St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy: Anti-discrimination in Public-funded Programs

The Supreme Court is hearing a case involving religious freedom and LGBTQ+ rights, both of which are perhaps the most polarizing constitutional questions in America today. Colorado has a universal preschool initiative set up to provide equal access to children called "Universal Preschool Colorado" (UPC). Preschools that participate in UPC must comply with the state's laws regarding nondiscriminatory practices and allow all children regardless of gender identity and sexual orientation to enroll in their programs. Catholic preschools affiliated with the Archdiocese of Denver, including St. Mary Catholic Parish, have refused to comply with these requirements because their faith prohibits them from serving children of same-gender couples or LGBTQ families. As a result, the state of Colorado will not include such Catholic preschools in the UPC. St. Mary Catholic Parish and its associated preschools have sued the state of Colorado, seeking damages.

The affected Catholic preschools claim that complying with the state’s requirements would force them to act in ways contrary to their beliefs about family and sexuality, and therefore believe Colorado is penalizing them for exercising their religious rights by excluding them from UPC. In contrast, Colorado contends that the law is neutral and generally applicable, meaning that any preschool (religious or not) can participate as long as it meets the clearly defined nondiscrimination standards. The lower courts ruled in favor of Colorado, confirming that the program does not target religion specifically, but instead applies a consistent standard to all recipients of government assistance. This case raises a significant constitutional issue that has yet to be addressed by the Court: Must the government provide accommodations for religious institutions trying to receive exemptions from general non-discrimination law when the government is providing public benefits? The issue relates to whether or not religious institutions should have to choose between their religion and other methods of accessing public programs.

Looking at similar cases, Employment Division v. Smith (1990) held that the government may enforce neutral and generally applicable laws that do not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if those laws may technically burden religious practice. Colorado has a long-standing reliance on the argument that its non-discrimination criteria applies to all preschools equally and has cited many cases to support this position. However, recent case law has resulted in an expansion of protections for religious claimants and given further indication that the Court may be increasingly inclined to grant exceptions for religious beliefs. For example, in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (2023), the Court found that a website designer's refusal to provide services to same-sex weddings demonstrated a need to protect religious and expressive rights. In light of these examples, the Court could want to extend the same latitude to the preschools’ religious beliefs.

The state of Colorado also relies upon the long-standing principle that anti-discrimination laws serve a compelling government interest. These laws protect all individuals from discrimination based on their sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation within all places of public accommodation. The state argues that allowing religious exemptions for public programs would undermine the State's protection of these groups and put vulnerable families at risk of being denied essential services.

I believe that the constitutional issue at hand cannot just be solved by focusing on one principle over another. Because the case involves both religious freedom and general equality, reaching a resolution requires an approach that considers each of these principles. I think the state of Colorado ultimately has the stronger argument in this case. This situation is not comparable to cases that have involved church governance or private conduct, as they relate to the church's own private internal governing processes and matters. Because the involved institutions must accept the publicly funded service rather than be granted the government funds by default, the state may rightfully require them to accept certain conditions. Additionally, allowing for exemptions in this instance would inhibit children’s access to preschool education based upon traits that the law specifically protects. 

In my opinion, the just outcome would be to uphold Colorado's policy, as it does not infringe upon religious autonomy on strictly internal matters, but rather concerns actions that externally conflict with basic fundamental principles of anti-discrimination. This outcome would create a distinction that preserves the integrity of the two principles at hand, such that the religious and nonreligious have the same level of freedom while still maintaining that the public (particularly when taxpayer funded) has the same level of access and equal opportunity for all.

Sources:

1. https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/04/supreme-court-will-hear-religious-liberty-case-on-catholic-preschools-and-lgbtq-families/

2. https://www.aclu-co.org/cases/st-mary-catholic-parish-v-roy-amicus/

3. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1213

4. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-476

Can you be in prison and still be religious? The court might say no.

 In Firewalker-Fields v. Lee the question of whether or not a Virginia correctional facility violated the First Amendment rights of a Muslim inmate by authorizing Christian centered religious services and allegedly restricting Islamic services. 

            In 2017, David Nighthorse Firewalker-Fields, a Sunni-Muslim inmate filed a complaint against the Middle River Regional Jail Authority and its Superintendent, Jack Lee. (Approximately 3 months after filing, Firewalker-Fields was transferred to the Virginia Department of Corrections where the legal battle continued.) This complaint was filed on the grounds that the prison was promoting Christianity, prohibiting Muslim religious practices, and unfairly segregating the broader Muslim community of the facility. Firewalker-Fields sought to participate in the Islamic Friday congregational prayer, Jumu’ah, but the prison claimed they were unable to accommodate this request due to a lack of volunteers and donations, and a limited number of available officers that would be required for this specific gathering. Ultimately, the prison argued “that kind of get-together for every faith was daunting.” This refusal of accommodation by the facility was seen as an abomination by Firewalker-Fields seeing as the facility permitted and facilitated Christian religious services. 

