Fraud or Faith? The Establishment Clause in Religious Financial Disputes

 

Huntsman v. Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

James Huntsman, a former member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, claimed that the Church fraudulently misrepresented how it used tithing funds. Tithing funds are donations that members are religiously or morally obligated to give, typically amounting to ten percent of their income. Huntsman claimed that he had donated millions of dollars over years under the impression that those funds would go only to charitable or religious purposes. However, he alleged that the Church used portions of these funds for profit ventures, including the City Creek Center, a high-end shopping mall in Salt Lake City, and for a bailout of Beneficial Life Insurance Company, which was affiliated with the Church. He argued that the Church repeatedly made statements assuring members that their tithes were used only for religious purposes, and that these statements were knowingly false. Huntsman argued that these actions were fraudulent and sought to recover his donations from the Church for their deception. The Church argued that decisions regarding the management and use of donated funds fall under the Church’s constitutionally protected religious autonomy. The Church found that any attempt by a court to evaluate its financial decisions would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by interfering with their religious practices. In response, Huntsman filed a lawsuit against the Church in the federal courts of California. 

Does allowing a court to evaluate a fraud claim against a religious organization based on its use of donated funds violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by allowing judgement of internal church affairs and use of their funds? 

This case dips into both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, however, the Establishment Clause is the larger issue. The Establishment Clause states that the government cannot establish an official religion or get entangled in religious affairs, in order to create separation of Church and State. A previous case that can be applied to this is Lemon v. Kurtzman which establishes the Lemon Test in helping evaluate Establishment Clause violations. This test has three prongs, there needs to be 1) a secular purpose 2) a primary effect that neither promotes or inhibits religion and 3) does not have excessive government entanglement with religion. In this case, there is a secular purpose to protect individuals from financial harm and deceit from the Church. If the Church is lying about the use of the funds they are collecting, this harms individuals who are donating based on religious obligation. This donation causes individuals who believe they are donating for a good cause to lose about ten percent of their income based on fraudulent statements. Furthermore, the primary purpose of fraud legislation is neutral in effect. This legislation holds every entity accountable for fraudulent actions and claims, regardless of its religious affiliation. The primary effect of this lawsuit is also not directed at their spiritual practices, but at how the Church decides to use the religiously donated funds. The laws are not targeting the Church’s practices, but rather how they are deceiving individuals based on their stated use of the funds. Finally, the last prong of the Lemon Test is whether there would be excessive government entanglement. Determining if the donated funds were used deceitfully would have required the Court to analyze the internal affairs of the Church and its priorities for its tithing funds. Since these funds are religiously obligated, determining how the Church uses them and how it allocates them would require the Court to evaluate every action of the Church. I find this to be the Court overstepping into entanglement with determining whether the use of the funds is a valid religious use or not. 

In my opinion, I believe that determining whether the Church has used funds fraudulently would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In terms of the Lemon Test, it only passes the secular purpose prong but fails the primary effect and excessive entanglement prongs. Deciding on the validity of donated funds used by the Church, I feel, oversteps too much into the Church’s religious practices and validity. Especially since these funds are donated due to a religious obligation as a member of the Church. In conclusion, I feel this case violates the Establishment Clause. 

https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/huntsman-v-church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints-church-autonomy-is-a-threshold-structural-bar-that-must-be-reckoned-with 

https://becketfund.org/case/huntsman-v-corporation-of-the-president-of-the-church-of-jesus-christ-of-latter-day-saints/ 

Are Universities responsible for the actions of their students?

    Political division is nothing new to college students, one could say that on-campus ideological differences are almost second nature, and certainly something that Bucknell isn’t spared from. This particular case, Louis D. Brandeis Center, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. revolves around exactly that, political dissension on the campus of UC Berkeley, specifically, regarding Jewish students and hostilities toward them that have taken place in recent months. The plaintiffs, The Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law, a national civil rights legal advocacy organization that focuses on protecting the civil and human rights of Jewish people, and Jewish Americans for Fairness in Education (JAFE), a nonprofit based in California that supports Jewish students' rights assert that Jewish students and faculty have been subject to widespread and systemic discrimination, creating a hostile on-campus environment that violates constitutional and federal statutory protections. The central claims of the plaintiffs revolve around several key points and events. Firstly, the plaintiffs allege that at least 23 student organizations at UC Berkeley’s School of Law adopted bylaws or statements explicitly or effectively banning speakers who hold pro-Zionist views. These groups include The Queer Caucus, Women of Berkeley Law, Law Students of African Descent, and The Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice. The bylaws of these groups allegedly claim that speakers who “hold views in support of Zionism, the apartheid state of Israel, and the occupation of Palestine” would not be invited or welcomed, which the plaintiffs argue amounts to systemic exclusion of Jewish students and faculty who identify with or support Israel. 

