Davis v. Ermold

    For backstory, the first incident in this case occurred back in 2015, when the county clerk of Louisville, Kentucky halted the issue of all marriage licenses. The clerk’s name was Kim Davis, and the stalling of all licenses stemmed from her initial refusal to issue marriage licenses to numerous same-sex couples. Davis reported that her deeply held Christian beliefs held her back from feeling comfortable enabling homosexual marriage. An important note here is that Obergefell v. Hodges, which legally permitted same-sex marriage in the same manner as opposite-sex couples in the United States, passed in a 5-4 decision back in June of 2015; the verdict from this court case came a few months before Davis v. Ermold. As a result of her refusal, Davis was ordered by a judge to unpause her distribution of licenses, sued by two of the gay couples, and later spent 5 days in jail, after defying a court order against her. After this, she lost her re-election bid in 2018 to the democratic candidate. Most recently, the Supreme Court decided unanimously on Monday (October 5) that they would not hear her case, but they would let the lower court orders against her proceed. Conservative judges Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito took the time to express their concerns on the impacts of the 2015 Obergefell v. Hodges ruling, stating that, “those with sincerely held religious beliefs concerning marriage will find it increasingly difficult to participate in society without running afoul”. Additionally, they agreed with the court’s decision to keep Davis’ case in the lower courts, expressing that it did not “cleanly present” the key issues at stake. 

    In light of the 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, Davis’ actions back in 2015 were a problematic distinction between belief and action. Before that decision, the issue of whether homosexual marriage should be allowed or not was more of a human rights opinion, since there was no legal regulations for it. Then, when the law passed, it became a topic with actual legal backing. Many situations similar to Davis’ arose as a result of this law passing; while the law suddenly viewed homosexual marriage the same as heterosexual, religious groups such as Christianity, did not. This goes back to the recently expressed concerns of judges Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, which conveyed that the legalization of gay marriage was certain to put specific religious individuals in uncomfortable situations. Here lies the crux of the issue: the distinction between belief and action. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment “embraces two concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be.” In other words, Davis is absolutely allowed to hold the personal, religious belief that marriage should be between a man and a woman. However, she is not permitted to take said value and impose it on others through different forms of action, such as using her position of power as a county clerk to deny same-sex couples the acquisition of a marriage license. Another example of distinction between belief and action is seen with religious groups who believe in polygamy; while they are free to think that a man should have multiple wives, as long as they are in America, they will not be permitted to marry multiple women at once. The bottom line is that Americans are allowed to believe whatever they please, yet, if they act on beliefs that have been deemed illegal in a court of law, they will run into trouble, just like Kim Davis did. 

    Though I am a Christian, it did not take the 2015 decision from Obergefell v. Hodges to convince me that same-sex marriage should be legalized. That being said, I want to look at the 2015 incident and 2020 decision through a legal lens. I agree that Davis refusing to distribute marriage licenses to same-sex couples on the basis of her personal beliefs was an abuse of power. During my research, I watched the video of the 2015 confrontal of Davis by one of the same-sex couples. Halfway through the argument, an individual in the back yells, “You’re forcing your religion on other people!” and someone else says “Do your job!”; I agree with both of these statements. When Davis clocks into work, she becomes a representative of Rowan County. Her job is to administer marriage licenses to couples who apply and meet the criteria; due to the decision of Obergefell v. Hodges a few months prior, distributing marriage licenses to same-sex couples was now part of her job. This being said, if Davis no longer felt as though she could uphold the duties of her job, she should have stepped down. Thinking of the 2020 decision, on one hand, I understand their reasoning for keeping the Davis case in the lower courts. On the other hand, I feel that even though the case was not a perfect example for them to make, it still would have had a good chance of passing against her on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause, her failure to complete her job requirements, and her disregard for a newly-passed law. If the case had been before 2015, similar to the Colorado baker who refused to make a same-sex couple a wedding cake in 2012, this would be a completely different case; yet this is not the case with Davis.

