Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools

Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools

Kimberly Polk was a substitute teacher for Montgomery County Public Schools in Maryland. The school district had a policy that required staff members to address students by their preferred names and pronouns and to keep students' gender identities private unless students gave permission. Polk refused to agree to the policy and requested a religious accommodation. She believed that using pronouns that did not match a student's biological sex would be dishonest and that parents should know about their children's gender identity.

Polk discussed other ways to continue teaching with a school district employee. One option was teaching in certain elementary classrooms with another staff member available for gender identity situations. The school district denied her request and she was not allowed to work as a substitute teacher for the next two school years. In May 2024, Polk filed a lawsuit against the school district arguing that the policy violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. She also stated that the district failed to accommodate her religious beliefs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This raises the constitutional question in Polk v. Montgomery County Public Schools: Does requiring a public school teacher to follow a policy that conflicts with her religious beliefs violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

The District Court sided with Montgomery County Public Schools and rejected Polk’s First Amendment arguments. One of the things the court looked at was whether the school district’s policy was neutral and generally applicable. This came from Employment Division v. Smith where the Supreme Court decided that a neutral and generally applicable rule can still be constitutional even if it places a burden on someone’s religious practices. The District Court decided that the policy met these requirements because it applied to all school staff members no matter what their religion was. The court also explained that the school district had a legitimate interest in protecting students and following federal law. Because of this, the court decided that requiring Polk to follow the policy did not violate her right to freely exercise her religion, but they did allow Polk's Title VII claim about religious accommodation to continue.

Polk disagreed with the District Court’s decision and appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. She said that the policy forced her to choose between following her Christian beliefs and continuing to work as a substitute teacher. Polk also argued that Employment Division v. Smith should not control her case. The Fourth Circuit explained that lower courts were still required to use Smith unless the Supreme Court overturned it. The court agreed with the District Court that the school district’s policy was neutral and generally applicable for the same reasons. Even though the court recognized that the policy placed a burden on Polk’s religious beliefs it explained that alone did not make the policy unconstitutional. The court also said there were legitimate reasons for the policy, being to follow federal law and for the safety of the children. Another part of Polk’s case was that the policy violated her freedom of speech by requiring her to use certain names and pronouns. The Fourth Circuit explained that teachers do not have the same free speech protections when they are speaking as part of their official job responsibilities and because addressing students was part of Polk’s job as a substitute teacher the court decided that the school district could require her to follow the policy. As a result, the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal of Polk’s First Amendment claims.

An important Supreme Court precedent to consider in Polk's case is Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of a public high school football coach who was punished for praying on the field after games. The Court decided that his prayers were protected by the First Amendment because they were a form of personal religious expression instead of part of his job responsibilities. The Court said that other employees were allowed to engage in personal activities, but Kennedy was not allowed to pray. This relates to Polk's case because both involved free speech with public school employees whose religious beliefs conflicted with their schools' rules. However, Kennedy's prayer was considered personal expression while using students' preferred names and pronouns was part of Polk's responsibilities as a teacher. Also, unlike Kennedy's situation the policy in Polk's case applied to all staff members.

I agree with the Fourth Circuit's decision in this case. I understand that the policy placed a burden on Polk's religious beliefs but, I do not think that automatically means the school district violated her First Amendment rights. Using students' names and pronouns is part of a teacher's responsibilities and I think teachers should be expected to follow school policies when doing their jobs. I also agree with the court that the policy was neutral and generally applicable because all the staff members had to follow it and no one had an exception. The school district also had important reasons for enforcing the policy to protect students' privacy and safety. Polk does have the right to her religious beliefs but, I do not think those beliefs give her the right to be exempt from a policy that applies to everyone especially when making an exception could affect the students she is responsible for teaching.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/25-1136/25-1136-2026-01-28.html

https://www.k-12legalinsights.com/2026/05/when-faith-and-policy-collide-fourth-circuit-upholds-school-districts-gender-identity-guidelines-over-teachers-religious-objections/

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf

https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/supreme-court-case-library/kennedy-v-bremerton-school-district

The Establishment Clause and USDA Emails

In May of 2026, a group of 7 USDA employees along with The National Federation of Federal Employees filed a federal lawsuit against the USDA and the Secretary of Agriculture, Brooke Rollins. They claimed that she violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by including “religious messaging” in work emails. The employees argue that Secretary Rollins' use of religious language in her emails coerce agency employees into feeling like they must conform to her religion. They also claim that this suggests that the agency as well as USDA employees share in the Secretary’s beliefs, proposing a clear establishment of religion in a government agency. The plaintiffs provided copies of her emails that contained religious language in multiple interviews. They stated that she expressed “gratitude towards God” in a Thanksgiving email, wrote that “God gave us the greatest gift possible” referring to the birth of Jesus, and as part of her Easter message said that “Today we celebrate the greatest story ever told, the foundation of our faith, and the abiding hope of all mankind.” They also added that she refused to acknowledge any other holidays other than those that were part of the Christian religion and frequently sent emails they described as proselytizing. 