    Secondly, the plaintiffs claim that there have been several on-campus incidents Jewish students allege that they were subjected to antisemitic slurs, and even threats of violence. Jewish students were reportedly harassed at an on-campus location known as Sather Gate, which is a common protest site on campus. One student was allegedly shoved during a counter-protest when they were attempting to film anti-Israel protestors, a campus bulletin board was vandalized with swastikas and anti-Zionist literature, and campus Jewish groups have reportedly received threats of violence on several occasions and had their messaging ripped down by oppositional groups. According to the plaintiffs, these incidents are not one-offs, but rather part of a broader, institutionally tolerated pattern of hostility that has left Jewish students feeling both unsafe and marginalized on campus. Perhaps the most troubling accusation is that University administrators have refused to take substantive action against these discriminatory behaviors despite several repeated reports from students and advocacy groups. 

    The plaintiffs claim that UC Berkeley administrators have either dismissed the concerns as mere “political disagreement”, or released public statements that fail to address the issue. UC Berkeley has pushed back against these allegations, largely on First Amendment grounds, claiming that student organizations are independent actors who have the right to adopt their own ideological stances, even if they are interpreted as controversial. Additionally, the University has added that it does not endorse or support these viewpoints, nor exclusions and so it cannot constitutionally penalize students for political speech, stating that disciplinary action could amount to infringement of free association and freedom of expression. In April 2025, U.S. District Judge James Donato allowed the case to proceed. Ruling that the plaintiffs “plausibly allege disparate treatment with discriminatory intent” under Title VI (“prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance”). The broader implications of this case raise questions such as “To what extent can public universities be held responsible for the discriminatory conduct of student groups?” and “Can ideological exclusion equate to racial discrimination (when applied to Jewish students)?”

    It is my personal opinion that the court should rule in favor of the Plaintiffs, as the University’s response largely misses the mark that Jewish students have been subject to repeated instances of discrimination, including physical violence and threats. Although the University has no basis to regulate the thoughts or ideologies of its students, its hesitance to discipline students for their actions because the issue is contentious has allowed for acts of physical violence to occur without reconciliation. The University essentially fails to understand that this issue goes beyond pure ideology and involves the perpetuation of a hostile environment for a demographic of students on campus, leading to them feeling unsafe and under threat. Rather than a Supreme Court case, I would defer to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance, and because UC Berkeley is a public school it is especially subject to this law.  

Land, Liberty, & Copper?

Introduction

 This term, the Supreme Court will hear Apache Stronghold v. United States, a case that asks whether destroying a sacred site for mining violates religious freedom. For centuries, Western Apaches have worshipped at Oak Flat (Chí’chil Biłdagoteel) in Arizona. The federal government long protected Apache rituals there, but after copper was found beneath the site, Congress transferred the land to Resolution Copper. That transfer will destroy Oak Flat and end the Apaches’ sacred ceremonies. Facts of the Case

In response, Apache leaders sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause. They argued that destroying Oak Flat imposes a “substantial burden” on their religious exercise by making their most important rituals impossible. A Ninth Circuit en banc panel, split into two separate 6–5 majorities, rejected both claims. The court said the destruction does not substantially burden religion under RFRA, relying on Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988). And although the court agreed that singling out Oak Flat for destruction is not “generally applicable,” it nonetheless refused to apply heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, again finding no substantial burden.

Constitutional Questions
An key issue is how to read RFRA’s “substantial burden” test and whether the Free Exercise Clause itself requires strict scrutiny when a law targets a sacred practice. Under RFRA, the government may only “substantially burden” religious exercise if it shows the law furthers a compelling interest by the least restrictive means. The Apaches say that destroying Oak Flat is the ultimate restriction—ending their rituals altogether—and that no mining interest can be so compelling. Resolution Copper and the government argue that RFRA does not cover land transfer decisions and that any burden on religion here is too indirect or speculative to qualify.

The Free Exercise Clause question overlaps: does singling out a religious practice for destruction trigger strict scrutiny—even without RFRA? After Smith, neutral laws of general applicability no longer require strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. But here the court below admitted the law is not generally applicable to religion, which traditionally should trigger heightened review. Yet the Ninth Circuit declined to apply it, again pointing to Lyng, which held that the government could build a road through a sacred site without violating the First Amendment.

Historical Background: The Proto‑Smith Era and Lyng
An article by Stephanie Barclay and Matthew Krauter reveals that Lyng was part of a “proto‑Smith” era in which the Court dismantled strict scrutiny for religious accommodation even before Employment Division v. Smith (1990). Justice O’Connor’s papers show that earlier decisions like Sherbert v. Verner (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) had set a high bar for laws burdening religion—compelling interest and least restrictive means. But in the 1980s, the Court, influenced by arguments from the Solicitor General’s office, grew reluctant to grant accommodations to “odd ball” or “squeaky wheel” faiths. Lyng thus marked a reversal: justices acknowledged they might have ruled differently if the government had acted at an earlier stage, but they refused to extend strict scrutiny to protect a sacred grove against forest service plans.

Barclay and Krauter argue that RFRA was Congress’s response to restore the Sherbert‑Yoder standard by mandating strict scrutiny for any substantial burden on religious exercise. Their research suggests Lyng should not be read as compatible with Sherbert but rather as a step toward Smith’s neutrality rule. This history is crucial for understanding why Apache Stronghold now asks the Supreme Court to choose between Supreme Court precedents that even the lower court struggled to fit together.