Firewalker-Fields was classified as a maximum-security inmate, which is why the prison deemed him ineligible from attending group activities including religious services. While this might seem like an imposition onto the inmate’s religious freedom under the First Amendment, it is understood that prisons such as the one Firewalker-Fields was placed into are granted the ability to burden, even significantly, an inmate’s religious practices, so long they are pursuing “legitimate penological interests.” The prison had three policies that the court ruled were in line with these “legitimate penological interests”: no prison groups led by inmates; no large, in-person groups or activities of maximum-security inmates allowed; and prison classes and activities must be organized by volunteer or donation only. In the end, while the question of whether or not the prison justifiably imposed on Firewalker-Fields’ constitutional right to Free Exercise is in a bit of a gray area, the court ruled in favor of the prison. The reason for this ruling was due to precedents set in Supreme Court cases such as O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz and Turner v. Safely.  

            The restrictions placed on Firewalker-Fields, however, were not the only actions subject to scrutiny in this case. Firewalker-Fields also raised Establishment Clause concerns, claiming that the prison was unequally promoting Christian religious services over Islamic and other religious sects’ services and activities. The prison claimed that this was due to a lack of volunteers and donations from other religious sects outside of Christian denominations. This still resulted in an indirect burden to many inmates in the way in which Christians had a greater opportunity to practice their faith in the facility. Through these volunteers and donations, the prison implemented what they saw as non-denominational religious classes which featured the Bible as the central teaching tool, and then most importantly for this case, they broadcast a sermon-like Christian video into all of the common areas of the facility on Sunday mornings. Firewalker-Fields commented that to avoid these facility practices one could either remain in his or her housing unit or be forced to listen to religious teachings they might disagree with; in short Firewalker-Fields claimed it felt like one had to “be Christian or be penalized.”

            In attempts to remedy this perceived oppressive nature of the prison, Firewalker-Fields requested to perform the traditional Islamic prayer of Jumu’ah under the supervision of the prison. This was in an attempt to have the facility begin to offer Islamic religious services and classes, which they did not already do so. He was refused on grounds that it would cause a safety risk to the facility. 

            This standard comes from O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, where the Supreme Court ruled that prison regulations restricting religious participation are constitutional if they are able to provide legitimate safety concerns. This precedent, applied in conjunction with the Turner Test, led the court to determine that the prison was justified in their restriction of Firewalker-Fields’ Free Exercise rights. In Turner v. Safely, the Supreme Court established what is now known as the Turner Test. The Turner Test is a four-factor rubric that questions: 1) rationality of restriction, 2) alternative means available, 3) impact on resources, and 4) absence of ready alternatives. With the precedent set in O’Lone and the use of the Turner Test, the court ruled against the Firewalker-Fields in his claims that the prison unlawfully imposed on his Free Exercise rights. The court however was ambivalent in their ruling regarding his Establishment Clause claims, inevitably remanding the decision back to the lower court to re-evaluate their earlier ruling. 

            The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) is designed to apply a stricter scrutiny in cases like these, the standard failed to assist Firewalker-Fields here. While it had the potential of providing Firewalker-Fields with his strongest argument, the government must meet strict scrutiny in addressing whether or not a burden is placed on an inmate’s religion, RLUIPA ultimately failed to assist Firewalker-Fields because it does not allow for monetary damages to be awarded in cases against state officials. Since the state the court could not change Firewalker-Fields’ sentence or shift the nature of the original claim, RLUIPA is unable to successfully support the case made by Firewalker-Fields. 

I believe Firewalker-Fields was slighted in the court’s ruling. Do I think that generally speaking, they applied the right precedents to this case? Yes, I do. However, I believe that the prison is being allowed to get away for very mediocre efforts to accommodate plurality of religious beliefs in the facility. While I understand the prisons must have an overriding state interest for safety within the facility; and I also understand that when you commit a crime you relinquish many of your rights, I still believe that the lack of considerate accommodation is unjust in this situation. Especially since there are clearly ways in which religion is broadly facilitated by the prison administration. If the prison wasn’t promoting any religious activity whatsoever and breaching the Establishment Clause of the first Amendment, than I believe that I would find myself positing a very different opinion. As it always seems to happen in cases like these, Firewalker-Fields wasn’t looking for preferential treatment, but equal treatment, a consideration I don’t believe was fully regarded in this ruling. 

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/197497.P.pdf

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/muslim-inmate-wins-another-shot-at-challenge-to-sunday-services

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1722

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1384

Free Exercise Debates in Mental Health Settings: Catholic Charities v. Whitmer

In recent years, as debates surrounding gender identity and youth mental health intensify, state governments across the country have increasingly intervened in the regulation of mental health treatment for minors who are experiencing gender dysphoria. One of these state governments is in Michigan, where there is a law that prohibits licensed mental health professionals from using non-affirming therapy practices, and as a result, these professionals must affirm a child’s beliefs about their gender and provide them with information about related medical interventions. These interventions include puberty blocking drugs, hormones, and surgeries. 