    What do you think? Should this case have been moved into the Supreme Court? Do you recognize other analytical categories that the Davis case applies to? I look forward to reading your viewpoint on the topic, in order to further mine.

No Spy, No Fly! (Tanzin v. Tanvir)

        In the Supreme Court’s upcoming 2020 term, they will hear the oral argument for FNU Tanzin v. Tanvir, a case involving the FBI’s “No Fly List”. Muhammad Tanvir, Jameel Algibhah and Naveed Shinwari have all been placed on the FBI’s “No Fly List” for refusing to become FBI informants. All of the men were approached by the FBI, who intended to have them spy on their local communities in their home countries. They were asked to participate in extremist events and online forums and that based on their participation alone, they would either be removed or kept on the “No Fly List”. The plaintiffs are all either citizens or permanent residents of the United States despite being born abroad and have no history of being threats to national security or aviation and no criminal records. The plaintiffs argue that their refusal to become informants was faithful to their religion. Also, one interesting note is that all three men were recently taken off the “No Fly List” but are continuing to pursue the case for damages. They continue to pursue the case as they were unable to visit family, lost work, and suffered financial and emotional distress as a result of their names being on the list.

        The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Tanvir, Algibhah, and Shinwari in 2018, however one of the dissenters, Judge Dennis Jacobs argues that this decision sets a dangerous precedent. He argues that the possibility of being held personally responsible for decisions concerning national security could have significant and damaging impacts on the actions of current and future government officials and employees.

        The primary question in this case is whether or not the Religious Freedom Restoration act of 1993 (RFRA) will allow the men to pursue money damages against individual federal employees. The RFRA is known for providing exemptions and accommodations from burdensome laws for sincerely held religious beliefs. The plaintiffs argue that by putting their names on the “No Fly List”, their free exercise of religion was violated.

        In this case, I believe that the Supreme Court should decide in favor of Tanzin. BY forcing the men to choose to betray their religion in order to be removed from the “No Fly List”, the FBI and the agents were forcing the men to choose between their religion and their freedom to travel and work. In United States v. Seeger, Daniel Seeger sought an exception from the draft citing his religious beliefs of pacifism and his belief in a “Supreme Being”. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Seeger and argued that all religions and religious beliefs should be legitimately considered whether or not they believe in a God or not. While not identical, both of these cases present the combatting issues of religious beliefs and religious loyalty clashing with service to the government. United States v. Seeger ruled that there could no be discrimination on sincere religious beliefs and stated that the Constitution grants the freedom of religion, inherently providing a benefit to religion that non-religion does not receive, touching on the issue of special rights versus neutrality under the law

        In Braunfeld v. Brown, the Supreme Court ruled that the Pennsylvania blue law requiring businesses to be closed on Sundays was not a violation of the Free Exercise of religion. Justice Warren, in the majority opinion, argued that there was no crime in believing in any religion whatsoever or pressure to conform or embrace any specific religion, according to the statute. The majority argued that the freedom to believe in any religion you want is given, but the law simply placed an indirect burden on the exercise of religion. Justice Brennan dissented on this issue, arguing that the statute forced Braunfeld to make a choice between his religion and his business. In McGowan v. Maryland, the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion that the blue laws did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as they did not infringe on their own religious practices, it simply placed an economic burden on them. However, this case is different. While in Braunfeld v. Brown, there was no coercion whatsoever to conform to another religion and the burden placed on Braunfeld was only indirect, in this case, there is a clear direct burden. By forcing the men to choose between their religion and their families, their work, and freedom to travel, there was not only an economic burden on them, but a mental one as well. I believe that this case could also be examined in the light of different religions. Would the case be viewed any differently if it were a group of Christian men who were added to the “No Fly List” and the only path to removal was spying on their churches and communities?

