A state law in West Virginia requires students attending public and private schools to receive certain vaccinations before they can attend school. The law allows students to receive an exemption for medical reasons, but it does not allow exemptions for religious beliefs. This became an issue for Krystle and Anthony Perry when they chose not to vaccinate their daughter because of their Christian faith.
The Perrys believed that receiving certain vaccines would go against their religious beliefs because some vaccines were developed or tested using cell lines that originally came from aborted fetal tissue. Their daughter attended a public virtual school from home, but she was removed from the school after the Perrys were denied a religious exemption. West Virginia law only allows exemptions when there is a medical reason that prevents a student from receiving a vaccine. Since the Perrys were requesting an exemption based on their Christian faith rather than a medical reason, their daughter did not qualify. The Perrys then challenged the law by arguing that it violated their right to freely exercise their religion. This raises the main constitutional question in Perry v. Marteney: Does West Virginia’s refusal to allow religious exemptions from its vaccination requirement violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
After their daughter was removed from the virtual school, the Perrys filed a lawsuit against West Virginia officials. They asked the court to allow their daughter to return to virtual school while the case continued. The District Court sided with the Perrys and granted them a preliminary injunction, which is a temporary court order that is put in place before a final decision is made. To grant the preliminary injunction, the District Court had to consider whether the Perrys had a strong chance of winning their case.
One of the main things the District Court looked at was whether West Virginia’s vaccination law was neutral and generally applicable. This idea comes from Employment Division v. Smith, where the Supreme Court decided that a law that is neutral and generally applicable can still be constitutional even if it places a burden on someone’s religious practices. The District Court decided that West Virginia’s law was not generally applicable because the state allowed exceptions to the vaccination requirement in certain circumstances while refusing to provide an exception for the Perrys’ religious beliefs.
West Virginia disagreed with the District Court’s decision and asked a higher court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, to review the decision. The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the District Court and decided that West Virginia’s vaccination law was neutral and generally applicable. The court saw the medical exemption differently and explained that it was meant for students who could face health risks from receiving a vaccine. Because of this, the Fourth Circuit decided that allowing medical exemptions did not mean that West Virginia was also required to provide religious exemptions. The court reversed the District Court’s preliminary injunction.
Another important part of the Perrys’ argument involves the way West Virginia treats students who are educated outside of traditional public and private schools. Some homeschooled students and students attending microschools and learning pods do not need to fulfill the same vaccination requirements. The Perrys argued that this was important because their daughter was also learning from home through a public virtual school. Even though she was not physically attending a school with other students, she was still required to meet the vaccination requirement because she attended public school. The Perrys argued that the difference in treatment shows that the law is not generally applicable.
Although I understand the Perrys’ argument, I do not think the lack of a religious exemption by itself means that West Virginia’s law violates the Free Exercise Clause. The law does not appear to target religion because students are required to follow the vaccination requirement regardless of whether their reasoning is religious or nonreligious. For example, if parents opposed vaccinations for personal reasons that had nothing to do with religion, their child would still have to meet the vaccination requirement to attend public school. The law does place an indirect burden on the Perrys’ ability to exercise their religion, but I do not think it targets their religious beliefs. The state also has a strong interest in protecting public health among students who attend public schools.
However, the fact that the Perrys’ daughter attended a virtual public school makes this case more complicated. I understand that public schools are run by the government, which gives the state the ability to set requirements for students who attend them. At the same time, the Perrys’ daughter was attending school from home and was not physically around other students. If the purpose of the vaccination requirement is to protect public health and prevent the spread of disease within schools, it is harder to understand why the same requirement should apply to a virtual student. Although I understand why the state has more control over students enrolled in public schools, I do not think being enrolled in a public school alone creates the same public health concern when the student never physically attends the school. Ultimately, I do not think West Virginia’s refusal to provide religious exemptions violates the Free Exercise Clause because the law does not treat religious objections differently from nonreligious objections. My concern is not the lack of a religious exemption, but whether a vaccination requirement meant to protect public health in schools should apply to a student who attends school entirely from home.
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