Thus, the case of Catholic Charities v. Whitmer is introduced. Emily McJones, a Catholic therapist who includes her religious faith in her everyday counseling practice, works with children experiencing psychological distress related to their gender identity. Through her Catholic faith, McJones seeks to help her clients explore the underlying causes of their distress, rather than affirming their expressed gender identity or endorsing any medical procedures. Specifically, McJones emphasizes the Catholic belief that God created only two human biological sexes, male and female, in her counseling. However, the Michigan law prohibits McJones and other religious mental health professionals from offering this type of therapy, placing them in a position where they must either change their practice, misaligning it with their religious beliefs, or they must risk losing their professional licenses and paying fines amounting to $250,000.

In June 2024, McJones filed a lawsuit challenging the law alongside a Catholic Charities counseling ministry and other mental health professionals. The lead defendant in this case is Gretchen Whitmer, who is the current Governor of Michigan. The Whitmer case raises the constitutional question:

Does a Michigan law prohibiting Catholic mental health professionals from using non-gender affirming therapeutic practices in their counseling violate their First Amendment right to Free Exercise?

In an amicus brief filed in support of McJones, the neutrality of the Michigan law is questioned. While the law was created to protect the beliefs of all children questioning their gender identity, the brief notes how it allows for only one viewpoint regarding gender identity to be used within therapeutic settings, and that viewpoint directly defies Catholic professionals’ religious beliefs. Additionally, McJones believes she has a compelling interest as a Catholic mental health professional to prevent young, impressionable children from partaking in gender-affirming medical procedures that are both irreversible and potentially harmful. Specifically, while these procedures were once thought to be scientifically validated and safe, more recent research suggests that the support for them is “weaker” than originally thought, as critics refer to the ongoing debate about long-term outcomes and risks associated with these interventions, including a number of health problems ranging from sexual dysfunction to cancer. Overall, given the goals of McJones’s religious practice and the lack of neutrality of the Michigan law, supporters of this brief describe the law as an indirect, yet substantial burden on McJones’s free exercise of religion.

Contrastingly, supporters of the Michigan law argue that the state has a compelling interest in protecting minors from potentially coercive therapeutic practices. They uphold the neutrality of the Michigan law, referencing its application to all mental health professionals, not just religious ones. From this perspective, there is a further compelling state interest in providing children with mental health treatment that validates their experiences and affirms their gender identity. Supporters of the Michigan law refer to the potential psychological harms that children may face if therapists discourage their expressed gender identities. In all, the state seeks to prioritize the protection of the mental well-being of minors experiencing gender dysphoria over individual providers’ rights to practice in accordance with their religious beliefs.

A relevant Supreme Court case that may act as a precedent in Whitmer is Employment Division v. Smith (1990). In Smith, the court argued that neutral laws which are generally applicable do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if an individual’s compliance with them incidentally burdens their religious practice. This precedent suggests that if Michigan’s law is truly neutral in practice and applied equally to all mental health counselors, then it is constitutional. However, another case, NIFLA v. Becerra (2018), complicates this debate. In Becerra, the court struck down a law that required pregnancy centers to provide patients with abortion services information, arguing that the government cannot compel individuals to share messages that violate their religious beliefs. This precedent suggests that if Michigan’s law requires counselors to endorse practices which they fundamentally disagree with, then it is unconstitutional. 

Therefore, based on the current arguments and the precedent in Becerra in particular, I would rule in favor of McJones and Catholic Charities in this case. I would argue that the Michigan law is not facially neutral to begin with, because it regulates counselors’ practice in a way that coerces them to affirm a particular viewpoint on gender identity. The viewpoint permissible by the law is in direct violation of Catholic mental health professionals’ religious beliefs. Thus, the Smith precedent is not applicable in Whitmer because the law itself is not neutrally applicable. Moreover, while I understand that the state does have an interest in protecting minors from psychological harm and providing them with proper care, I think that the compelling state interest in protecting these children from potential irreversible health effects is more crucial, given that gender-affirming care options are the subject of current ongoing medical and scientific debates regarding long-term health effects.

Religious Expression and Solicitation in Public Parks

 On January 16th, 2026, Brant Zeller and his friend visited Woldenberg Park in New Orleans to practice their Christian faith and evangelize by sharing the gospel with pedestrians in Woldenberg Park. They held signs that expressed their beliefs and distributed literature while engaging in conversations to communicate their religious message. Their approach was peaceful and non-disruptive, as they did not use amplification or aggressive tactics. Despite this, they were stopped by New Orleans Police as a result of a complaint from a park employee. The city code prohibits solicitation in public parks, including the distribution of materials such as religious literature. The officers warned them that if they did not leave immediately, they could be removed or arrested. In response, First Liberty Institute, a nonprofit law firm that supports religion cases, sent a demand letter to the City of New Orleans on Zeller’s behalf, arguing that the enforcement of this policy violated his constitutional rights. 