While Secretary Rollins argues that this is her right, given to her by the First Amendment, the plaintiffs argue that regardless of this right, with her position of power within the government it is a clear violation of the Establishment Clause to send work emails containing religious material that they allege is intended to proselytize employees. The issue presented by this case is: “Is it a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause for Secretary Rollins to send work emails containing material and language that potentially promotes religion as a government employee?” 

I would argue that yes, this is a violation of the Establishment Clause. While I do believe that the government should protect their employees’ rights to the free exercise of religion, I also believe that there should be some regulations on the time and place in which they can do so in order to prevent a potential breach of the Establishment Clause. I think that there is a difference between a government official expressing their personal religious beliefs and an official using their position to endorse and further a certain religion. With this, I think that the actual content of the emails helps me to determine the difference. As Lamb’s Chapel and John Steigerwald v. Center Moriches Union Free School District determines, there is a difference between religious content and a religious viewpoint. Lamb’s Chapel demonstrates that religious expression cannot be denied simply because it reflects a religious viewpoint or lens. This being said, I believe the religious content of the messages, when considered alongside the Secretary’s position and use of government authority, is what distinguishes the case from Lamb’s Chapel. Where Lamb’s Chapel examined the rights of private religious expression, this case examines a government official using her position to promote religious beliefs. Moreover, I believe that the secretary using work emails to promote Christian content, along with her position of authority is what makes her actions unconstitutional. For instance, if the Secretary explained how her life choices and way she does her job are based upon her religious beliefs, then that would be constitutionally permissible because it is her using her religious viewpoints to explain something. It is the fact that she creates a discussion about Christian beliefs and theology and imposes them onto other agents while actively working in an authoritative position within the government that makes what she is doing an establishment of religion. 

Continually, as established in Engel v. Vitale, the power imbalance she holds because of her authoritative position (most notably in government) creates social pressures to conform and follow the religion she is promoting. Specifically in Engel, the majority held that “the people’s religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government.” Although the case involves state-sponsered prayer in public schools, rather than religious content in work emails, I believe the reasoning of the case is relevant. Because of the schools "authority" over the students, the court ruled that there could be pressure to conform and ultimatley an establishment issue. The secretary's position in this case is similar to that of the schools. By being in a position of power, her religious communications to those who recieve them offer an establishment problem becasuse of her nature as a government official, as well as the problem of social pressures. As Secretary Rollins is part of government by compelling her employees to conform through social pressures it is an establishment. More simply, I argue that because there are social pressures to endorse a particular religion based upon what a person of authority within government said in the workplace and because the secretary’s messages constitute promotion of religious beliefs rather than merely personal expression, there is an establishment of religion.

https://clearinghouse.net/case/48278/

https://abcnews.com/US/lawsuit-accuses-secretary-agriculture-proselytizing-employees-emails/story?id=132926896&utm

https://www.au.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/1-NFFE-v-USDA.pdf

https://www.au.org/how-we-protect-religious-freedom/legal-cases/cases/national-federation-of-federal-employees-v-usda/?meta_key=legal_case_search&meta_value=1&utm

https://www.au.org/wp-content/uploads/securepdfs/2026/07/3-26CV04406_DocketEntry_07-22-2026_26.pdf

Rozanski v. Stolzer: Religious Freedom and Sacramental Access in Immigration Detention Centers

    The First Amendment protects the right to freely exercise religion, but the extent to which this right applies to individuals who are under government custody has been a topic of high contention with recent U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) activity.. This issue is especially relevant in Rozanski v. Stolzer, a federal lawsuit filed by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis against immigration authorities and local jail officials in Missouri. On October 5, 2026, the Archdiocese filed a complaint alleging that officials at the Ste. Genevieve County Detention Center were violating the religious rights of immigrant detainees by restricting their access to Catholic priests and sacraments. The facility houses approximately 150 civil immigration detainees under a contract with ICE. According to the complaint, priests are only permitted to visit during a four-hour window on Monday mornings and may only communicate with detainees through a glass divider using an intercom. The Archdiocese argues that these restrictions prevent priests from administering important Catholic sacraments, including the Sacrament of Reconciliation (Confession), the distribution of the Holy Eucharist (Communion), and the Anointing of the Sick. All of these Catholic sacraments require physical presence and strict spiritual confidentiality. This case raises the question of whether the government can restrict religious practices in the name of institutional security when said restrictions make certain religious practices impossible. The case remains pending, and the court has not yet made a ruling.