        However, I also believe that there is a strong counter argument to be made. Based on the decisions in the two cases mentioned above, the Supreme Court could rule based on precedent and argue that the burden placed on the men was reasonable and justifiable in the name of national security. Additionally, I found Judge Jacobs’ argument about setting a dangerous precedent for current and future government employees compelling. If individuals become liable for the actions they take given to them by their employers, I have no doubts that at least a reasonable handful of workers would question their actions while working and possibly even refuse with the fear of legal action looming over them. However, I have confidence that employees would still be willing to carry out their duties without overwhelming concern and that if there were to be a surge in legal filings, the courts would ensure that only reasonable complaints and significant issues would be accepted. Despite the aforementioned cases and other decisions and arguments made in favor of the FBI and the agent, the direct burden placed on the men to choose between their livelihood and their religion denote their pursuant of money damages legitimate under the RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

        Since this case is going to be decided by the Supreme Court, I believe that it is relevant to look at how the Supreme Court may decide the case, especially with the recent death of Justice Ginsburg. At this point, I am unsure how the Court will decide. Historically, conservative justices tend to lean on the side of the Free Exercise Clause and the rights it grants, but the main focus of the case it not on the Free Exercise Clause, but the allowance or disallowance of pursing legal action against in individual government employee. Based on the reading and research that I have done on the case; I currently suspect that the case will be decided in favor of Tanzin and the FBI, but I am interested to see the development of the case.

Is God's Help Needed to Vote?

The state of Alabama’s voter registration requires citizens to swear an oath on the voter declaration that begins with “I solemnly swear or affirm”, and ends with “so help me God”. Failure to sign this statement on the form results in being ineligible to vote. There is neither a secular alternative to acknowledging this statement, nor an option for people practicing polytheistic religions. Alabama is the only state in the US that requires citizens to make this claim in their voter registration application; “in all other states, voters are provided a completely secular registration form or are not required to submit an oath or affirmation at all”. Four Albamians are suing John Merrill, the Secretary of State in Alabama, on the premise that mandating citizens to swear “so help me God” violates the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) is also filing suit against Merrill. The voter declaration can be altered by the Secretary of State at any point in time. In the state of Alabama, registration forms were last edited in 2019. 

The lead plaintiff is Randal Cragun who has tried to register to vote since November of 2019. He brought to the light the statement under the oath that says: “If you falsely sign this statement, you can be convicted and imprisoned for up to five years”. Cragun, who identifies as an atheist, would be falsely signing the statement by accepting the “so help me God” phrase. Therefore, he could be subject to the consequences of falsely signing the statement. Furthermore, Cragun inquired about not acknowledging this portion of the voter declaration. The director of elections responded to him and announced “there is no legal mechanism to register to vote in AL without signing the oath as it is stated... If you cross out a portion, the board of registrars in your county will reject the application and ask you to resubmit”. 

The main constitutional questions this case raises are whether or not mandatory acknowledgement of the statement “so help me God” violates the Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause in the First Amendment? Like any constitutional question, the answer is debatable. One Supreme Court case drawn upon in the suit filed was West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette. This case set the precedent that the government cannot “force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief”. The state of Alabama is forcing citizens to do exactly this: profess a statement of belief. By this standard, the “so help me God” phrase does violate the First Amendment. Furthermore, this case is extremely similar to Torcaso v. Watkins. In Torcaso v. Watkins, Maryland denied Torcaso of serving a government job he was appointed because he could not declare his belief in God. The court ruled unanimously in Torcaso’s favor proclaiming that “neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person to ‘profess a belief or disbelief in any religion’”. By this ruling, the “so help me God” phrase would be deemed unconstitutional under the Establish Clause of the First Amendment. 