The events in Woldenberg Park raise significant constitutional questions involving both the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. While the City of New Orleans justified its actions by citing a general prohibition on solicitation, the situation is not only about regulating speech in a public space. It raises real concerns about whether a facially neutral law can constitutionally restrict an individual's ability to engage in religious practices, such as evangelism, in a public forum. For Brant Zeller, sharing his faith in a public park is not simply expressive conduct, but a fundamental aspect of practicing his Christian faith. Evangelism has long been recognized as a form of religious exercise, which centers on spreading beliefs through conversations and distributing literature. Restricting this activity appears to impose a burden on Zeller’s free exercise rights. If a law is not neutral or is applied in a way that affects religious conduct, it could be subject to strict scrutiny through courts. The city's prevention of solicitation raises concerns about whether it is being applied in a way that burdens religious activity more than other forms of expression. 

At the same time, the City of New Orleans may argue that its solicitation prevention is due to government interests unrelated to religion. The purpose of preventing solicitation is typically to maintain order, protect visitors from unwanted interactions, and prevent heavy traffic in areas such as parks. While these are real concerns that cities often work to prevent, it is important to consider if this broad restriction is actually achieving those goals without unnecessarily burdening religious exercise. 

In addition, Louisiana has a state-level Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which explains that the government may not substantially burden the free exercise of religion unless it serves a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving the interest. Spreading faith is a core religious practice, meaning the city would need a strong justification for the burden and be able to prove that there are no less restrictive means to achieve this interest.  

This issue relates to Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), where the Supreme Court held that individuals have a right to engage in religious solicitation and distribute literature, even in public spaces, as a part of their free exercise rights. This case emphasizes that peaceful evangelism is a protected religious activity, especially in public forums. 

The constitutional framework was later narrowed in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), where the Supreme Court held that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if they incidentally burden religious practice. Here, the City of New Orleans would likely argue that its solicitation rule is neutral and applies to all individuals regardless of the content of their speech. However, this case is complicated by Louisiana's RFRA, which requires courts to apply strict scrutiny when a law substantially burdens religious exercise, rather than the standard in Smith. As a result, the focus shifts away from whether the law is generally applicable and toward whether the City can justify its restriction under a constitutional test. Even if the policy is upheld under Smith, it must still satisfy RFRA’s requirement that the government use the least restrictive means. 

I think that the City’s enforcement of the city code against all solicitation and against Brant Zeller is an unconstitutional application of the law because it places a substantial burden on his free exercise of religion. While the city has legitimate interests in maintaining order and preventing unwanted or disruptive actions in the park, those interests do not justify a broad restriction that effectively prohibits sharing religious messages, which is a key religious conviction of Zeller. Under RFRA, the city must show that its policy is the least restrictive means of achieving its goals. Preventing all types of solicitation is broader than what is necessary. Less restrictive alternatives, such as regulating aggressive conduct or obstruction, could address the city's concerns without limiting Zeller’s religious practice. This issue shows the importance of protecting religious exercise in traditional public forums and ensuring that regulations do not unintentionally prevent constitutionally protected religious practices. 

Sources: 

https://firstliberty.org/cases/brant-zeller/#simple1 

https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-04-08-Demand-Letter-sent-to-City-Zeller_Redacted.pdf 

https://legis.la.gov/Legis/Law.aspx?p=y&d=725122

California AB 1578: Anti-Hate Speech Training and Free Exercise

A bill that would require elected state officials to complete mandatory anti-hate speech training called AB 1578 is currently moving through the California legislature. AB 1578 was composed by Corey Jackson, who represents the 60th State Assembly District, and passed the Assembly Committee on Local Government on April 14th by a 8-2 vote. It would embed one hour of anti-hate speech training into California’s sexual harassment prevention training, which the state already requires for state and local officials. The bill would become effective on January 1, 2028. The bill would not just apply to state level officials, but also city council members, county supervisors, and school board trustees across the 58 counties of California. 

The bill specifically states that state agencies must offer ethics training at least twice a year, and that officials must attend every two years. Officials must also complete anti-hate speech training within six months of taking office, then every four years from there. Local agency officials specifically must complete the hour of training within six months of taking office, and attend every four years after. The California constitution also requires reimbursement for this training. Jackson claimed that the bill was an appropriate public safety response to “documented trends in hate activity”, referencing findings from the Commission on the State of Hate. He claimed that words of officials heavily influence hatred, claiming that they are “the primary impetus of hate crimes”. With this, he suggests that correcting this through AB 1578 will uphold the state's claim of valuing equality. 

That being said, California and the federal government do not currently have an official legal definition for “hate speech”. The Supreme Court case Matal v. Tam upheld the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech and ruled that the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act, which denied trademarks that disparage, was unconstitutional. The bill additionally delegates the curriculum design to exterior parties and does not establish standards for who develops the training or what views may be promoted in the training. 