Legal Alpha

    The central constitutional issue in this case concerns whether the detention center’s restrictions violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. While the government argues that they have a legitimate interest in maintaining safety and order within detention facilities, this interest must be balanced with the religious rights of those in its custody. The Archdiocese argues that the restrictions do not only limit access to religious services, but they effectively completely prevent detainees from participating in essential religious practices. According to Catholic teaching, Confession requires a priest to hear a person’s confession in strict confidentiality, one-on-one. Furthermore, Communion requires the priest to distribute the consecrated Eucharist. The Archdiocese argues that these sacraments cannot be properly administered through a glass divider or an intercom. Officials reportedly suggested that priests could place consecrated hosts in containers for guards to distribute through slots, but the Archdiocese rejected this alternative. He stated that it was inconsistent with Catholic practices. Therefore, the issue is not simply whether detainees can communicate with a priest, but whether they can actually practice their religion in a meaningful way that aligns with tradition and true Catholic religious convictions.

    

    The lawsuit also raises questions about whether the restrictions are actually necessary to maintain security. Detention officials may argue that non-contact visits help prevent contraband from entering the facility, reduce security risks, and make it easier to manage detainees. From this perspective, religious visitors should be subject to the same restrictions as other visitors who are not attorneys. However, the Archdiocese argues that the facility already allows private, in-person meetings for attorneys and foreign consular representatives. If these meetings can occur safely, the plaintiffs question why similar arrangements cannot be made for religious reasons. The lawsuit also largely surrounds federal religious liberty protections, such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which requires federal authorities to justify substantial burdens on religious exercise through a compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. Because the detention center operates under an agreement with ICE, the lawsuit also raises questions about the responsibility of federal authorities for religious accommodations at facilities operated by local governments.

    I believe that the court should rule in favor of the Archdiocese and require the detention center to provide reasonable access to priests for the administration of Catholic sacraments. While I understand the importance of maintaining security in a detention facility, I think the government must demonstrate that its restrictions are necessary rather than simply relying on general concerns about safety. The fact that the facility already allows private meetings for attorneys and counsel representatives weakens the argument that contact visits with priests would create an unacceptable security risk. If similar precautions can be used for these visitors, the facility’s officials should explain why they cannot also be used for clergy. Religious freedom should not be treated as an unnecessary privilege simply because someone is being detained.

    This case also relates to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which held that neutral laws of general applicability generally do not violate the Free Exercise Clause merely because they burden religious practices. However, the Archdiocese’s claims also involve RFRA, which provides stronger statutory protection against substantial burdens on religious exercise by the federal government. Under this framework, even a policy that applies broadly must be justified if it substantially burdens religious exercise. I think this distinction is extremely important because a rule can be applied consistently to everyone while still preventing individuals from exercising fundamental rights. A neutral policy is not automatically a reasonable one, especially when less restrictive alternatives may be available.

    All things considered, I believe that the government in this case has a responsibility to protect both the safety of its detention facilities and the constitutional rights of the people held within them. Immigration detainees are in government custody, but their detention does not mean that they should lose the ability to practice their religion. In fact, because detainees have limited freedom to leave the facility or seek religious services elsewhere, access to clergy becomes especially important. Denying access to essential sacraments can have a much greater impact than simply limiting visitation. The First Amendment protects religious freedom, and that protection should not disappear at the entrance to a detention center. Although security restrictions may be necessary in certain circumstances, they should not be used to justify a complete barrier to religious practices when reasonable alternatives exist. Ultimately, I believe that allowing reasonable access to priests would protect the religious rights of detainees without requiring the government to abandon its legitimate security responsibilities.

Sources:

https://www.thelegalalpha.in/article/pastoral-care-behind-glass-catholic-archdiocese-sues-ice-and-missouri-jail-over-denied-sacraments-to-immigrant-detainees https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/catholic-diocese-sues-us-government-seeking-clergy-access-detainees-2026-10-05/ https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/odo-compliance-inspections/SteGenevieveCoJail_SteGenevieveMO_Jun10_Jul9_2026.pdf https://public.files.capacity.com/b74c60b2-5d6b-4369-ae6a-8eed6e9bbb22/1bf3f2b0-2298-4f91-a86f-023e56aa0662?FU=1791218819 https://www.stlpr.org/race-identity-and-faith/2026-10-06/st-louis-archdiocese-lawsuit-alleges-violation-ice-detainees-religious-rights