On the contrary, “so help me God” is comparable to the phrase “In God We Trust”. In a previous post on this blog about Butler v. Smith County, it states that “In God We Trust” and “under God” do not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Therefore this begs the question: would “so help me God” be considered constitutional as well? I believe it should not be. “Under God” and “In God We Trust” are ingrained in American society, and are merely tolerated today. Many Americans believe they are unconstitutional, but they are deemed acceptable by the Supreme Court as the mottos of our nation. However, there is no historical value in incorporating a religious phrase into the state of Alabama’s voter registration form. Failure to answer truthfully on the form can result in jail, but failure to submit the form acknowledging the phrase “so help me God” prohibits citizens from exercising their right to vote. There is no way to vote without believing in God, which is extremely unconstitutional in my opinion. It is not illegal to denounce the motto of our nation, but it would be illegal to sign the form and identify as atheist or practice a polytheistic religion. The Secretary of State is more than capable of rewording the voter declaration to exclude the religious component and allow all citizens to register to vote freely without this caveat. Alabama is the only state that forces citizens to make a religious claim, so the phrase “so help me God” is unnecessary and should be removed from the forms.

Is official prayer in public schools unconstitutional?

Is official prayer in public schools unconstitutional?

 

Sources: 

https://www.aclu.org/news/religious-liberty/no-more-forced-prayers-in-school/ 

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-sues-stop-official-prayers-promotion-religion-tennessee-school-district

https://www.wbir.com/article/news/smith-county-school-system-sued-over-first-amendment-violations-promotion-of-religion/51-322b4d89-3411-4a07-a5f6-8fb059a08389  

 

    On November 18, 2019, the American Civil Liberties 

Union of Tennessee and ACLU National filed a lawsuit against the Smith 

County Public School System on the grounds that their practice of 

regularly incorporating prayer into various school events 

was a violation of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment. 

The lawsuit was filed on behalf of 3 adults who identified as atheists and 

whose children did so as well: Kelly Butler, and Sharona and Jason Carr. 

Among the school’s practices were: school-wide dictated prayer read 

at assemblies where attendance and participation were mandatory, 

the distribution of Bibles to students in classrooms, Bible verses

read in class, prayers broadcast during sports games and rallies, 

coaches leading student athletes in prayer, and a large, painted 

cross displayed prominently on the wall of a school gymnasium. 

This case (Butler v. Smith County) was brought to a federal 

district court where it was decided in favor of the ACLU and 

their plaintiffs and against the Smith County Public School System on 

the grounds that they violated the Establishment Clause.

    

    In the view of the ACLU of Tennessee and the ACLU National, 

public, taxpayer funds were going to a public institution where 

children were being indoctrinated into a particular religion. 

This is a public school district, and therefore they must act religiously 

neutral in order to accommodate for and represent their constituents. 

If maybe there was a large Star of David displayed in a gym, or a Star 

and Crescent, etc, there would be a more specific argument for the school 

practicing neutrality (or verses from the Quran in addition to the Bible, the 

Bhagavad Gita, etc), although Courts have often found that not only can a school 

not favor one particular religion, they cannot sponsor any religion at all. 

One of  the plaintiffs, Leyna Carr (one of the children attending the school), 

cited the school’s practices as consistently awkward and uncomfortable and 

she often felt intense peer pressure to conform to a religion which she did not 

believe in. In addition to establishment concerns, the article on the ACLU website  

focuses on discrimination against the plaintiffs, citing an alienation that 

non-Christian students felt at the school. Ms. Carr said that “I respect other 

people’s religion, and I would like it if everyone else respected mine.” 

Therefore, not only are tax dollars being used to promote a particular religion, 

but those attending the school who are not a part of that religion are being 

discriminated against and pressured to convert.

   

    I found the other response to this issue by another student really interesting 

because it focused on the use of the words “In God We Trust” as the motto of 

the United States as well as the pledge of allegiance featuring words referencing 

a supreme being. I respect this angle and absolutely see where it comes from, but 

I am personally more concerned with the mandatory prayer and reading of Bible 

verses in class. 

