Friday, May 1, 2026

Ban on Demonstrations at Healthcare Facilities & Free Exercise Rights

    Matthew Lipscomb is a pro-life advocate from Detroit, Michigan and these beliefs are rooted in his Christian faith. Specifically, Lipscomb believes that life begins at conception and that every individual was created in God’s image and deserves a chance to live, so he thinks that abortion is wrong as it ends a life. As a result of his religious convictions Lipscomb wanted to share his beliefs with as many people as possible, so he would go to public sidewalks that border an abortion clinic in Michigan to speak with women and other individuals entering the facility. He would also hold whiteboard signs to share his pro-life views and offer those entering the clinic with information about abortion alternatives.
    In October of 2024, the city of Detroit enacted Ordinance § 31-14-1 et seq. “Offenses at Healthcare Facilities” which aimed to minimize demonstrations from taking place outside of all healthcare facilities. Specifically, the policy made it criminal for individuals within 15 feet of the entrance to “knowingly congregate, patrol, picket, or demonstrate.” It also made it criminal for those within 100 feet of an entrance to “knowingly approach within eight feet of another person” and prohibited individuals from engaging in protest, education, or counseling without consent from the other person near these facilities. In Lipscomb’s view, this severely restricts his free speech and free exercise rights because it prevents him from sharing what he believes to be God’s message.
    As a result of this, Lipscomb filed suit against the city of Detroit claiming that the ordinance is unconstitutional. He also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The central issue that the court will consider is: Does Detroit Ordinance § 31-14-1 et seq. “Offenses at Healthcare Facilities” violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
    In cases that may inflict a burden on the Free Exercise rights of citizens it is important to consider if there is a state-level Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in place. However, this is not directly applicable in this case because the state of Michigan does not have a state-level RFRA policy. Nevertheless, the precedent set in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) should still guide this decision. Specifically, this case held that neutral, generally applicable laws which incidentally burden religious exercise are constitutional. The holding in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) is also relevant because it asserted that policies which directly target a religious practice are not neutral.
    Given these precedents, the city of Detroit would likely argue that this law is neutral and generally applicable because it applies to all people regardless of the message they are sharing. The policy also does not target any particular religious practice or belief; rather, it places a ban on all advocacy regardless of if it is religiously based or offers a pro-life or pro-choice perspective. Furthermore, even though there is no state-level RFRA in place, the city would also likely highlight that there is a compelling state interest for this policy as it makes healthcare facilities more secure. Specifically, there is evidence that protestors outside of abortion clinics sometimes physically block entrances and their presence adds unnecessary levels of anxiety for patients and staff. Therefore, in the city’s view, patients, visitors, and healthcare professionals would be more safely able to access these places because of the ordinance.
    After considering the facts of this case, I would hold the Michigan policy to be constitutional because it is neutral and generally applicable. This is because the ordinance applies to all people regardless of their religious beliefs and importantly regulates behavior outside of all healthcare facilities. This is a critical distinction, because Lipscomb has expressed that the policy is pro-abortion as he feels that it restricts his ability to share his pro-life beliefs; however, because the ordinance applies to all healthcare facilities, not just abortion facilities and does not target any particular religious belief or viewpoint on abortion making the ordinance neutral and generally applicable.
    It is equally as important to note that this policy serves the important purpose of keeping healthcare facilities secure. Specifically, it minimizes the barriers that patients may face when attempting to access healthcare as protests or other demonstrations outside of the facility which they are entering could deter them from accessing the care that they need. Moreover, this would also minimize the number of barriers that providers face when going to work so that important care can be provided to patients. In sum, the ordinance appears to be neutral and generally applicable and it serves an important purpose, so I hold it to be constitutional.


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