Analysis: Why the Case Matters
Apache Stronghold forces a clear choice. If the Court holds that destroying a sacred site is not a substantial burden, it will cement Lyng and Smith as barriers to protecting land‑based religious practices. That outcome would mean Native American rituals tied to geography have no special constitutional protection, even if Congress once promised protection. On the other hand, if the Court recognizes a substantial burden here, it would affirm RFRA’s promise that religious exercise deserves protection from government action that destroys its foundational practices.

The case also tests whether RFRA can fully override Lyng’s legacy. RFRA applies to all federal actions, so if the Court accepts the Apaches’ RFRA claim, it will confirm that Congress can restore strict scrutiny for free exercise. But the broader Free Exercise Clause question remains, will the Court revisit Smith’s neutrality rule and require heightened scrutiny for laws that target religion, especially with recent signals from Justices expressing interest in free exercise doctrine’s original meaning?

Conclusion
Apache Stronghold v. United States is more than a fight over land; it is a turning point for American religious freedom. The outcome will determine whether the First Amendment and RFRA protect sacred ceremonies tied to the land or leave them vulnerable to mineral claims. It will also signal whether the Court will continue down the Smith/Lyng path or reclaim earlier commitments to strict scrutiny for substantial burdens on religious exercise. For Western Apaches, the stakes are paramount: the right to worship their Creator in a place they have honored for generations hangs in the balance.

Sources

https://reason.com/volokh/2025/02/20/one-more-first-amendment-case-to-watch/

Faith vs. Force: The Constitutional Clash Behind a Shaved Head

In 2020, Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian, was sentenced to prison for 5 months for drug possession. While serving his term, he vowed to “let the locks of the hair of his head grow.” Landor had been growing his hair for nearly two decades per his religious Nazarite vow and exclaimed, "during the entire period of one’s Nazarite vow, no razor may be used on one’s head." While serving his term, he had first been incarcerated at two facilities, both of which respected his vow and allowed him to keep his hair in a “fast cap.” In the final 3 weeks of his sentence, he was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center (RLCC) and told prison officers that he had been practicing Rastafarian. He provided them with state and federal forms that outlined his prior religious accommodations for his hair and a copy of the Supreme Court decision in Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections. Upon receiving the copy, an intake officer threw it in the trash and summoned Marcus Myers, the Warden, who demanded documentation from his sentencing judge. Landor told Myers that he could request the documentation from his lawyer to which Myers said “it was too late for that. He then proceeded to bring him to another room, handcuff him to a chair, and shave his hair while holding him down. 

After being released from prison, Damon Lander sued the Louisiana Department of Education under the Free Exercise Clause in the case of Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, arguing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) -a federal law created to protect the religious rights of inmates who lose rights while incarcerated- was violated. Though this act is statutory, it was created as an extension of the Free Exercise Clause to address burdens on religious exercise that are not fully guaranteed by the Constitution. Under this act, the government must show that a restriction on religious exercise: (1) serves a compelling state interest and (2) is the least restrictive in achieving the interest. Landor argues that neither of these premises were met and therefore he has the right to freely exercise his religion, which includes his dreadlocks as a religious practice. To receive relief, he sought to recover damages against state government officials.

The constitutional issue in Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections deals with the Free Exercise Clause, which “protects citizens' right to practice their religion as they please, so long as the practice does not run afoul of a "public morals" or a "compelling" governmental interest.” This clause prohibits the government from enacting policies or laws that interfere with an individual's ability to freely practice their religion. However, the scope of this clause becomes complicated in prisons, where restrictions on religious practice can be justified. Nevertheless, the central issue is whether the Louisiana Department of Corrections and its prison officers violated Landors right to freely exercise his religion when they forcibly cut his dreadlocks off, despite him making it clear that he is a practicing Rastafarian. Landor argues that by forcibly shaving his hair, RLCC put a substantial burden on his religious exercise.

When Holt v. Hobbes is applied to the case at hand, there are stark parallels. In Hobbes, Gregory Holt, who was an inmate at the Arkansas Department of Corrections, had been practicing Salafi Muslim. While serving his term, he sought an injunction and temporary relief from the correction facility grooming policy, which allowed for only quarter-inch beards and mustaches for diagnosed medical purposes. Holt argued that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to grow a bird, which was essential to the practice of his religion. This policy, he contended, therefore violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). In a 9-0 majority opinion, the Court ruled that the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy violated the RLUIPA, undermining the Free Exercise Clause, by preventing Holt from growing a one-half-inch beard per his religious beliefs. They exclaimed that the RLUIPA allows prison officials to test the sincerity of one's religious beliefs, and if they were found to be science, an accommodation can be made. In this case, Holt's religious beliefs were found to be sincere, and therefore he met the standard of accommodation. Further, the Court argued that prison officers failed to meet the burden of proof. They had the burden to prove that preventing inmates from growing beards constituted a compelling government interest and that this interest was the least restrictive means of interference, however, they did not satisfy this burden. This landmark case, which defines an inmate's religious rights in prison, can be compared to Landor. In the case at hand, Landor had been a devout Rastafarian who made a vow to not cut his hair for religious purposes. He made it very clear that he was sincere in his beliefs of not cutting his hair through both practice and telling prison officers that he had received religious accommodations in other facilities. Given that Hobbes was allowed to receive a religious accommodation for growing his beard under the RLUIPA, Landor should have received the same accommodation. 