    In my opinion, this is a classic one-two Establishment Clause violation 

punch. Certainly more than the 2 pence Madison feared is going to this school, 

it’s a public school paid for by taxpayers who are not religiously and culturally 

homogeneous. The right to proselytize is absolutely afforded to individuals 

in this country, but direct or indirect funding of that proselytizing is 

unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause because it gives a particular 

religion the financial means to evangelize, giving that religion a 

government-sanctioned advantage over others. Additionally, this 

state sponsorship of religion, in practice, oppressed religious minorities. 

Part of the reason, in my opinion, for the existence of the Free Exercise 

Clause is to counteract any feared establishment, and so therefore, when 

there is a case of the Establishment Clause being violated, free exercise 

has been violated as well. The Free Exercise Clause guarantees an individual 

the right to practice their religion in any way they see fit; it does not 

guarantee the right to impose that religion on others and evangelize in a 

public sphere using public funds. One could argue that taxpayers pay for 

all sorts of things they don't believe in, but there are specific provisions in 

our constitution enacted in order to prevent that dilemma in regards to 

publicly funded religion. Asking one to convert is different than a public 

school system practically indoctrinating children from an early age. A child’s 

greatest influences on them are often their parents, but are also frequently 

their teachers and authority figures in school. If from kindergarten to senior 

year of high school you are being compelled to pray, read Bible verses, and 

treat Christianity as a norm, there is significant cause for concern 

of indoctrination, or at the very least, a conflict with the religious values of their

homes. I disagree with Justice Scalia’s position that we are not guaranteed the right to 

not be peer pressured. The right to not be indoctrinated/peer pressured is half of the 

purpose of the Establishment Clause. A state sponsored religion is bad because it is

 using public funds to pressure or compel individuals of other faiths to convert, 

conform, or face consequences (be they social, economic, legal, or physical). If 

preventing overwhelming peer pressure isn't a part of the Establishment Clause, 

then why else is a state sponsored religion bad? Does there need to be explicitly 

violent conversion tactics before it’s unconstitutional? I fear that if we wait for 

a public school teacher to explicitly say “convert to Christianity or be punished” 

we will wait forever and allow indirect but still potent religious indoctrination 

and intense pressure to convert, all the while Madison rolls in his grave,

aghast at our lack of foresight and respect for this lesson from history: 

religious oppression starts by indirectly enforcing cultural and religious 

hegemony. This is a clear and dangerous establishment of religion. 

Minton v. Dignity Health

     In 2017, a transgender man, Evan Minton, was scheduled to have a hysterectomy at Mercy San Juan Medical Center: a hospital within the Dignity Health chain in California. Minton was diagnosed with gender dysphoria, which is considered to be a serious medical condition by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. The surgery was suddenly cancelled, however, after the hospital learned Minton was transgender. Dignity Health claims that this cancellation was due to the organization's religious purposes. On April 18, 2019, Minton along with several organizations dedicated to protecting the rights of LGBTQ+ people, filed for a lawsuit against Dignity Health, claiming that they denied medical care based on the patient’s gender identity. Their lawsuit ultimately amounted to sex discrimination against Minton.

    Minton stated, “I had no idea prior to this that my local, community hospital was a Catholic hospital, or that they would argue that religious doctrine permits them to prevent doctors from providing patients with the care they need just because those patients are transgender." Minton's doctor at Mercy San Juan Medical Center, Dr. Dawson, stated that this incident was the first time the hospital has prevented her from performing this surgery. Dignity Health, however, was open to sending Minton to another hospital to perform his surgery for him.  

    The lawsuit, filed in the state court of California, alleges that Dignity Health’s cancellation of Minton’s hysterectomy violates California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits businesses from discrimination based on sex. This includes gender identity. The San Francisco Superior Court dismissed the case, and Mr. Minton appealed. In September of 2019, however, the Court reversed Minton's dismissal, giving the lawsuit the ability to proceed in the appellate court. Two months later in December, the Supreme Court of California denied Dignity’s petition for review. 