Given this lack of definition and delegation of content and interpretation to exterior parties, residents of California have raised concerns about subjectivity and bias among the training. The California Family Council (CFC) believes that this training will label unpopular Christian viewpoints related to sexuality and gender as hateful based on comments from California legislators over recent years. The CFC specifically stated that “Mandatory ideological training that frames certain viewpoints, particularly traditional religious beliefs about marriage, sexuality, or gender, as inherently hateful would stigmatize these individuals”. With this, a couple concerns are raised regarding the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Firstly, Christians and other religious practitioners must make the choice to either comply with training that may frame their sincerely held beliefs as intolerable, or fail a government mandated requirement. Secondly, since Free Exercise protects from acting against one’s religious beliefs, and the Free Speech protects from being forced to conform with beliefs that one rejects. With that, one could argue that the bill requiring officials to treat religious beliefs as hate could implicate both. This raises the question: does requiring mandatory training that may label certain religious views as “hate speech” violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

This case is similar to Sherbert v. Verner since government officials were forced to make a choice between religious convictions and public benefit, with both cases creating a choice between faith and office. In addition, in Sherbert the state placed an indirect burden by denying benefits, and in this bill, opposers argue that the state is imposing an indirect burden by requiring officials to go through training that may deem their sincerely held religious beliefs to be intolerable hate speech. 

In my opinion, this bill is unconstitutional as it forces officials to make a choice between faith and office. First and foremost, the fact that it is built around the term “hate speech”, which is not defined by the California or US government, is already questionable. Given that the training is administered with hostility toward religious viewpoints, which the CFC suggests that the California legislature has already demonstrated, a substantial burden is placed on free exercise. If an official with sincerely held religious beliefs must sit through this training that frames their beliefs as hateful in order to remain in office, the government is implying that the practice of their faith makes them unfit for their position. While the bill looks neutral from the surface as it applies to all, the fact that it would burden certain religious beliefs in practice makes it not neutral. In addition, since there are no defined standards of curriculum content, the state can delegate curriculums which target viewpoints that they oppose, making it not generally accessible. While the state’s interest in reducing hate speech and crimes is compelling, the government would likely not be able to prove that this training is the least restrictive means in achieving this as the training labels certain beliefs as hateful. The bill would need to define “hate speech”, establish standards for content, and explicitly exclude sincerely held religious beliefs from that definition in order to achieve the least restrictive means.

 

Harris v. Muhammad

Maurice Lydell Harris is a California state prisoner who identifies as a Nichiren Buddhist. As a Nichiren Buddhist, Harris believes that he must follow a clean diet. The clean diet includes “‘not highly processed,’ ‘organic,’ ‘not artificial or synthetic,’ ‘described as natural,’ and which do not ‘have a chemical-sounding name.’” While the prison did not have a specific diet program for his specific religion, he enrolled in the halal prison diet, as he believed that this was the program that most closely aligned with his religious beliefs. The prison diet that Harris chose was called the Religious Meat Alternative Program (RMAP). However, the prison removed him from the diet plan when he “purchased non-halal items from the prison commissary.” Harris argued that his First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) rights were violated, so he filed suit. 

The RMAP diet that Harris enrolled in had specific requirements for its participants. It required that they not purchase any food that is not part of their religious diets, but are allowed to eat those foods if the RMAP meals are unavailable for whatever reason. California argues that these rules must be enforced strictly because, if they aren’t, it opens the door to people who enroll in the program insincerely, simply because they prefer the food to the normal diet plan. It also costs more than the normal meal plans, so the prison wants to make sure that every member of the diet is sincere. 

In 2018, the prison changed the ingredients of the RMAP, replacing “halal meat with vegetarian options.” Harris said that he felt malnourished, and his doctor told him to increase the amount of calories and protein he was eating. Harris also had an irregular heartbeat, and all of these factors led him to buy non-halal products. He bought non-halal items such as “beef and chicken flavored instant ramen soups, pork rinds, beef steaks, and salami.” All of these are highly processed foods, which violate the halal diet. In 2019, Harris received his first warning and continued to get warnings all the way through 2022. Harris argued that the ramen products were a “staple in Nichiren Buddhist culture.” In 2023, Harris received more violations and was eventually cut from the RMAP. Harris filed for a preliminary injunction but was denied by the district court. 

The primary issue the Ninth Circuit had to decide was whether Harris's beliefs were sincere. The decision first went through the lower court, in which the Ninth Circuit Court argued that they made a poor decision as they “erroneously dictated the content of Harris’s beliefs and questioned the centrality of those beliefs.” The lower court agreed with the prison and decided to affirm the decision to cut Harris from the RMAP. The Ninth Circuit Court decided to review the decision made by the district court because it believed that there could be a case of abuse of discretion. The Court argued that neither the district court nor the prison “inquired into the sincerity of Harris’s beliefs, only their centrality to his religion.” The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the decision, meaning that the decision made by the district court would be nullified and the Ninth Circuit would send it back to the district court for a correct ruling, making sure they look at all of the factors. 

Harris argued that denying him access to the RMAP was a substantial burden on his religious exercise. He argued that prison forced him to choose between following a diet that partially followed his religious beliefs, and following that diet, but breaking the rules of the diet to buy other foods he believed were important to him, following his religion. He is essentially saying that he will either have to sacrifice his religious beliefs or his health. The Court argued that Harris is requesting to be reenrolled in RMAP while allowing him to purchase other goods that also follow his religious beliefs. He is not asking for a separate meal plan; he is just asking to be able to accommodate himself while still following the basic dietary guidelines of the RMAP. 