I strongly believe that this case should be ruled in favor of Landor. It is worth noting that the government can limit inmates' constitutional rights (freedom). However, they still must act in accordance with the Constitution. In analyzing many different prisons across the United States, Congress found significant evidence of religious discrimination, especially against “non-mainstream” faiths.  For this reason, the RLUIPA was created to protect inmates' religious rights and practices when the First Amendment cannot do so in prisons. It primarily serves as an extension of the Free Exercise Clause. Under this act, the government must show that a restriction on religious exercise: (1) serves a compelling state interest and (2) is the least restrictive in achieving the interest. If the religious practices are sincere and these premises are not met, the government may not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise. In taking the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA into account, I believe that it is clear that the prison officers violated Landor’s right to freely exercise his religion in a stark manner. After asking the officers for a religious accommodation, they first threw out the piece of paper that contained a court case holding that Louisiana's policy of cutting hair violated the RLUIPA in front of Landor. They then pinned him down and shaved his head. After the fact, the officers failed to provide a compelling governmental interest in denying Landor's accommodation and consequently shaving his head. Rather than acting neutrally, it appears these officers acted hostile toward religion. The mere fact that two other facilities recognized the sincerity of his religious beliefs and allowed him to grow his hair makes it seem that officers at RLCC took punitive measures rather than security measures.  Additionally, they failed to explore any alternatives for Landor and instead immediately resorted to physical force, and therefore, neither of the premises of RLUIPA were met. Ultimately, the officers unlawfully put a substantial burden on Landor's religious rights.

Therefore I ask you all to consider these questions. When the prison Warden shaved Landor's hair, did he unlawfully burden his right to freely exercise his religion? Does the RLUPIA extend constitutional protection toward religion in this case? What do you guys think? Should religion be accommodated in prison and if so to what extent?

Sources:

https://www.aclu.org/cases/st-dominic-academy-v-makin

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/22-30686/22-30686-2023-09-14.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/13/us/supreme-court-prison-rastafarian.html#:~:text=Damon%20Landor%20is%20a%20Rastafarian,fell%20 nearly%20to%20his%20 knees.

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/22/22-30686-CV0.pdf

https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/first-amendment-and-religion#:~:text=The%20Free%20 Exercise%20 Clause%20 protects,a%20%22 compelling%22%20 government%20 interest.

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-6827

Religious Freedom vs. Neighborhood Regulation

     Morris v. West Hayden Estates First Addition is a legal case that involves a homeowner who went exceptionally far in expressing his faith on his private property. This dispute ultimately raises significant questions regarding the balance between religious freedom and neighborhood regulations. In 2015 Jeremy Morris, a lawyer and self proclaimed “Christmas Lawyer,” made himself known for displaying an array of Christmas decorations outside of his home in Hayden, Idaho. His exhibit consisted of hundreds of thousands of lights, real animals, and buses full of guests. Upon moving into a new neighborhood, he attempted to repeat the event, at which point the homeowners associations (HOA) objected. Following this was a battle between Morris and the HOA as to whether he was being discriminated against for being a Christian, or if he was simply being held to the same rules and standards that apply to everyone.

Prior to purchasing his home in West Hayden Estates, Morris informed the HOA of his intentions to host a Christmas celebration similar to the year before. The HOA advised him not to, warning that this would likely break the rules involving lighting, noise, and the use of homes in the neighborhood. Morris proceeded anyway and went ahead with the show. 

The HOA sent him a formal letter saying the event would likely violate three parts of its community rules, called CC&Rs: 1) using the property for non-residential purposes, 2) creating noise that disturbs neighbors, and 3) using excessive outdoor lighting. In one version of that letter, a board member added that “some of our residents are non-Christians or of another faith,” which Morris took as proof of religious discrimination.

Photo of Jeremy Morris’s 2015 Christmas display, with thousands of visitors. Image via Instagram / @thechristmaslawyer.

After hosting the event anyway in 2015 and again in 2016, with buses, characters, a live scene, and huge crowds, Morris filed a lawsuit claiming the HOA had violated the Fair Housing Act by targeting him because of his Christian beliefs. A jury agreed, awarding him $75,000. But a judge later overturned the decision, saying the issue was not a religious matter, rather, it was a violation of neighborhood rules. As Judge Winmill stated, “the case wasn’t about religious discrimination, but rather the Morris family’s violation of neighborhood rules.”

Morris appealed, and in 2024 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals gave a mixed decision. They argued that the HOA had not clearly violated the law in its original letter, but there was still enough evidence to justify a new trial over whether the HOA’s actions were partially motivated by religion.

Now, we must determine the bigger issue in this. Did the HOA’s actions violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Fair Housing Act by targeting Morris’s religion? Or was the HOA simply enforcing its rules fairly?