    The main issue regarding this case is if the First Amendment rights of Dignity Health to practice their religious beliefs allow them to turn away Evan Minton because he is transgender. The case also revolves around the Unruh Civil Rights Act on the basis of discrimination against Minton.

    This is a multi-faceted case, and one that has many components to it. Dignity Health is technically a non-profit and not an official ministry of the Catholic Church. However, the organization still claims to be Catholic in their beliefs and values. Therefore, they claim to act on their beliefs in order to fulfill what they feel is their “mission.” Dignity Health actually has both Catholic Churches and Non-Catholic Churches in their chain, which have different mentalities when it comes to certain issues. The Catholic Hospitals are funded by congregations, adhering to the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. Since Dignity Health has multiple non-catholic hospitals within their chain, it can be argued that they had the right under the First Amendment to send Minton to a medical center that is not based on religious beliefs.

     The lawyer for the defense stated, “The complaint affirmatively alleges that Dignity Health accommodated Minton by immediately rescheduling the procedure at "a non-Catholic Dignity Health hospital" in Sacramento.” This fact establishes that Dignity Health simply followed a binding Catholic Doctrine. This therefore prohibited Mercy San Juan Medical Center from performing the hysterectomy, while still doing its best to accommodate Minton nonetheless. Although Minton claims in his lawsuit that he was declined service due to anti-trans sentiment, Dignity Health claims that their refusal was due to their religious obligations under this Catholic Doctrine. Dignity Health argued that as a Catholic hospital, Mercy has to follow its facially neutral ethical and religious directives for Catholic Health Care Services issued by the U.S. Conferences of Catholic Bishops. Abiding by this Doctrine is an example of Dignity Health freely exercising their religion as protected under the First Amendment. 

    However, it can be argued that since the Unruh Rights Act prohibits discrimination from any kind, Dignity Health turning away Minton from their hospital violates this classification based on this action alone. The Unruh Civil Rights Act specifically guarantees “full and equal services” to everyone. Therefore, an organization cannot turn anyone away from their services under this statute. This covers sexual orientation, which also includes gender identity or expression. One essentially has the right to express any gender they want, despite it not being assigned at birth, and still be protected by the anti-discrimination act. By way of this policy, Minton should not have been denied service by Dignity Health.

Does Maryland's No-Fault Divorce StatuteViolate One's Free Exercise of Religion?

On March 26, 2019, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, permitted Ms. Cynthia Samaha (Wife) an absolute divorce from her husband, Dr. Toufic Melki (Husband), following a twelve-month separation of the two parties. Wife, a Catholic, and Husband, an Orthodox Christian, married in Lebanon in an Orthodox Christian Church in 2009, and then moved to Montgomery County. On August 4 of 2016, Wife filed for a limited divorce. Husband lost in the trial court and progressed to summary judgement, where he testified that, because the marriage inaugurated in Lebanon, only the “Lebanese courts have jurisdiction over the divorce” and thus, Maryland’s declaration of an absolute divorce between himself and Wife infringed on his free exercise of religion to practice as an Orthodox Christian. Here, it is important to note that Lebanon, as opposed to Maryland, does not allow no-fault divorces. The circuit court rejected Husband’s reasoning, allowing an absolute divorce. Shortly after, Husband requested that the court relinquish its grant of an absolute divorce and in May of 2019 the court denied his motion.