Religious Freedom in Public Spaces

 As a Christian, David Hoffman sincerely believes that it is his mission to spread the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Hoffman has been evangelizing since 2015, sharing his religious beliefs with others through preaching, personal conversations, and the distribution of religious literature. He also founded a nonprofit dedicated to spreading the Gospel across the country. On December 13, 2025, Hoffman and his friends visited the Winterhaven Festival of Lights in Tucson, Arizona, where they continued this mission by sharing their Christian beliefs in hopes of positively changing people’s lives. For approximately 10 years Hoffman had been attending and evangelizing at this festival. The festival itself is a public event, free of charge and available for anyone to attend. It is situated on public streets and it winds through the neighborhood of Winterhaven located in northwest Tucson. Every year, thousands of visitors walk through the neighborhood and enjoy the Christmas light displays. Vendors offer food and drinks and homes play amplified music and host live performances. As during the rest of the year, the neighborhood is not closed off to the general public during the festival. The musical performances and entertainment inside the festival are authorized by the organizers. The permit, however, which was given to the organizers of the festival by the City of Tucson, allows the organizers to exclude anyone for any reason.

At the festival Hoffman and his friends were spreading the message of Christ in the open public street when the police warned them to stop. The police stated that what they were doing was in violation of the festival’s solicitation policy. Specifically, the policy prohibits all “political, religious, or commercial materials or messaging” (3, p. 9). When Hoffman inquired what the problem was, Officer Leondardo stated that it wasn’t the noise, but Hoffman’s asking “someone if they’d like to discuss Jesus” (3, p. 12).The officer stated that this was a form of sermonizing, which was against the rules. Hoffman was then threatened with arrest and he and his group were sent to a barricaded zone outside of the festival area known as a Free Expansion Zone.

Following this event, First Liberty, who represents Hoffman, sent a demand letter to the city of Tucson. When the city did not respond, Hoffman sued the city in Federal Court in 2026. The key constitutional question I am examining is whether the City of Tucson’s prevention of David Hoffman and his group from evangelizing the Gospel of Jesus Christ violates their right to the “free exercise of religion” under the First Amendment of the Constitution. 

In determining whether the City of Tucson’s actions of excluding Hoffman violated the First Amendment, we must answer the following questions: First, was the policy that prohibited religious exercise neutral or generally applicable? Second, if it was not, does the policy serve a compelling or very important government interest? According to the complaint in Hoffman v. City of Tucson, the festival had a city approved event safety plan, which was cited as a justification for the designated Free Expression Zone. This way they could ensure safety, enjoyment, and accessibility for attendees at the festival (3, p. 10).

A case that sets precedent is Widmar v. Vincent. In the Vincent case, a group of evangelical Christian students were denied access to their public university’s facilities. These facilities were made generally available to student groups to encourage student organization activities. After challenging their right to access the public university’s facilities in a manner that other groups were allowed access, the Court concluded in a 8 to 1 decision that the university’s regulation limiting access did not serve a compelling state interest. It was not neutral in its application and was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The religious group’s “incidental” benefit from access to university facilities was not the same thing as the university helping to advance the religion (4). It was simply a matter of being neutral. If all other student groups could utilize these resources, the evangelical Christian students should have had the same access. Therefore the university was found in violation of the First Amendment. 

Connecting this to the case at hand, while the City of Tucson has not cited the Establishment Clause in its reasoning, or even made an official statement regarding the lawsuit, granting Hoffman and his group access to the public forum like a public street would not necessarily amount to government advancement of religion. Instead, it would be a matter of treating religious expression equally. 

I believe that with the permit, the City is empowering the festival organizers to exclude people because of their speech or practices. The government imposed non-neutral policies, allowing non-religious messages to be spread but preventing religious ones. There is also no compelling state interest that justifies the exclusion of religious messaging. The safety of the public is not in jeopardy and while some may experience less enjoyment, that is not a justified cause to intervene. 

The policy was also not narrowly tailored in pursuit of the City’s interest in safety. There is no reason to single out religious messaging because of concerns over harassment or overcrowding in certain areas. These are public streets in an open festival and Hoffman has a First Amendment right to exercise his religion by spreading the message of Christianity. For Hoffman, spreading the Gospel is not just a form of speech, but key to practicing his faith, so preventing him from evangelizing restricts his ability to exercise his religion. 

When the city enforced this policy and removed Hoffman and his friends, it burdened this right in a non-neutral fashion. Furthermore, this was not the least restrictive way of protecting the government’s interest in safety, enjoyment, and accessibility. The City cannot just prohibit anyone from preaching Christianity, that is not narrowly tailored. Instead, it could prohibit anyone, regardless of their message, from obstructing sidewalks or creating big crowds. There is also nothing narrowly tailored about giving the festival organizers power to exclude citizens on any basis. To this day, the city’s actions continue to deter Hoffman from exercising his religion. 