A useful comparison is Employment Division v. Smith (1990), where the Supreme Court ruled that neutral, generally applied laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if they place a burden on someone’s religious practice. In this case, two people were denied unemployment benefits because they used peyote during a religious ceremony. In the end, the Court ruled that the law wasn’t targeting religion, as it applied to everyone. The same idea can be seen in Morris v. West Hayden Estates. The HOA’s rules about lighting, noise, and traffic were applied to all residents, no matter their religion. Just because Morris’s event was religious doesn’t mean he was permitted to break those rules. Similar to Smith, the key question isn’t whether someone was practicing their religion, it’s whether the rules were applied fairly and equally.

Morris asserts that the HOA attempted to cease his Christmas display not because it was size or disruption, but solely because it was Christian. He claims he was unfairly singled out and that other events wouldn’t have received the same treatment. In one Fox News interview, he argued the case is about “the right to celebrate Christmas in accordance with our family’s faith traditions... [and] the right to use our property to express that Christian faith tradition.”

However, the HOA claims it had strong reasons to object. According to court records, the event caused noise, traffic, trash, and even complaints of public urination from visitors. HOA board members were also worried about safety and the disruption to a generally quiet residential neighborhood. As one court document states, “This display/event... will produce in excess of 900 additional vehicles traveling through the neighborhood.” Judge Tashima, who agreed with much of the district court’s ruling, wrote that the HOA was “concerned about the Morrises’ holiday events because of the size and scale of the events, not because of the Morrises’ religion.”

There’s a reasonable argument to be made on Morris’s side. The Ninth Circuit admitted that a jury could find the HOA’s behavior was influenced “at least in part” by the religious nature of the event. The draft of the HOA letter that mentioned “non-Christians” shows that religion may have played some role in their decision. And religious displays, such as Christmas decorations or public nativities, are protected forms of expression, especially when done on private property.

Regardless, there’s a key difference between this instance and others. In Morris’s case, religious expression doesn’t allow someone to break neutral rules that apply to everyone. The HOA would undoubtedly have objected to a secular event of the same size. Nothing in the HOA’s history suggests it treated Morris differently just because of his faith. It is clear that the issue was the crowds, the lights, and the noise, not the nativity scene or the caroling.

All in all, Morris v. West Hayden Estates demonstrates how tricky it can be to draw the line between religious freedom and community rules. Morris sees the HOA’s actions as an attack on his faith. But from the evidence, it seems more like the HOA was simply carrying out its duties, protecting the rights and peace of everyone in the neighborhood. The First Amendment provides all Americans with the right to worship freely. However, it does not give them the right to disrupt an entire community in the process. When religious expression starts to impact hundreds of neighbors, it’s fair to ask whether it’s an issue of faith, or a different matter.

Works Cited:

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/17/19-35390.pdf

https://nypost.com/2024/12/24/us-news/christmas-lawyer-jeremy-morris-files-for-supreme-court-review-in-holiday-light-show-fight-with-hoa/

https://firstliberty.org/media/u-s-court-of-appeals-for-the-ninth-circuit-sides-with-religious-freedom-in-christmas-lights-case/

Parents V. Education.

 The Supreme Court is set to decide a pivotal case, Mahmoud v. Taylor, highlighting the growing tension between parental rights grounded in religious beliefs and the enforcement of state-mandated curricula in public schools. This case arose when Montgomery County Public Schools (MCPS) removed parents' opt-out rights for certain educational materials, leading to significant questions about who ultimately holds authority over the education of young children—parents or the public education system. A diverse group of parents, including representatives from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities, has challenged the curriculum changes made by MCPS. The updated curriculum now includes "Pride Storybooks," with some parents claiming that these books promote a singular perspective on gender identity and same-sex relationships. These parents assert that such materials contradict their religious beliefs and are inappropriate for elementary school students. Initially, they sought notifications when controversial materials would be introduced and the ability to opt their children out, which were previous practices under Maryland law and MCPS guidelines. After MCPS denied the opt-out requests, parents filed a lawsuit on May 24, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for Maryland. The Court ruled against them, and on May 15, 2024, the Fourth Circuit upheld this decision, stating that parents have no constitutional right to be informed or to opt out of public school curricula, even if such materials conflict with their religious beliefs.  

This case centers on significant constitutional issues regarding the Free Exercise rights of parents and their children, particularly how these rights intersect with educational mandates. Key inquiries in this context include: Can the state compel children as young as four to engage with ideologically charged materials about gender and sexuality that conflict with their parents' religious beliefs? When parents enroll their children in public school, do they necessarily relinquish their constitutional right to influence their spiritual and moral upbringing? These inquiries build on established precedents, notably Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), which affirmed that "the child is not the mere creature of the state," underscoring the fundamental right of parents to govern their children's education and upbringing according to their beliefs. Nevertheless, the recent ruling by the Fourth Circuit in Mahmoud seems to create exceptions to this long-standing principle, permitting public school curricula to include sensitive topics such as gender identity without requiring parental consent, thereby raising profound concerns regarding the implications for Free Exercise rights.  

