in legal decisions, we can only deal with the facts present at the time. In conclusion, I 100% support the dismissal of Brown, as I think jurors should meet the expectation of basing their decision off evidence, at least on the surface.
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