1) https://firstliberty.org/cases/david-hoffman/#simple3

2) https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Hoffman-Demand-Letter-12.16.25_Redacted.pdf

3) https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Complaint-Hoffman-V.-Tucson_Redacted.pdf

4) Muñoz, V. P. (2025). Religious Liberty and the American Supreme Court (2nd ed.). Bloomsbury USA. https://reader.yuzu.com/books/9798216374848

Should Religious Schools Receive Public Funding Without Following Its Rules?

Should Religious Schools Receive Public Funding Without Following Its Rules?

Colorado’s requirement protects access to taxpayer-funded education. It does not require participating schools to abandon religious instruction or change their teachings about marriage. It addresses whether families may enroll without discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. In my view, admitting a child does not require a school to endorse the parent’s relationship. Colorado should protect access to its preschool program while allowing religious schools to explain and practice their faith within constitutional limits.

Colorado’s universal preschool program began operating in 2023 and provides free preschool to four-year-olds. Parents may choose participating public, private, or religious providers. According to Greenhouse, approximately 2,000 schools participate, including dozens of religious schools. Providers must meet program requirements, including protections against admissions discrimination based on characteristics such as race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Religious schools are eligible for funding; the disagreement centers on whether certain providers must follow the admissions conditions.

The Archdiocese of Denver requires parents seeking admission to its schools to accept Catholic teachings concerning marriage and family and sign a statement of community beliefs. Greenhouse reports that same-sex and transgender parents are instructed not to apply. The archdiocese requested an exemption from the relevant nondiscrimination provisions, but Colorado’s Department of Early Childhood refused. Two parishes, St. Mary in Littleton and St. Bernadette in Lakewood, sued alongside parents seeking publicly funded Catholic preschool education. The federal district court rejected their challenge, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has agreed to review the case but has not decided it.

The central constitutional question involves the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, which protects religious belief and practice against unconstitutional government interference. The schools argue that their admissions policies reflect their religious mission and that Colorado pressures them to compromise their faith to receive funding. Financial conditions can burden religious exercise even without directly prohibiting religious practices. However, recognizing that burden does not automatically require Colorado to grant the requested exemption. The Court must examine the condition, its purpose, and how it operates.

Colorado’s strongest argument is that the requirement protects access to a taxpayer-funded educational service. The state permits religious schools to participate without abandoning religious instruction. The challenged condition addresses whether families can enroll without discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. From my perspective, admitting a child does not require a school to approve of a parent’s personal life, let alone their relationships or its teachings about marriage. Colorado should be able to protect access to its program without deciding whether those religious teachings are correct.

The school’s reliance on Carson v. Makin does not settle this dispute. In Carson, the Supreme Court rejected Maine’s exclusion of religious schools from a tuition assistance program. Colorado already includes religious providers. Requiring an exemption here would extend the argument beyond funding eligibility to the conditions governing participation. Equal treatment should mean a fair opportunity to participate, rather than an automatic right to replace the program’s admissions protections with a provider’s preferred policies. The Court should preserve that distinction.

(Source 3)

Bob Jones University v. The United States sets a precedent as an analogy. The Supreme Court upheld denying tax-exempt status to religious schools practicing racial discrimination, finding that the government’s compelling interest in eliminating racial discrimination in education outweighed the burden on religious exercise. The case demonstrates that a religious justification does not automatically require the government to provide a financial benefit. Colorado’s case concerns preschool funding and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, so Bob Jones does not determine its outcome. Nevertheless, its reasoning supports Colorado’s position: protecting religious exercise does not prevent the government from defending a sufficiently strong interest in nondiscriminatory access to education. Colorado should be permitted to protect that access within the preschool program it finances.

The slippery-slope concern here involves public funding and accountability. If religious providers can receive funding while rejecting access protections, similar arguments could challenge other requirements attached to publicly financed services. That outcome is not inevitable, but the reasoning could weaken the state’s ability to protect intended beneficiaries. A constitutional exemption requires a specific justification. Religious participation alone should not turn public funding into an entitlement available on terms each provider selects.

The schools also argue that Colorado permits other exceptions, undermining the requirement’s general applicability. This objection matters. A state cannot claim neutrality while treating comparable secular conduct more favorably. However, an exception does not automatically justify every requested religious exemption. The Court should examine whether the exceptions undermine the same governmental interest. Colorado should defend its position through that comparison, rather than assuming identical wording always produces equal treatment.