Mahmoud v. Taylor extends the Supreme Court's recognition that religious liberty protections must go beyond congregational spaces. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Court ruled that Amish parents could withdraw their children from public schooling due to conflicting religious beliefs. While Mahmoud does not involve complete withdrawal from school, the opt-out provision serves as a more focused means to uphold religious conscience within the framework of pluralistic education. The implications of Mahmoud v. Taylor are significant. Suppose the Supreme Court supports the school district's decision. In that case, it may establish a precedent that undermines religious conscience in public education, especially on topics where state narratives clash with traditional spiritual perspectives. Such an outcome could significantly limit parents' constitutional rights to raise their children according to their beliefs, particularly as progressive educational content becomes more widespread.  

Conversely, a judgment favoring the parents would affirm the accountability of public schools to the diverse communities they serve and clarify that inclusivity does not necessitate the exclusion of conscience. It would recognize religious liberty as the freedom to hold beliefs and guide children to adhere to them without governmental interference.  

Mahmoud v. Taylor underscores the crucial issues of parental authority and religious liberty in an increasingly secular society. As the state seeks to influence children's knowledge and values, preserving parental rights to nurture their children's spiritual and moral foundations becomes ever more vital. Religious freedom transcends personal belief; it encompasses the ability to transmit these beliefs to future generations without governmental intrusion. If public education becomes a domain where only a singular worldview is sanctioned, we risk undermining the diversity essential to democratic governance. The First Amendment protects not only the right to diverge in belief but also the right to live by those beliefs, fostering an environment where parents guide their children in the teachings of their faith, even amidst state opposition. 

Considering the case facts and relevant precedents, I conclude that the Montgomery County Board of Education's refusal to allow parents to opt their children out of reading assignments conflicting with their religious beliefs violates their parental rights and the Free Exercise Clause. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court recognized parents' fundamental right to direct their children's education. At the same time, Wisconsin v. Yoder emphasized that the state cannot override parental authority in religious matters. Here, the state's interest in promoting inclusivity does not justify the complete denial of opt-out accommodations, especially when parents seek limited relief to protect their children from conflicting instruction. While the school district may argue its policy is neutral under Employment Division v. Smith, its abrupt shift from a previously accommodating stance suggests otherwise. Following Sherbert v. Verner, the state must pursue its interests through the least restrictive means, and allowing limited opt-outs would still permit curriculum function while respecting religious conscience. Thus, the school board's denial of opt-out rights constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on religious freedom and parental authority.

Sources: 

https://becketfund.org/case/mahmoud-v-taylor/

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-110

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/268us510

Natural Born Right to Life vs Religion

A doctor at the Lankenau Medical Center, Dr. Joseph Bushra, requested a religious exemption from his hospital's mandatory COVID-19 vaccine policy. Bushra’s specific position in the hospital's emergency department requires him to work in person with his patients on a daily basis, some of whom are carriers of the COVID-19 virus. The doctor feels that frequent testing and wearing a mask are proper accommodations that will prevent the spread of the deadly virus. In opposition, the hospital saw this as a high-risk situation. While the Main Line Health (MLH) organization offers medical and religious exemptions, they denied him on the basis that patients coming to the hospital are in a highly vulnerable medical situation. This resulted in Bushra suing the healthcare system for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). 

As a member of the Tenth Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia, Dr. Joseph Bushra gave four reasons as to why the vaccine violates his religious obligations/beliefs. His first reason is that the composition of the vaccine utilizes cells obtained from aborted fetuses. He explains, “My Christian worldview teaches that human life begins at the moment of conception, and that abortion, which ends a human life, is therefore murder”. The second reason was that he had already contracted the virus in previous months, and the risks that come along with the vaccine outweighed the risks of him obtaining the virus once again. He also felt that he had a religious obligation to ensure that the scarce vaccination be handed out to those who are truly in need rather than wasting one on himself. Lastly, Bushra states it is a violation of his First Amendment Free Exercise rights to go against his conscience as his Christian faith advises.

The constitutional question at hand is whether it is a violation of Dr. Joseph Bushra’s free exercise rights to deny his request for a religious exemption to the COVID-19 vaccine. Or does the government have a compelling state interest in protecting medically vulnerable individuals from risk of contracting a deadly virus? Does the position of an individual matter when considering religious exemptions? 

A comparable case, given the compelling state interest of the government to uphold national security and health, is Goldman v. Weinberger. In this case, an Orthodox Jewish individual in the United States Air Force was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty. A yarmulke is a religious head covering worn as a sign of respect, but was refused due to the Air Force's strict policy regarding no headgear inside. The Supreme Court ruled that the Air Force did not violate the free exercise clause, as they must be examined with less scrutiny for their intention to protect the nation. Their policy is made to ensure orderly conduct and uniform attire, which cannot be contested in terms of our nation’s defensive line.

While I see both sides of the argument, I am leaning towards the side of the Main Line Health Incorporation. If Dr. Joseph Bushra were not a physician in an emergency room, the conditions of this case would be extremely different. While Bursha has the right to deny vaccination, he does not have a natural-born right to be a doctor in an emergency medical environment. There is a clear and present danger in having high-risk patients suffering from serious illnesses and at varying ages to be in the presence of an unvaccinated doctor who must also service patients with COVID-19. As someone who has acquired COVID-19 twice while taking the precautions seriously, Bushra’s claim that a mask is enough is inaccurate. If he worked in a different medical facility with a less susceptible environment or had a different occupation, I could understand the religious exemption. I’d argue that jobs in the medical field should be evaluated with less scrutiny in cases similar to this. Is the cost of a life worth a workplace religious exemption? There is a natural right to be alive, but not to be a physician in an emergency room. 