A relevant precedent is O’lone v Estate of Shabazz(1987) because it deals with prisoners' religious rights. Two prisoners, Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen, were Muslim inmates at New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison and were denied the opportunity to go to their weekly religious service on Fridays. They were denied because of their classification within the prison and were forced to work during the weekly service. They sued the prison, arguing that their Free Exercise rights had been violated. The Third Circuit Court agreed with the inmates, arguing that the prison was required to seek alternatives and present proof that there were no other reasonable alternatives. The Supreme Court overturned its decision, arguing that the prison had a compelling interest in keeping order within the prison. They also concluded that being held in a prison places necessary limitations on inmates' rights, and they felt that to keep order within the prison, a necessary burden had to be placed on the inmates' rights. 

In my opinion, I agree with Harris’s argument. The prison does not have a plan that follows Harris’s specific religion, so he was forced to join the RMAP, which only partially followed his religious beliefs. The RMAP also switched out the protein from the halal meat to vegetarian options, which had an impact on the health of Harris. The doctor said that he needed to consume more protein, which made Harris need to buy non-halal foods to make up for the protein he was missing. Not only was there a substantial burden on his religious beliefs when he was removed from the program, but there were also significant health concerns. The health concerns were a result of the RMAP changing the ingredients, and there were no records of Harris violating the RMAP before 2017-2018, because he was getting the protein he needed. He also claims that the foods he bought did not violate his specific religious diet, even if they violated the RMAP guidelines. There isn’t enough of a compelling interest from the prison or the state to deny Harris access to the RMAP, with the ability to purchase products that violate the RMAP. All of the prisoners in that specific diet program already follow it because it is their specific religion. Harris is not Muslim, but it is the best option that fits his Nichiren Buddhist religious beliefs. He should be reenrolled in the RMAP with the exemption, unless the court determines that he is insincere in his religious beliefs. 

Sources:

24-3307.pdf

24-3307 Harris v. Muhammad, et al. - YouTube

O'lone v. Estate Of Shabazz | Oyez

When ICE Comes to Church: Does the Revocation of the Sensitive Locations Policy Violate RFRA?

            The case of Mennonite Church USA v. US Department of Homeland Security raises a question that sits at the intersection of immigration enforcement and religious freedom: when does the federal government’s conduct at or near a house of worship cross the line into a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act? On January 20, 2025, the Trump administration rescinded the Department of Homeland Security’s “sensitive location” policy, which had restricted Immigration and Customs Enforcement from conducting raids at churches, mosques, synagogues and schools for over thirty years. In its place, the acting DHS Secretary directed ICE officers to rely on “discretion” and “common sense” when conducting enforcement actions at places of worship. Within weeks of the change, over two dozen Christian and Jewish organizations filed suit against the DHS in deferral court. The case remains active on appeal before the D.C. Circuit Court.

           The plaintiffs’ argument is grounded primarily in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless it can demonstrate that the burden furthers a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. This standard is applied even when the burden results from a facially neutral, generally applicable policy. Unlike a purely First Amendment challenge, RFRA cannot be sidestepped by simply arguing that the rescission was not aimed at religion. The question is whether it substantially burdens religious exercise in practice and if it does, the burden shifts entirely to the government to justify it.

            The facts of the case suggest the answer to the first question is yes. Since the rescission, congregations with large immigrant memberships reported large drops in attendance, with some losing up to 100 weekly attendees. Congregations providing food distribution, soup kitchens, and weekly meals (which the plaintiffs argue is an expression of their faith not an optional charity) have also reported declining participation. When congregation members stop attending services because ICE may enter, or when food pantries become empty because those who need help are afraid enter, the ability to actively exercise religion as a group is diminished.

           The District Court, in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction in April of 2025, focuses mainly on standing rather than the merits of the RFRA claim itself. The ruling judge found that the plaintiffs had not established a credible threat of enforcement because DHS had not specifically directed agents to target churches. This is an important distinction because standing doctrine and RFRA’s substantial burden analysis are separate inquires which will need to be examined by the D.C. Circuit Court. The attendance declines alone provide significant evidence of the presence of a substantial burden, even without direct enforcement action at a plaintiff’s church.

            Assuming substantial burden can be established, the government then faces two additional hurdles: demonstrating compelling interest and proving it has chosen the least restrictive means of achieving its goal. On the issue of compelling interest, the government must show a specific interest that justifies the burden on this form of religious exercise. The relevant question is not whether immigration enforcement is compelling in the abstract, but whether there is compelling interest in conducting enforcement specifically at or near a place of worship rather than somewhere else. The DHS offered no evidence that the prior sensitive locations policy had allowed criminals to shelter in churches or meaningfully impeded immigration enforcement.

            Furthermore, the least restrictive means facet of RFRA is where the DHS’s position is the weakest. The prior sensitive locations policy itself was a less restrictive alternative to immigration enforcement as it permitted enforcement actions at houses of worship under emergency circumstances or written supervisory approval. That framework coexisted with immigration enforcement for more than thirty years. Replacing it with nothing more than personal officer discretion is very difficult to justify as the least restrictive option when a more tailored alternative had already existed for so long.

