Judge Michelle Amico, the Arapahoe County, Colorado district judge, detained Mrs. Lindecrantz on account of her refusal to provide testimony. Her choice to testify (or not testify) is protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. It is unconstitutional for Ms. Lindecrantz be placed in a position where she is forced to violate her religious beliefs just to avoid incarceration.
The actions of the court can be proved unconstitutional through the Sherbert Test from the case Sherbert v. Verner. The Test stipulates that the court must decipher if the free exercise of religion in the given situation is burdened. If the practice is burdened, the court must present a compelling state interest or determine the least restrictive means towards the observed religion. Ms. Lindecrantz faces a clear indirect burden, as practicing her religion has placed her behind bars. Judge Amico ordered Ms. Lindecrantz to answer particular questions while testifying, to which she responded: “I feel like I’m having to choose between you and God.” The burden here is clearly outlined. Sherber v. Verner additionally provided a definition of a “burden”, in which it is stated if:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.As Ms. Lindecrantz clearly states, she is choosing between her religion and the regulations of the government, facing an indirect burden imposed upon her through the court’s actions. Continuing with the other components of the Sherbert Test, the compelling state interest to uphold justice and demand fairness within the legal system can be reasonably observed and understood. However, the burden placed upon Ms. Lindecrantz for practicing her religion is substantial, and she faced detainment, arguably not the least restrictive means. Overall, using the Sherbert Test it is clear the court’s actions are not constitutional.
Dealing with extremely similar components as Ms. Lindecrantz’s case, In Minersville School District V. Gobitis, Jehovah’s Witnesses were obligated, by the policy of public school district, to recite the Pledge of Allegiance despite religious objections. The original Supreme Court ruling forced all students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, however this decision was later overturned by West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette. In both cases of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Ms. Lindecrantz, the government cannot compel individuals to violate their religious beliefs and inhibit their free exercise; the act of speech in these situations violates their religious core principles.
Recently, after spending a total of twelve days behind bars, Ms. Lindecrantz changed her mind and agreed to testify, realizing that her refusal could negatively impact Mr. Ray’s legal proceedings, and ultimately his life. Testifying could mean a chance to save a man’s life, which was ultimately what her religious convictions ask of her. Judge Amico clarified the terms of her release, stating that if she refuses again to testify, however, she will immediately be returned to custody.
Despite the recent news of her release, the precedence still stands: Ms. Lindecrantz was denied her Free Exercise rights to practice her religion. Judge Amico had no constitutional means to punish and imprison Ms. Lindecrantz on behalf of simply observing and practicing her religion.
9 comments:
This is clearly a tricky case because it deals with a potential life or death situation at the hands of one individual. The "compelling state interest" of justly sentencing a prisoner in my opinion, clearly supersedes that of Minersville School District v. Gobtis, which the state claimed to be unifying the students through the Pledge of Allegiance. However compelling the state interest though, I still agree with you that Ms. Lindecrantz cannot be punished for refusing to testify because of her religious beliefs. If she had decided not to testify, the story of what happened regarding the murder would have only been half painted, but this is the price society faces when they guarantee citizens the right to freely exercise their religion. Also, the woman was the innocent one in this case so her justice may need to be prioritized over that of the criminal, however harsh this may sound.
There is a valid and compelling interest to make sure justice is served but at what cost. Ms. Lindecrantz first amendment rights to freedom of religion protects her from the imprisonment that Judge Amico gave her. Because we have these freedoms we must live with the consequences which include not having all the testimony that one would have wanted
The use of the Sherbert Test, in my opinion, is a valid method to determine whether or not an individual's free-exercise rights have been broken. Clearly, Ms. Lindencrantz is burdened by her legitimate religious concern, however, the compelling state interest of convicting a murderer is extremely great. If having Ms. Lindencrantz's testimony is the only way the prosecution is able to convict this murderer, then I think she must be forced to tell the court her story. That being said, there is likely other evidence to the case that would assist the prosecutors in convicting Mr.Ray, but if there is any chance without the testimony of Ms. L. that he will walk free, the compelling state interest is enough to require her to testify. I think the judge was wrong to put her in jail, but this is an example of how details matter in every free-exercise case. Perhaps rather than giving the death penalty the prosecution could have charged Mr.Ray with a life-sentence in order to get her to testify without completely defying her religious beliefs. All in all, I think the court is entitled in this case to do what it has to in order to put a vicious murderer behind bars.
The state has a compelling interest here and should be angered by this women's refusal to testify in this case with extreme circumstances. I see similar precedent to Employment Division v Smith for the law of the land is far more pressing than religious exemptions and beliefs if the well being of the person is being threatened. Overall the prosecutors have a legitimate reason to override the witness rights under Free Exercise if they deem her testimony to be needed for conviction.
I think the question of religion versus government is very interesting. In this case, the state had a compelling interest in having Ms. Lindencrantz testify, however where is the line to be drawn in terms of violating ones free exercise rights by calling it unlawful to stand by a religious belief, which in this case was to not participate in court testimonies.
While I understand Ms. Lindencrantz does not want to go against her religious belief, I agree with the other commenters that the compelling state interest of putting a murderer away is greater than protecting free exercise of religion. It may have been aggressive to put Ms. L in jail, and there is no doubt a burden is being placed on her to go against her religious convictions, but I think it is justified that she should have to testify as a witness for what she saw. This might be a substantial burden, but I do not think it is an unconstitutional one. There is justice that needs to be served for the lives lost, and everyone's testimony is important when deciding to sentence someone to death.
I agree with many of the other comments and would argue that there is a beyond compelling interest by the state to justly sentencing criminals. I am conflicted as to whether or not this interest outweighs the free exercise of Ms. Lindencrantz. I think in scenarios where the witness is the deciding factor in a trial then the state interest supersedes, but in situation where their testimony is not essential to the ruling the free exercise prevails.
I believe that this woman's rights were violated by Judge Amico, she clearly stated as to why her religion could not allow her to do that he did not seem to agree that that was a valid answer and punished her accordingly. This seems like a civil magistrate deciding what is a religion which as we have address many times in this course is a big issue. Also to the point that the court has a compelling state interest. in making her comply to their wishes, surely a murder conviction does not solely rest on the account of one witness.
I agree with the prior statements arguing that Judge Amico infringed upon the Free Exercise rights of Mrs. Lindecratz, yet she should be mandated to testify in court for the state has significantly more compelling interest in prosecuting a murder than it does protecting First Amendment rights. While I understand the contention that Lindecratz testimony in this matter could indirectly establish hostility between the state and the Mennonite religion if Mr. Ray were to receive the death penalty, his felonious actions merit significant consideration by the state for the safety of other citizens are in peril. Additionally, even if Ray were to receive the death penalty there would be a lack of correlation between Lindecratz and his death, for the jury would ultimately be the ones deciding the matter not Lindecratz. Finally, if Lindecratz were to be granted an exemption from testifying in the matter, the state would be giving preference to those of the Mennonite faith for those of other religious beliefs are not granted the same immunities from imprisonment.
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