(Source 2)

Overall, Colorado’s program exists to expand educational opportunities for children. Excluding a child because of a parent’s identity or relationship restricts access for reasons unrelated to educational need. Religious schools deserve protection from government hostility, but families also deserve protection within publicly funded services. The Court should uphold Colorado’s challenged requirement and reject the requested exemption. That outcome would preserve religious participation while maintaining the state’s authority to protect fair access to the educational opportunities taxpayers finance.

Sources:

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/30/opinion/su
preme-court-john-roberts-religion.html

https://manhattan.institute/article/amicus-brief-st-mary-catholic-parish-v-roy  

https://angelusnews.com/news/nation/scotus-colorado-preschool/

Can Religion Count as a Religious Exemption to Abortion?

     In 2022, the Hoosier Jews for Choice and four anonymous women, from varying religious faiths, sued the state of Indiana to challenge the state’s, near total, ban on abortion. The Indiana law banning abortion (S.E.A. 1) states that abortions are illegal in the state with the few exceptions of rape and incest, lethal fetal anomalies, and risk of life and physical health to the mother. The plaintiffs state that their rights are being violated under Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA ). This act states that the state and/or local government may not substantially burden a person’s ability to freely exercise their religion unless there is a compelling state interest or it is the least restrictive way of furthering compelling state interest. The plaintiffs in this case are arguing that their religious beliefs are being burdened by the abortion ban, citing that both the Jewish and Islamic faiths believe that life begins at birth and not conception. The State has fought back against this argument, stating that it is too broad, while the ACLU of Indiana, who is representing the plaintiffs, argued that the burden of the law being placed on the plaintiffs is life altering and prevents them from being able to freely exercise their religions. 

In March of 2026, the Marion County Supreme Court of Indiana converted abortion protections into permanent injunctions which banned states from enforcing the abortion law against those whose religious views went against it. However, the state once again argued that the injunction was too broad, noting that outlawing abortions did not fall directly under issues of religious freedom for the plaintiffs. 

On September 10th, 2026, the Indiana Supreme Court heard oral arguments as the state chose to appeal the previous injunction made, and enforce a near total ban on abortions against those with religious objections. The state argued that this was an unprecedented ruling, and never, had a ruling favored intentionally destroying human life. They also stated that the injuries claimed by the plaintiffs are purely hypothetical because during the process of litigation over the years, none of the plaintiffs were ever pregnant. They also noted that it was not similar to the ruling of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby because the plaintiffs in that case faced financial penalties that would amount to millions of dollars, an non-hypothetical damage in their opinion. 

The ACLU responded that the plaintiffs have had to change their behaviors in fundamental ways that prevent them from being impregnated, in fear that they will not be able to obtain an abortion, even when they are religiously required. They also noted that it is not fair for lawmakers to decide what religious beliefs are, and when they can and cannot be used as exemptions. 

The Supreme Court of Indiana has not yet released an opinion on this case and has not announced when they are expected to make a decision on the facts presented within the arguments. 

So the legal issue is presented as follows: does the Indiana abortion law infringe upon the freedom of exercise of religious groups that believe that life begins at birth? 

I think that this is a very interesting but tricky case. This seems to once again be a case where a law is facially neutral, but in the end does discriminate against some religions. In this case, the Islamic and Jewish faiths believe that life begins at birth, not conception like the Christian religion suggests. I agree that this law could impose a life altering burden on someone, especially whose religion permits abortions. I also find the ACLU arguments about the government and lawmakers deciding how people should view their religious beliefs and practice them goes against Indiana’s RFRA law which protects the freedom of exercising religion for those living in Indiana. 

I do wonder how this case, and others, would play out if the country’s majority (and in some ways, founding) religion, of Christianity, believed that life began at birth. The faiths at the center of the plaintiffs argument are minority faiths in the US and who the Free Exercise Clause seeks to protect. Abortion is a topic that across many religions and groups of people is heavily contested, however, I believe the arguments given by the plaintiffs are very compelling. Allowing lawmakers to infer how a widely recognized religion with “deeply rooted” beliefs can act on those beliefs could create a “slippery slope” for future cases. The Free Exercise Clause exists so that minority religions can be protected and have the ability to practice what they believe without government interference, the court deciding in favor of the state could create a precedent for lawmakers using their power to direct people on how to practice their religions.