Sources:

https://religionclause.blogspot.com/

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/241117np.pdf

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-paed-2_23-cv-01090/pdf/USCOURTS-paed-2_23-cv-01090-0.pdf

https://www.google.com/search

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1097

A Pledge Too Far: When Loyalty Oaths Violate Religious Freedom

    Brianna Bolden-Hardge is a Jehovah’s Witness and a state employee of the California Franchise Tax Board. Bolden-Hardge began working in 2016 and did not sign the loyalty oath at the beginning of her employment. The purpose of this oath is to ensure that public employees pledge their loyalty to both the United States and the State of California Constitutions. Bolden-Hardge later applied to work for the Office of the State Controller and was offered a higher-paying position. As part of her employment agreement, Bolden-Hardge was asked to take a loyalty oath. Bolden-Hardge claimed that her faith prevents her from “sweaing primary allegiance to any human government” over the Kingdom of God. Bolden-Hardge requested an accommodation to sign with an addendum specifying that her religious allegiance was first in her life, and that she would not take up arms. The Controller’s Office denied her request for accommodation and rescinded the job offer. Bolden-Hardge returned to her job at the California Franchise Tax Board, which then required her to take the oath but permitted her to include an addendum like the one she intended to use with the Controller’s Office. 

    Bolden-Hardge sued the Controller’s Officer under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and other provisions. Bolden-Hardge v. California State Controller is now in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. 

    The constitutional issue at hand in this case is whether the Controller’s office violated Title VII and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause by rescinding its job offer to Bolden-Harge because of her stated need for religious accommodation to the Controller’s Office’s requirement that she sign a loyalty oath.

    To conclude whether Bolden-Hardge’s First Amendment rights were violated, I draw on precedents set in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), Sherbert v. Verner (1963), and Employment Division v. Smith (1990). 

    West Virginia State Board of Education supports Bolden-Hardge’s claim. The key holding of this case was that the government cannot compel individuals to affirm a belief or pledge loyalty that violates their conscience. Like the students in this case who refused to salute the flag on religious grounds, Bolden-Hardge objected to signing a loyalty oath that conflicted with her religious duties. Her objection was not rooted in disloyalty to the United States government, but rather in not being forced to declare allegiance in a way that violated her religious convictions. This case supports Bolden-Harge’s claim that compelling her to sign a loyalty oath without an accommodation for her religious beliefs violates her free-exercise rights.

    Sherbert’s ruling supports Bolden-Hardge’s claim, as the case held that the government cannot impose a substantial burden on religious practice without evidence of a compelling interest. The state's refusal to accommodate Bolden-Hardge’s request for an addendum can be seen as a substantial burden on her ability to live out her faith. The state would need to prove that denying the accommodation was necessary and the least restrictive way to achieve a compelling state interest. The state’s compelling interest claim to preserve loyalty and commitment to the constitution and government would be undermined by the fact that another state agency (Franchise Tax Board) granted the same accommodation. 

    Employment Division could support the state's claim, as this case held that neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Using this precedent, the state could argue that the loyalty oath is a neutral requirement for all employees and not targeted at any religion. However, because other agencies allowed the accommodation, Bolden-Hardge could argue that the oath is not consistently applied, weakening the state’s defense based on Employment Division.

    Considering the facts of the case and these precedents that could be applied, I conclude that the denial of Bolden-Hardge’s request for a religious accommodation to sign the loyalty oath with an addendum to comply with her religious beliefs and the subsequent revoking of her job offer is a violation of her free exercise rights. This is because I believe the state can still achieve its goal of preserving loyalty to the Constitution through less restrictive means, which in this case would be through modifying the oath for religious purposes so Bolden-Hardge can take it in good conscience. In Barnette, the Court held that individuals cannot be compelled to express loyalty in ways that violate their conscience, and Sherbert requires a compelling interest pursued by the least restrictive means. The state’s refusal fails this test, especially since another agency had previously accepted her addendum. Though the state may argue the oath is a neutral, generally applicable requirement under Smith, its inconsistent enforcement undermines that defense. Therefore, denying Bolden-Hardge the ability to affirm her loyalty in a way consistent with her faith was unconstitutional.

Sources: 

https://religiousfreedominstitute.org/bolden-hardge-v-california-state-controller/

https://www.courthousenews.com/ninth-circuit-revives-religious-bias-suit-over-california-loyalty-oath/

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-15660/21-15660-2023-04-03.html

Religious Conscience and Compelled Speech: A Closer Look at Schroeder v. Treto

In a case that underscores the ongoing tension between religious conscience and state-mandated health care regulations, a federal court in Illinois recently struck down part of the state’s Health Care Right of Conscience Act (HCRCA). The case - Schroeder v. Treto - involves pro-life pregnancy centers and doctors who challenged an amendment to the HCRCA that required them to discuss the risks and benefits of abortion and childbirth in order to qualify for liability protections. These healthcare providers (physicians and otherwise) argued that this requirement violated their First Amendment rights, both in terms of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion.

