Iknoor Singh, born and raised in Queens, New York, was a Sikh college student at Hofstra University who was denied enlistment into the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) unless he shaved his beard, removed his turban, and cut his hair. These requirements were in accordance with Army grooming policies. It was a lifelong dream to serve in the Army, so Singh requested a religious exemption from these regulations. Unfortunately, the Army officials at the university rejected this request. This rejection left Singh with the choice between a lifelong dream or upholding his religious faith. In response, Singh brought a lawsuit against the Secretary of the US Army (John McHugh), the Commander of the ROTC program at Hofstra University (Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Cederman) and other Army officials (James McConville and Peggy Combs) in November of 2014.
In the present case, known as Singh v. McHugh, we must assess the claim of religious freedom against the claim of national unity and discipline in the armed forces. Did the Army violate Singh’s free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the Constitution by denying an accommodation to the grooming and uniform policy?
First and foremost, it should be clarified that Sikhs have been allowed to enlist in the US Army in the past with the same accommodation requests being granted. Singh argued that the Army’s refusal to grant his accommodation violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The RFRA, which became law in 1993, seeks to protect religious practice and expression. More specifically, the RFRA prohibits any agency of the United States from substantially burdening a person’s free exercise of religion. This act also states that the government may burden a person’s exercise of religion if the burden is of compelling governmental interest or if it is the least restrictive means of furthering compelling governmental interest. The arguments made by Singh were similar to those seen in Di Liscia v. Austin in which Edmund Di Liscia (and other Muslin sailors) claimed that their beards were ‘an expression of obedience to God’ while the Navy claimed that having a beard reduced safety and effectiveness of protective equipment. Despite the claims by the Navy, there was no proof that allowance of a beard would hinder safety. The same may be said about Singh’s accommodation requests.
The Army initially argued that allowing this accommodation would undermine readiness, unit cohesion, health, safety, and most importantly, discipline. Relating back to rules set forth by the RFRA, the Army claimed that they were allowed to deny the accommodations because this standard is in furtherance of a compelling state interest in maintaining a strong, disciplined, rule-abiding military. This argument rings similar to the points made in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987) in which inmates at New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison were denied attendance at Jumu'ah. In this case, the prison officials argued that any accommodation to the rules set in place (work assignments determined by custody classifications) would negatively affect security and order. Although these are entirely separate cases, both argue that security, order, and safety serve as compelling governmental interest. Despite this initial argument, the Army later claimed that they could not provide this accommodation because Singh was not formally enlisted. Until he enlists, the exemption can not be granted and he must obey the regulation.
I believe that the Army did violate Singh’s free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the Constitution by denying the accommodation to the grooming and uniform policy. While this case never made it to the United States Supreme Court, I found great insights from various US District Court judges. For one, US District Court Judge Amy Jackson said, "Given the tens of thousands of exceptions the Army has already made to its grooming and uniform policies, its successful accommodation of observant Sikhs in the past, and the fact that, at this time, plaintiff is seeking only to enroll in the ROTC program, the Army's refusal to permit him to do so while adhering to his faith cannot survive the strict scrutiny that RFRA demands." I would agree with every point made by Judge Amy Jackson. It is clear that observant Sikhs have been allowed accommodations in the past (as shown in the image at the bottom of this blog post), so there is no reason to deny an accommodation in this instance. The Constitution was adopted to protect the rights of all people, specifically minority groups. It appears that observant Sikhs are underrepresented in the US Army, but this does not provide justification to disregard their religious beliefs. Denying this accommodation would be blatantly overlooking the rights of minority groups which is in clear violation of the United States Constitution. We may consider Iknoor Singh as a minority in terms of his race and religious affiliation, but also in terms of his young, impressionable age. I believe that the actions of the ROTC officials are overbearing and coercive toward this young man who simply wants to follow his dreams of serving in the Army. In addition to this, I believe that this denial placed a substantial burden on Iknoor Singh's ability to practice his religion, and therefore, failed the Sherbert Test. There is far more compelling state interest in protecting the religious liberties of all groups rather than protecting the image of ‘unity’ and ‘discipline’ in the military. There is no proof that allowing this accommodation would undermine unit cohesion or safety, and until any proof is shown, this accommodation should be allowed.