            In my opinion, the plaintiffs ultimately have a stronger argument, even if the District Court’s procedural ruling was defensible on its own terms. What stands out to me the most is the least restrictive means question. The government is not being asked to totally stop enforcing immigration law, but rather they are being asked to explain why it needs to enforce it specifically inside places of worship without any procedural guardrails. The prior policy answered that question for thirty years. The rescission of the policy provides no answer at all.

            That being said, I do think that this case exposes a genuine tension between religion and executive power. Immigration enforcement is legitimate and constitutionally grounded function of the executive branch, and courts historically have been rather reluctant to oppose enforcement policies. One could argue that requiring supervisory approval before entering a church imposes a true operational constraint on time-sensitive executive action. But under RFRA, the government does not get the benefit of the doubt, rather it bears the burden of providing sufficient proof. The complete elimination of a decades-old protective framework, without evidence of necessity and without considering a less restrictive alternative, does not meet the burden of proof required.

            Ultimately, Mennonite Church USA v. US Department of Homeland Security asks whether RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard has any real force when invoked against widespread executive enforcement priorities. The answer the D.C. Circuit gives will matter beyond immigration policy. If the government can suddenly rescind longstanding protections for religious exercise without satisfying RFRA’s demanding tests, the practical value of the statute and its protections become significantly diminished. The church has long been understood as a place of sanctuary. Whether that understanding survives this time of aggressive enforcement is now up to the courts.

Sources:

https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11490

https://www.brethren.org/news/2025/general-secretarys-declaration-filed/

https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/our-work/defending-immigrants-and-sanctuary-cities/mennonite-church-usa-v-u-s-department-of-homeland-security/

https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/mennonite-church-usa-v-u-s-department-of-homeland-security-u-s-district-court-for-d-c-2025/

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/religious-groups-sue-over-immigration-raids-at-places-of-worship

Coates v. Williamson et al.

Keshel S. Coates is an African American, non-Catholic woman employed as a first-grade teacher at St. Peter Claver Catholic School (SPCCS). Coates brought this case against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Savannah (RCDS), SPCCS, Principal Sister Cheryl Hillig, and the school Superintendent Carrie Jane Williamson. She alleged nine counts of allegations against the group, of which the major allegations were race and religious discrimination, constitutional violations, and a breach of contract.

Coates stated that during her interview, she informed Hillig that she would not worship as a Catholic. Hillig allegedly assured her and stated that she would only need to escort students to Mass, while another teacher handled religious instruction. Despite these assurances being only verbal, Coates signed employment agreements stating that her employment was conditional and rested on her adhering to Catholic tenets, thus acknowledging her role was "Ministerial." Throughout her time on the job, Coates received positive reviews and initially did not participate in religious rituals, as she stated she would not. However, she alleges that Hillig eventually pressured her to participate in religious rituals, such as requiring all faculty, religious and non-religious, to receive ashes on Ash Wednesday. 

In April of 2024, Coates provided a police statement regarding an incident involving another teacher and a student. Afterward, she alleges she faced increased scrutiny and "fabricated allegations." Then, on May 29, 2024, a month later, Coates was informed her contract would not be renewed by SPCCS. The reason given was her failure to "fully participate in the religious aspects" of the school program, which she alleged was verbally promised she wouldn’t have to do. Coates then filed a lawsuit based on nine expressed counts, of which three, in relation to religious discrimination under Title VII, were dismissed. Three more, in relation to employment discrimination and retention, proceeded, and the final three were dismissed as well.

The US District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed Coates’ claims for religious discrimination under Title VII. Title VII contains an express exemption allowing religious educational institutions to employ individuals based on their religious beliefs. Because SPCCS is a religious institution, it is legally permitted, in some ways, to discriminate based on religion for work connected to its activities. Thus, Coates' claims of religious discrimination were denied by the Court.

 Williamson et al. argued that the "ministerial exception," which prevents courts from interfering in how religious groups select their leaders, should be able to block all of Coates’ employment claims. However, upon examining the role required of Coates, the Court found that while Coates’ contract called her a "minister," she had reasonably claimed that her duties in practice were secular. She did not teach religion or lead prayer in any way, and SPCCS allegedly accepted her non-participation for two years. Due to the fact that it was plausible she served a non-ministerial function, the motion to dismiss her employment claims was denied by the court.

Lastly, Coates alleged that there were violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the Court found that section 1983 only applied to "state actors" acting under color of law. SPCCS was considered a private entity; thus, the Court ruled that receiving federal funds or being subject to state accreditation does not turn a private school into a state actor. Ultimately, this meant that the claims made by Coates via section 1983 were dismissed. In the end, the court chose to proceed with the claims on Racial discrimination (Title VII/§ 1981), retaliation claims, and state law claims/breach of contract.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC is an important case to look toward when thinking about how the ministerial exemption is being discussed in Coates v. Williamson et al. Historically, the court has decided the role of “ministerial” through the actions and duties of the individual in question. Contrary to Perch in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the court found that although the role upon hiring was ministerial, the role in practice was not religious. Coates was restrained from getting involved with any religious practices within her duties; this was judged differently from Perch, who was deeply involved with both the religious and secular parts of her job. Furthermore, Perch was a leader within the church and school communities and acted as a direct public representation of the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School. 