The case was brought by attorney Thomas Schroeder, who represented several Illinois pregnancy centers and medical professionals with religious objections to abortion. They filed suit against Dr. Sameer Treto, the Director of the Illinois Department of Public health, in his “official capacity”. Schrooeder and the plaintiffs argued that Illinois’ amended law unlawfully compelled speech and punished conscience-based refusals to promote or refer abortions.

The federal district court agreed, in part. While it struck down the broader speech requirement, it also upheld a more limited provision: if a patient explicitly asks about abortion services, the provider must either refer, transfer, or give them a list of providers - but only if they intend to use the HCRCA as a defense in a malpractice suit. The court reasoned that this narrower requirement was a reasonable, triggered obligation and did not violate constitutional rights.

What’s at Stake: The Speech vs. Religion Debate

This case sits at the intersection of compelled speech and religious liberty, and to me, that’s what makes it so compelling. It raises the question: can the state force religious providers to speak about something they morally and religiously object to? And if so, where is the line between public interest and individual conscience? The constitutional issues is two-fold, and involves both Free Speech and Free Exercise:

1. Free Speech: Under NIFLA v. Becerra (2018), the Supreme Court held that the government cannot compel pro-life pregnancy centers to deliver state-scripted messages about abortion services. The logic from NIFLA applies almost directly to Schroeder. The Illinois law required doctors and clinics to deliver a government-approved message - even if it contradicted their values. That’s not informed consent - it’s compelled ideology.

2. Free Exercise of Religion: For many of the doctors and staff at these clinics, opposition to abortion isn’t just a political view - it’s a religious conviction. Compelling them to speak positively about a practice they consider morally wrong not only violates their conscience, but pressures them to participate in what they see as a sinful act. While the court didn’t find the Free Exercise claim as compelling here, I personally think the claim deserves more attention. Even if the law is “neutral and generally applicable,” as seen in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), when speech and religion overlap, the burden is hard to ignore.

Constitutional Analysis and Broader Implications

The constitutional tensions in Schroeder v. Treto are directly tied to both the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. What makes this case so interesting - and in my eyes, important - is the way it forces courts to reason through what counts as a “burden” on religious conscience when that burden comes through compelled professional speech instead of direct religious conduct.

Relating to Previous Decisions

This case builds on the foundation laid by National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra (2018), in which the Supreme Court held that the state could not compel pro-life clinics to post government-mandated notices about abortion services. The Court in NIFLA emphasized that even “professional speech” is protected speech, and the government cannot override that protection simply because it thinks certain information is important. The speech required by Illinois’ HCRCA amendment - especially the section the court struck down - mirrors the flawed logic in NIFLA: that the state can mandate disclosure to be ideologically loaded under the banner of “neutral information.”

In terms of religious freedom, the case also raises questions under the framework of Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which held that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if they incidentally burden religious practice. However, more recent cases like Fulton v. Philadelphia (2021) and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018) (which has been seen in a previous blog post) have chipped away at Smith, especially when laws aren’t truly neutral in practice or allow for secular exceptions. While the Illinois law might look neutral on its face, it’s religious providers who are disproportionately affected - and who are being asked to violate their core beliefs or lose legal protection. To me, this feels more targeted than incidental.

Implications for Religion and Law

The biggest implication of this case is that it tests the limits of religious conscience in a post-Dobbs landscape (Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization overturned Roe v. Wade, allowing states far more control over abortion regulation). As states regulate abortion more aggressively, they will inevitably clash with individuals and institutions that hold deeply religious objections. Cases like Schroeder remind us that these clashes aren’t just about physical conduct (like refusing to provide a service), but also about forced participation in speech and messaging.

If states can compel speech about abortion - even just in “neutral” clinical settings - this threatens the constitutional protection that insulates private religious conviction from governmental control or endorsement. The line between public regulation and private religious conviction gets more blurred, which jeopardizes the integrity of our society, which is pluralistic and built on a variety of different values. Once we accept that conscience can be overridden for the sake of "informational balance," we open the door to compelled speech in any profession where religious views diverge from state policy.

Why This Case Is Important

This case is important, to me, because it points to a deeper shift in both our laws and broader cultural dynamics. In an increasingly polarized world, courts are being asked to balance competing rights: the right to access information (and abortion), and the right to abstain from ideological expression. But constitutional protections - especially around speech and religion - don’t disappear just because the speaker works in health care.

Religious freedom doesn't just mean the right to worship; it also means the right to live out those beliefs in professional and civic life. If religious providers are forced to speak words that directly contradict their beliefs, that isn’t neutrality - it’s coercion. And when the government conditions legal protection on compliance with compelled speech, it’s effectively punishing religious dissent.

So the deeper constitutional question isn’t just whether Illinois’s law “helps” patients - the real question is whether the First Amendment stops the state from using individuals to push its own message. And based on the reasoning in NIFLA, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Fulton, the answer should be yes.

Links to Cases Referenced:

https://www.christianpost.com/news/mandate-for-pro-life-centers-to-promote-abortions-struck-down.html

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/19-1392

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-123

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1213

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-18