Citations
https://www.aclu.org/cases/singh-v-mchugh
https://www.acludc.org/en/cases/singh-v-mchugh
https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308
6 comments:
What is most concerning to me is that there have been previous individuals, like Singh, who have obtained a religious exemption and it has not been an issue. I wonder what the difference is here. If there is no difference, then I believe that Singh should also be allowed the religious exemption. I am also reminded of the Goldman v. Weinberger case. I believe that it is unconstitutional to make the decision between job and faith. Singh should be able to exercise his religious beliefs and at the same time be able to serve his country, a very respectable duty. If previous accommodations have been made without any issues, this case should also be approved. Professionalism can still be upheld, even with Singh following his religion. I don't see any compelling interest to prohibit this if previous exemptions have been allowed.
I think an important fact to acknowledge in this case is that he is not yet enlisted. As stated by the author, "the Army later claimed that they could not provide this accommodation because Singh was not formally enlisted. Until he enlists, the exemption can not be granted and he must obey the regulation." This could be the distinction between the case and previous examples that have been brought up. Additionally, it is important to consider that this case takes place in an ROTC program on a college campus. With this detail, the claim could be made that it is harder to establish order and uniformity in this setting, surrounded by "civilian students". Thus, while I understand the cases that have come before with exceptions, I find it likely that the request will be denied given the specific facts of the case.
I ultimately see both sides of this case. I agreed with Emily, especially because I do think that it places a substantial burden on Singh's ability to practice his religion freely. However, after reading the other comments and realizing that Singh was not formally enlisted as Molly pointed out, I agree with her. Establishing uniformity and order is much harder to do through an ROTC program on a college campus, since there are more distractions and people that are not involved with the program. I also think if Singh is exempt, this creates a slippery slope for future exemptions and how flexible the regulations will be.
Max makes a good point about previous exemptions. Why wouldn't these religious exemptions apply to Singh as well? I could be wrong to assume that xenophobic sentiments stirred anxiety surrounded Singh's turban as well. I feel as if his appearance was so unconventional to the army it was hard to accommodate his culture. I disagree with this case the most in the fact that Singh's turban and beard does not pose a threat to national security or impeded on his ability to serve his country. Additionally, I have to disagree with Molly that his role in ROTC informs the courts decision. Since he is not actually enlisted, I think he should most definitely be allowed to maintain his appearance as an ROTC officer. He's certainly not in combat on a college campus and is not in official training yet.
While I do believe that Singh should get an exemption, I disagree with the argument that there is a more compelling state interest in protecting religious liberties than with protecting unity and discipline in the military. When one joins the military, they have to be prepared to relinquish certain rights for safety reasons, as there are life-or-death situations involved. However, that is a case-by-case basis in which evidence should be provided to explain that there is a compelling state interest to burden religion. In this case, I do not believe there is because like everyone else in the comments has said, previous exemptions have been made for a similar thing and Singh was just trying to be a part of ROTC. This is the next step in the slippery slope from the Di Liscia v Austin case, as it is a more noticeable religious appearance that Singh has, so it will be interesting to see how the Courts rule. I wonder if there will be any stereotypical, racist decisions made like Paris pointed out.
I am very conflicted about this case. While I do see that it imposes a religious burden on Singh, I also think that this case is different because it concerns the military. As we have discussed several times in class, when you join the military, you give up some of the rights that you have as a civilian. Under this thinking, I would agree with the military for the need for uniformity and utmost cleanliness. However, because there have been exceptions in the past for Seek men, it is difficult for me to totally commit to this line of thinking. I think that ultimately, we should follow the rulings of past cases.
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