Another important case that played a role in this decision is Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, which was quoted by the judge when making the decisions for Coates v. Williamson et al. Following the decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the court reinforced its evaluation of the role of a minister. The Court’s decision in Morrissey-Berru led to the expansion of ministerial exemption as it held that the formal title of ministerial doesn't matter as much as function, and even teachers with relatively limited religious duties can fall under the exception. I believe Coates’ greatest challenge will be centered around her duty being non-religious, but her signing agreements which label her official capacity as ministerial. As she agreed to the role and the weight the title bears. Furthermore, the agreement stated that teachers would serve as “a Catholic role model, both inside and outside the classroom, regardless of his/her personal beliefs or different religious affiliation.”

 Coates also technically failed to meet the criteria given by the school; thus, her termination was indeed valid. The court may be able to find evidence of retaliation, but when looking at whether the claim is reasonable, I believe that it is. Coates' claim to a verbal agreement holds little to no weight against written agreements; thus, I do not believe this aspect of the case will be ruled in her favor. With the decisions made in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, I believe that Coates has some chances of winning the case, but I can also make various points in which she may not.

South Carolina Resident refuses Poll Working's 'So Help Me God' requirement

On October 8, 2025, South Carolina resident James Reel filed a lawsuit against the Greenville County Voter Registration Office for violating his right to freedom of religious expression and the Establishment Clause. Reel sought to become a poll worker for future elections and attempted to complete the training required before the 2024 November election. In December 2023, after completing the required online poll worker training courses, Reel learned about the religious oath required of poll workers. Applicants who complete the training are required to certify an oath prescribed by the statute. The oath includes the statement, “So help me God,” which Reel claimed went against his beliefs as an atheist. He said that he, with his conscience as a non-believer, can’t swear by God. Reel called a representative of the county elections office to request that he be allowed to strike out that part of the oath. However, the representative stated that the oath was dictated by the state’s statute, so a version of the oath without that phrase wouldn’t be valid. Reel tried to offer a secular alternative to the oath, but that also wasn’t accepted.

There’s an implication within S.C. Code § 7-13-72, stating “After their appointment, the managers and clerks must take and subscribe, before any officer authorized to administer oaths, the following oath of office prescribed by Section 26 of Article III of the Constitution: 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm)...” An affirmation, unlike an oath, is a vow without referring to a religious deity, but the Interim Executive Director declared that citizens who don’t abide by the oath are ineligible to work as a poll worker and that affirmations/exceptions weren’t an option for future applicants. In response, the Freedom From Religion Foundation, composed of thousands of atheists, agnostics, and other religious dissenters, informed the director that the practice of an oath violated the First Amendment. They claimed that the Constitution bans any religious tests for public offices as "neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion, in correspondence with Torcaso v. Watkins (1961).

In that case, Roy Torcaso was appointed as a notary public for Maryland. However, Maryland’s constitution required a declaration of belief in God, and Torcaso, an atheist, refused, as it went against his beliefs. His appointment was revoked, and Torcaso sued, claiming that his freedom of religious expression had been violated. The Supreme Court found that Maryland’s requirement for a person in office to state a belief in God violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, in 1997, Herb Silverman’s application for notary public in South Carolina was denied when he crossed out the phrase, “So help me God,” and the Supreme Court once again ruled that religious test requirements violate the Constitution.

Although the FFRF argued that the statement is coercive and denies nontheists or polytheists the right to serve as poll workers without believing in a singular deity, the Director held that the policy complies with  S.C. Code § 7-13-72. FFRF also argued that by not allowing an alternative, it’s a violation of the Establishment Clause as it’s a legal statute coercing a statement of belief in a singular God. The lawsuit specified that South Carolina routinely lets attorneys, jurors, and witnesses make secular affirmations as alternatives. Reel specified in his lawsuit that he wanted a permanent injunction that prohibits defendants from requiring citizens to swear to a god and requiring that they offer a secular alternative in the oath.

No ruling has officially been made, but I believe that the court should rule in favor of Reel. There’s already been previous Supreme Court rulings that establish that requiring religious tests is a violation, and while one could argue that needing to swear to God isn’t a religious test, the fact that no secular alternative or exemption is allowed, as well as the director calling that the oath needs to remain as is even though affirmations was included in the policy, I would argue that it is. Additionally, a statute requiring the swearing of God has no compelling state interest, as attorneys and others have been allowed to make secular affirmations already. While the inclusion of the word God has been embedded in things like the Pledge of Allegiance and other Oaths, I believe this issue is denying Reels the ability to make a secular alternative. Other religious groups such as Quakers and Jehovah' s Witnesses have barred swearing, so there’s a neutrality issue in my opinion. And finally, requiring the statement is coercive and compelled speech, as it forces people who might not agree with the swearing to a singular God by putting a job on the line.

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