When Religious Freedom Conflicts With Public Health: Miller v. McDonald

 

As early as 1830, the Amish began settling in New York. They came to the United States in search of religious liberty. The Amish have been good citizens, and New York has accommodated their faith. The Amish community has a religious objection to vaccinations. For over 50 years, New York State has exempted them from attending their private Amish schools and to tend to their health as their faith permits. In 2019, New York repealed this exemption, following a major measles outbreak. Some New York legislators described religious objections to vaccinations as “fake” and “garbage,” and even called their beliefs “selfish and misguided.” Forty-five states and the District of Columbia continue to allow religious exemptions for school vaccine requirements, making New York an extreme outlier on the issue. The conflict between the Amish community and vaccination requirements is central to Miller v. McDonald, a case that raises important questions about religious freedom and public health. In this case, the main question that can be considered is: Can New York require Amish parents to vaccinate their children when doing so conflicts with their sincere religious beliefs and desire to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs, or does the Free Exercise Clause protect them from that requirement?

In this case, New York wants to impose penalties on three Old Order private Amish schools that exist on their private Amish farms, in small Amish communities that refuse to require vaccinations because it conflicts with their faith. The schools were fined a total of $118,000 for failing to agree with the vaccination requirements. Previously, the Supreme Court said parents have the constitutional right to guide and decide their children's religious upbringing. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court affirmed this right. In this case, the law “Public Health Law 21664” is repeatedly referenced because it requires parents to vaccinate their children even if they have sincere religious beliefs against vaccination. The parents argue that vaccination is especially serious in their faith, as it is permanent and can not be undone. The law interferes with parents' ability to raise their children in accordance with their religious beliefs.

The Central Constitutional question is whether New York can require the Amish parents to choose between following their religious beliefs and sending their children to Amish schools. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, Jonas Yoder refused to send his 15- and 14-year-old children to school after eighth grade because he believed that high school exposed his children to values and lifestyles that directly contradicted his fundamental religious beliefs. The Supreme Court recognized his right to direct his children's religious upbringing and held that requiring him to send his children to high school violated the Free Exercise Clause and outweighed the state's interest in making attendance mandatory. In the case, Miller .v. McDonald, they argue that New York’s law substantially interferes with their ability to raise children according to their faith, as vaccination is permanent and irreversible, and contradicts the values and beliefs that they are trying to teach their children. The petitioners argue that New York’s law forces an unjust burden on the Amish religious exercise, forcing them to commit this irreversible act and forcing them to do so would contradict the ruling of the Yoder case.

The Second Circuit Court disagreed, and it held that New York’s vaccination law was neutral toward religion and applied generally; the court also concluded that the law did not create the same type of burden involved in Yoder. The Second Circuit argued that this vaccination requirement does not interfere with Amish education in the same way Yoder interfered with their religious upbringing. I agree with the court on this point, as the New York court does not specifically target the Amish community and does not prohibit them from practicing their religion. The vaccine requirement applies broadly to students attending New York schools, particularly after a measles outbreak in 2019, giving them a strong reason to demand vaccination. However, I think the facts of this case still need to be considered. The New York Legislators described religious objections to vaccinations as “fake” and “garbage,” along with other hostile wording calling into question whether the government can enforce a law against religious conduct after the government has expressed hostility toward the religious beliefs. This is where Miller can be compared to Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme

Court ruled in favor of a Christian baker after the Colorado Civil Rights Commission made hostile comments about his religion. In this case, a homosexual couple requested a custom cake for their upcoming wedding reception, and the Christian baker refused, as he did not approve of same sex marriage. The Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated the baker’s Free Exercise Clause. The court emphasized that the government cannot treat religious beliefs as illegitimate, focusing heavily on the conduct of the Colorado Commission directed at the baker. This is directly applicable to the Miller case: can free exercise be called into question because of the hostile words chosen by the New York Legislators?

I ultimately agree with the Second Circuit Court on their ruling; while medical exemptions do remain available for children who can not safely receive vaccinations, the state has a strong interest in getting involved, as it is a matter of public health. This case has interesting layers as it brings into question how the government's treatment and opinions should affect a free exercise claim. New York clearly has a serious, compelling state interest in public health, especially the requirement that children be vaccinated. However, the Amish are not simply disliking this law; it directly inhibits their ability to practice their religion and would directly burden them. I agree with the Second Circuit that a medical exemption addresses the safety of a child receiving a vaccination, while a religious objection is based on the beliefs of a family, not prioritizing the greater good of child safety. In my view, these comments from the New York legislators are serious, but they cannot automatically determine the case. The government’s concern for public health does not disappear just because of offensive comments or because a community rejects vaccinations due to their religion. In the end, the Second Circuit Court delivered a neutral and generally applicable vaccination requirement; although it imposes a burden on the Amish community, it must also consider the safety of the majority of children; exempting one group from vaccination could open the door for other groups to claim that they also can not receive a vaccination.

Sources:
https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/26-Miller-Petition.pdf
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/24-681/24-681-2026-06-30.html
https://firstliberty.org/cases/new-york-amish/#simple1
https://firstliberty.org/cases/new-york-amish/#simple2

Can Catholic Schools Engage in Workplace Discrimination?