Amongst other issues raised, the fundamental issue regarding the Milki v. Milki case is whether or not the Court’s approval of an absolute divorce between Husband and Wife infringed upon Husband’s right to free exercise of religion as protected under the First Amendment. As outlined by the Husband himself, the grant of the divorce on account of a twelve-month separation “unconstitutionally force[s] him to commit a mortal sin according to his religion” (9). According to the free exercise clause, citizens can practice religion uninhibited, with the expectation that their beliefs and traditions do not violate the law.  Provided this, an individual is not relieved of the obligation to comply with neutral laws of general applicability, even if they place an incidental burden on a particular religious activity. In Employment Division v. Smith, it was declared that the protection of the First Amendment does not grant an individual the constitutional right to ignore a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)” (9). Husband’s contention that the Court expanded the technicalities of the marriage contract in its decision to allow the absolute divorce goes against court precedent. This argument is based on the Contracts Clause in Article I of the Constitution, stating that no state shall pass a law impairing obligations in a contract. However, while marriage is classified as a civil contract, under stare decisis, the Maryland Court has to follow the holding of Maynard v. Hill, where the Supreme Court affirmed that “marriage is not a contract within the meaning of the [Contracts Clause’s] prohibition” and thus, a marriage contract “is not constitutionally protected from interference” or modification by laws respecting divorces (8). Accordingly, the legislature is allowed to legislate on the subject of divorces.

I believe that the Court’s permission of an absolute divorce to Husband and Wife on the grounds of Maryland’s Family Law Article did not infringe on Husband’s free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. While it is a violation of the First Amendment for Congress to pass a law which either establishes religion or prohibits the free exercise thereof, Employment Division v. Smith confirmed that this right “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” Therefore, Husband cannot say that his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion is infringed because Maryland has passed a valid and neutral law which says that a person can obtain a no-fault divorce based on a twelve-month separation. Maryland’s no-fault twelve month separation divorce law is clearly neutral and of general applicability and doesn’t require a compelling governmental interest because it does not single out one particular religious belief as compared to another nor does it selectively impose burdens on religious conduct.  See Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565 (2001). 

Further, the Wife, who holds different religious beliefs than Husband, and her ability to obtain a divorce through Maryland’s Family Law Article, does not directly provoke a violation of Husband’s free exercise of religion. Despite the legal judgment determining an absolute divorce, Husband’s “constitutional prerogative to believe that in the eyes of God, [he] and [his] estranged [wife] are...wedded as one...according to [his] belief and conscience”  remains preserved under the free exercise of religion clause (11). The court cannot proscribe or prescribe religious behavior, so by forcing the wife to stay married and not grant her the divorce, they are prescribing life-long behavior hinged on religion. In fact, this would be considered a violation of the Establishment Clause, as Wife would be legally bound into marriage for the sake of the Husband’s religious responsibilities. Here, the Court would be placing preference on one of the party’s religious beliefs. If the Court rejected this grant of an absolute divorce, the court, in a sense, becomes a church because they are compelling behavior based on religious principles. This behavior is permissible when someone gets married in an Orthodox Christian ceremony, because the two parties are obligated by that particular religion to follow the principles of that religion in their marriage. Conversely, if the Court was to grant/dismiss divorces using religious framework, it is clearly violating the proscription of separation of church and state and creating excessive entanglement between the church and the state, a violation of the Establishment Clause.

Furthermore, in his discussion of the Court’s impairment of the marriage contract, Husband contends that he and his Wife had an implied promise to only pursue divorce on the grounds permitted by the Orthodox Church and thus, the Court’s decision is a violation of their obligation within the marriage contract. However, as demonstrated historically and specifically in Reynolds v. United States (a case in which the Supreme Court backed a law prohibiting polgymamy), the Supreme Court is free to enact “general laws that regulate marriage, even if the application of the law interferes with some religious practices” (10).  Because the Orthodox Church, where they got married, had set forth particular grounds for divorce, which did not include no-fault divorce, Husband argued that there was an implied obligation to not have a no-fault divorce after twelve months of seperation on behalf of the religious laws of the Orthodox Church. A neutral and generally applicable law, such as Maryland’s divorce statute, does not violate the right to the free exercise of religion when it allows a no-fault divorce even if “a spouse’s religious beliefs prohibit no-fault divorces” (10). Therefore, Maryland’s no-fault divorce statute, which granted Wife an absolute divorce on no-fault grounds, does not impinge upon neither of the Husband’s exercise of free religion of the First Amendment nor the Contracts clause of the Constitution.