In late August of 2021, Kenneth Ference applied to be a teacher at the Aquinas Academy Catholic school serving under the Roman Catholic Diocese of Greensburg in Greensburg, Pennsylvania. He was hired to teach three secular subjects, math science and social studies, and as he himself was not a Catholic, was “forb[idden]...from religion class or engaging in any spiritual instruction” and would serve purely as a secular teacher. That said, weeks into the school year, he had indicated on an insurance waiver that his healthcare coverage was under his husband, “thus incidentally releavl[ing] that he was in a same-sex marriage.” Soon after, Ference was terminated from Aquinas Academy, and it was widely understood that it was due to their disapproval of his same-sex marital status. 

Upon his dismissal from Aquinas Academy, Ference filed a complaint wherein he was suing for compensation for wrongful termination on the basis of discrimination of his sexuality. Ference iterated that “the Diocese violated his Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” which was created to protect people from discrimination of all kinds (racial, religious, gender, or namely sexual orientation in this case). However, his initial attempt to take the diocese to court was placed under review numerous times, as Aquinas Academy argued that as a religious institution, it is within the scope of their power to avoid hiring those that pose a direct conflict with their religious convictions and values. In other words, they have the right to an exemption from the Title VII and civil rights act and can permissibly engage in workplace discrimination for religious purposes. After these attempts by the diocese to dismiss the case, and an amended complaint, the District Court for Western Pennsylvania, the case survives and is still ongoing.

Overall, the constitutional questions at hand are as follows: does Aquinas Academy and its diocese have the right to discriminate against for being in a same-sex marriage? Are Catholic institutions exempt from the parameters of Title VII proceedings because of their religious convictions and ideas about things like sexuality? Does this case limit the free exercise and expression of religion of Aquinas Academy? From the perspective of Aquinas Academy, they believe that having a staff member who, in their opinion, does not live by the teachings of the religion that is central to their students’ education, is a direct violation of their own religious expression. Even as Ference served as a purely secular employee, “Aquinas Academy maintains that ‘at all times, the Catholic school is engaged in the process of catechesis and the formation of the Christian personality, a process which is integrated within the curriculum of all subjects taught in Catholic  schools’” (16). This claim that religious teachings are ongoing even outside of the context of religious classes is vital to this case, as it places Ference in a quasi-ministerial role in the eyes of the school and Catholic Church. 

While it is true that Catholic schools can permissibly not hire certain teachers for religious classes, I believe that this case should rule in favor of Ference. In fact, during his interview and hiring process, Ference was honest about not being Catholic (rather, a member of the Lutheran Church), and as per the school policy, could only teach secular content, which is surely within the school’s right to do. However, If Aquinas Academy genuinely considered every teacher to be responsible for religious instruction, as they iterate in their own defense, it is reasonable to question why Ference was hired in the first place, given that his religious affiliation was disclosed from the beginning. Judge Ranjan explains that “until the incidental disclosure on the waiver form, his marriage status was apparently a complete secret at Aquinas; and nothing about the circumstances of that disclosure imply that Mr. Ference would not, or could not, remain discreet about his marriage at work” (24). This observation complicates the school’s argument that Ference's marriage interfered with his ability to fulfill his professional responsibilities. Because Ference was already considered unqualified to provide religious instruction due to his non-Catholic faith, it seems inconsistent to make him responsible for holding and promoting the religious mission of the school only after the school discovered that he was in a same-sex marriage.

Ultimately, this case raises serious concerns about workplace discrimination in religious spaces, particularly when an employee’s dismissal appears to be based less on his actual job responsibilities than on the discovery of his marital status. Undoubtedly, religious institutions must have the right to constitutional freedom, and should be able to have total autonomy regarding who represents their faith. But, Ference was never a representative of the Catholic faith as an employee of Aquinas Academy. Aquinas Academy used the First Amendment in order to sanctify discrimination, which the constitution does not protect against. I believe that Ference was, in fact, wrongfully terminated. The discrimination at hand seems to forego any right that Aquinas Academy has in the name of religious free-exercise and expression, and that there is, in fact, a compelling state interest here. The proceedings of Title VII should have protected Ference against discrimination, even at a Catholic institution.  

Sources: 

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/pennsylvania/pawdce/2:2022cv00797/289970/101/

https://www.legalnewsline.com/pennsylvania-record/former-catholic-diocese-of-greensburg-teacher-alleges-he-was-fired-over-same-sex-marriage/article_8bf177a8-c975-5d7c-93c2-3ecdeb8b1cab.html

https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964